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When solving syllogisms, people can adopt either a spatial strategy, where spatial 
representations are used to illustrate relations between terms, or a verbal strategy 
where the problem is represented in terms of letters and relational rules (Ford, 1995). 
People with dyslexia tend to adopt a spatial strategy when solving syllogisms while 
people without dyslexia tend to adopt a verbal strategy (Bacon, Handley & McDonald, 
2007). But how fixed are these strategic approaches? This thesis examines whether 
training that focuses on verbal or spatial representations of the problems affected 
performance for people with and without dyslexia, and whether the effectiveness of 
this training varied according to whether the syllogisms were categorised as those 
easiest to solve for verbal reasoners, easiest for spatial reasoners, and equally difficult 
for both types of reasoners, based on Ford’s (1995) results. Five studies were 
conducted to compare the performance of people with dyslexia to people without 
dyslexia to examine 1) individual differences in spontaneous reasoning strategies, 2) 
effects of figure and belief bias, 3) performance after being taught a verbal strategy, 4) 
performance after being taught a spatial strategy, and 5) the pattern of eye movements 
to observe where attention is focused while solving the syllogisms.  
 The results supported previous research that people do tend to reason 
spontaneously with a verbal or spatial strategy but failed to find evidence of a 
difference between participants with dyslexia and participants without dyslexia. The 
studies further showed that participants with dyslexia are affected by the figure of the 
syllogism (the placement of the middle term in relation to the end terms). Training 
was effective in encouraging all participants to switch solution strategies, but this 




but did not promote problem solving and was not particularly helpful for the 
participants with dyslexia. It appears to make problems that are easier with a verbal 
strategy harder to solve.  
 Examination of eye movements revealed that the focus of attention during 
problem solving was more on the terms in the premises than the quantifiers. The 
pattern of eye fixations was the same regardless of the figure or problem type. There 
was an interaction between problem type x AOI, indicating a longer processing time 
for premise 2 for problems that are difficult to solve with a verbal or spatial strategy. 
 Overall, the studies suggest that there is a burden on participants with 
dyslexia in problem solving that is not alleviated by training in either spatial or verbal 
strategies, but that particular problems might be easier or harder to solve according to 
whether a spatial or verbal strategy is spontaneously used by the participant, and that 








I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Padraic Monaghan, for his patience, 
support and guidance throughout my PhD. I truly appreciate his wealth of knowledge 
and expertise in my area of study. 
Many thanks also my daughter, Whitney, for her never-ending moral support and 














TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................... 4 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... 12 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 14 
1.1. Definition of reasoning .................................................................................... 14 
1.2. Background ...................................................................................................... 15 
1.3. Mental Models ................................................................................................. 15 
1.4. Mental Logic .................................................................................................... 17 
1.5. Dual Processing ................................................................................................ 19 
1.6. Meta-reasoning ................................................................................................. 24 
1.7. Verbal v Spatial Reasoning .............................................................................. 27 
1.8. Visual Imagery ................................................................................................. 29 
1.9. Ethics ................................................................................................................ 31 
1.10. Outline of the thesis ......................................................................................... 32 
CHAPTER 2: DYSLEXIA .......................................................................................... 35 
2.1.  What is dyslexia? ............................................................................................. 35 
2.2.  Theories of Dyslexia ........................................................................................ 36 
2.2.1.  Phonological Deficit Hypothesis ...................................................................... 36 
2.2.2.  Double Deficit Hypothesis ............................................................................... 43 
2.2.3.  Automatisation ................................................................................................. 46 
2.2.4.  Magnocellular Deficit Hypothesis ................................................................... 58 
2.2.5.  Memory and Dyslexia ...................................................................................... 60 
2.3.  Learning Styles and Metacognition ................................................................ 63 




CHAPTER 3: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN REASONING STRATEGIES ..... 71 
3.1.  Introduction ...................................................................................................... 71 
3.2.  What is a reasoning strategy? ........................................................................... 73 
3.3.  Figural effects of syllogisms ............................................................................ 80 
3.4.  Belief bias ......................................................................................................... 83 
3.5.  Dyslexia and reasoning .................................................................................... 87 
3.6.  Purpose of the studies in this chapter ............................................................... 91 
3.7.  Study 1 ............................................................................................................. 93 
3.7.1.  Method ............................................................................................................. 94 
   Participants .................................................................................................. 94 
   Materials ...................................................................................................... 95 
   Design .......................................................................................................... 95 
   Procedure ..................................................................................................... 96 
3.7.2.  Results .............................................................................................................. 96 
   Accuracy ...................................................................................................... 97 
       Problem type ............................................................................................ 97 
       Figure ....................................................................................................... 99 
   Response Time .......................................................................................... 100 
       Problem Type ........................................................................................ 100 
       Figure ..................................................................................................... 101 
3.7.3.  Discussion ...................................................................................................... 104 
3.8.  Study 2 ........................................................................................................... 108 
3.8.1.  Part 1 – Sentence-Picture verification ............................................................ 109 
3.8.2.  Method ........................................................................................................... 109 




   Materials .................................................................................................... 110 
   Design and Analysis .................................................................................. 111 
   Procedure ................................................................................................... 112 
3.8.3.  Results ............................................................................................................ 113 
3.8.4 Discussion ...................................................................................................... 118 
   Sentence comprehension ........................................................................... 118 
   Picture verification .................................................................................... 118 
3.9.  Part 2 – Syllogism solving ............................................................................. 120 
3.9.1.  Method ........................................................................................................... 121 
   Participants ................................................................................................ 121 
   Materials .................................................................................................... 121 
   Design ........................................................................................................ 122 
   Procedure ................................................................................................... 122 
3.9.2.  Results ............................................................................................................ 124 
3.9.3.  Discussion ...................................................................................................... 125 
3.10.  Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 130 
3.11.  General discussion ......................................................................................... 131 
 
CHAPTER 4: VERBAL STRATEGIES ................................................................... 135 
4.1.  Similarities and differences between visual or spatial processes and verbal or 
rule-based processes in problem solving ........................................................ 135 
4.2.  Training and Strategies .................................................................................. 141 
4.3.  Study: Performance of participants with dyslexia and participants without 
dyslexia after being taught a verbal strategy for solving syllogisms ............. 148 
4.3.1.  Method ........................................................................................................... 149 




   Materials .................................................................................................... 149 
   Design ........................................................................................................ 152 
   Procedure ................................................................................................... 152 
4.3.2.  Results ............................................................................................................ 153 
4.3.3.  Additional analysis of reasoning strategy data ............................................... 159 
4.3.4.   Discussion ..................................................................................................... 162 
 
CHAPTER 5: SPATIAL STRATEGIES ................................................................... 167 
5.1.  Spatial processing strategies .......................................................................... 167 
5.2.  Study: Performance of participants with dyslexia and participants without 
dyslexia after being taught to solve syllogisms using Euler Circles .............. 178 
5.2.1.  Method ........................................................................................................... 178 
   Participants ................................................................................................ 178 
   Materials .................................................................................................... 179 
   Design ........................................................................................................ 183 
   Procedure ................................................................................................... 183 
5.2.2.  Results ............................................................................................................ 184 
5.2.3.  Additional analysis of reasoning strategy ...................................................... 189 
5.2.4.  Discussion ...................................................................................................... 191 
 
CHAPTER 6: EYE TRACKING ............................................................................... 196 
6.1.  Eye movements and problem solving ............................................................ 196 
6.2.  Insight problem solving .................................................................................. 199 
6.3.  Eye movements and embodied solutions ....................................................... 202 
6.4.  Study examining eye movements while solving syllogisms .......................... 209 




   Participants ................................................................................................ 210 
   Materials .................................................................................................... 210 
   Design ........................................................................................................ 212 
   Procedure ................................................................................................... 212 
6.4.2. Results .............................................................................................................. 214 
   Problem type x AOI .................................................................................. 214 
   Figure x AOI ............................................................................................. 219 
6.4.3. Discussion ........................................................................................................ 224 
 
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ................................................... 229 
 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................... 237 
 







LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 3.1: Overall number of correctly solved syllogisms x problem type. .............. 98 
Figure 3.2: Average solution time (in seconds) for syllogism figures. ...................... 103 
Figure 3.3: Example of abstract and concrete stimuli. ............................................... 111 
Figure 3.4: Mean response times (in seconds) for abstract/concrete x is/is not x 
match/no match x dyslexic status. ........................................................... 116 
Figure 3.5: Mean response times (in seconds) when pictures match or do not match 
affirmative and negative sentences. ........................................................ 117 
Figure 3.6: Mean response times (in seconds) for picture verification. ..................... 117 
Figure 3.7: Mean number of syllogisms solved correctly. ......................................... 125 
 
Figure 4.1: Example of Euler Circles representing ‘Some A are B’.......................... 144 
Figure 4.2: Completed example using Euler Circles. ................................................ 145 
Figure 4.3: Examples of natural deduction representations. ...................................... 145 
Figure 4.4: Example from the training booklet. ......................................................... 151 
Figure 4.5: Mean number of correctly solved syllogisms before and after training. . 155 
Figure 4.6: Mean number of correctly solved ES syllogisms in dyslexia v non-dyslexia 
before and after training. ......................................................................... 157 
Figure 4.7: Mean number of HSV syllogisms solved correctly before and after 
training. ................................................................................................... 158 
Figure 4.8: Mean number of correctly solved HSV syllogisms for participants with 
dyslexia v participants without dyslexia before and after training. ........ 158 
Figure 4.9: Mean accuracy for syllogism type. .......................................................... 160 





Figure 5.1: Example of the compass point direction task. ......................................... 173 
Figure 5.2: Example of Euler Circles representing the syllogism premise ................ 174 
Figure 5.3: Example problem from the training booklet. .......................................... 180 
Figure 5.4: Example of a participant’s workings in the post-training workbook. ..... 182 
Figure 5.5: Overall mean number of correctly solved syllogisms. ............................ 185 
Figure 5.6: Interaction between problem type x dyslexia. ......................................... 186 
Figure 5.7: Interaction between training x problem type. .......................................... 187 
Figure 5.8: Main effect of dyslexic status. ................................................................. 189 
Figure 5.9: Distribution of syllogism figures in the training booklets. ...................... 194 
 
Figure 6.1: Problems used in insight study (Knoblich et al, 2001) ............................ 201 
Figure 6.2: Presentation layout of the syllogisms during experimental trial ............. 212 
Figure 6.3: Overall looking proportion of AOI for problem type. ............................. 215 
Figure 6.4: Looking proportion for problem type x AOI. .......................................... 218 
Figure 6.5: Response times for problem type. ........................................................... 219 
Figure 6.6: Overall looking proportion for AOI of syllogism figure. ........................ 220 
Figure 6.7: Looking proportion for figure x AOI. ..................................................... 222 
Figure 6.8: Collapsed results across all AOIs for each syllogism figure. .................. 223 






LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 3.1: Syllogism figures and response biases........................................................ 81 
Table 3.2: Distribution of the figure of syllogism type x problem type ...................... 94 
Table 3.3: Proportion of correctly solved problems by level of difficulty for verbal .. 96 
Table 3.4: Proportion of correctly solved problems by Figure. ................................... 98 
Table 3.5: Response times for problem type. ............................................................ 100 
Table 3.6: Time taken to solve problems by Figure. ................................................. 100 
Table 3.7: Skewness and kurtosis of dyslexic status x figure of syllogism ............... 101 
Table 3.8: Mean response time (in secs) for sentence-picture verification task. ....... 112 
Table 3.9: Mean response times for dyslexic and non-dyslexic participants for 
affirmative and negative sentences. ........................................................... 113 
Table 3.10: Mean number of syllogisms solved correctly. ........................................ 123 
 
Table 4.1: Mean number of correctly solved syllogisms. .......................................... 154 
Table 4.2: Mean accuracy across all conditions. Standard deviation is shown in 
parentheses. ......................................................................................................... 160 
 
Table 5.1: Mean number of correctly solved syllogisms. The figure in parentheses is 
the standard deviation. ........................................................................................ 184 
Table 5.2: Mean accuracy across all conditions. Standard deviation is shown in 
parentheses. ......................................................................................................... 190 
 
Table 6.1: Looking proportion for problem type x AOI.  .......................................... 214 
Table 6.2: p-values of pairwise comparisons between problem type x AOI ............. 215 
Table 6.3: Looking proportions of figure x AOI.  ..................................................... 219 





LIST OF APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Examples of participant information sheet, consent form and  
  debrief sheets ........................................................................................ 275 
Appendix 2: List of syllogisms used in the belief bias study .................................... 282 
Appendix 3: List of syllogisms used in the pre-training workbooks and 
 in the eye tracking study ........................................................................ 283 
Appendix 4: List of syllogisms used in the post-training workbooks ....................... 284 
Appendix 5: Verbal strategy training booklet ............................................................ 285 
Appendix 6: Spatial strategy training booklet............................................................ 287 
Appendix 7: Pre-training workbook .......................................................................... 293 
Appendix 8: Post-training workbook (Verbal) .......................................................... 306 









CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Definition of reasoning 
 Reasoning is a cognitive process that involves the ability to make judgements 
and draw conclusions about things from a variety of sources. According to Bruner 
(1973), the core of reasoning is going beyond the information given at the time. Most 
of the research on reasoning has tended to focus on the nature of the task rather than 
the nature of the reasoner, or more specifically, individual differences in reasoning. In 
a pioneering study, Ford (1995) suggested that people solve problems in very different 
ways. She identified two groups of reasoners – verbal and spatial. She found 
verbal reasoners tended to treat syllogisms like mathematical problems, re-writing 
them as equations, substituting words with letters and using arrows to indicate 
relationships between the terms of the premises. Spatial reasoners, on the other hand, 
tended to use shapes in different spatial relationships to represent different classes and 
their relationships.  
 Further, Bacon, Handley and MacDonald (2007) demonstrated that people 
with dyslexia tend to adopt a spatial strategy, while people without dyslexia tend to 
adopt a verbal strategy. My thesis further explores these differences in strategy, 
comparing the performance of people with dyslexia and people without dyslexia. In 
particular, in a series of studies I examine the way people with dyslexia and people 
without dyslexia reason when solving syllogisms and the effects of training to solve 
them with a different strategy. The aim of my research is to contribute to the 
understanding of reasoning, strategy selection and problem solving, and the 






 A long-standing and commonly-used paradigm used in the study of reasoning 
is the task of solving syllogisms. A syllogism consists of a pair of premises presented 
to a participant who then has to either deduce a conclusion based on those premises 
(production task) or decide if the conclusion given is valid or invalid (evaluation task). 
The validity of a logical argument is not affected by whether its premises and 
conclusions are, in fact, true or false. Take the following example:  
  All cats are fish 
   All fish have gills 
   Therefore, all cats have gills 
 Even though one of its premises (All cats are fish) is obviously false, the other 
premise (All fish have gills) is obviously true, and the conclusion (Therefore, all cats 
have gills) is obviously false, the argument is still logically valid. Different theories 
have been proposed to describe the process of human reasoning. Three main theories 
and their proponents are Mental Models (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), Mental 
Logic (Braine & O’Brien, 1998) and Dual Processing (Evans, 1989). 
 
1.3. Mental Models 
 According to Mental Models theory, an abstract representation is first created 
of members of a set in a spatial array and this is used to determine a conclusion 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). The process is proposed to follow a pattern: 
1) A simple model is constructed based on the premises identified, and then a 




2) A further model is constructed in order to falsify the conclusion. If no 
falsifying evidence is found, the conclusion is accepted. 
3) If the conclusion is falsified, there is an attempt to identify a new conclusion 
that is compatible with the initial models. If none is found, then a decision of 
no valid conclusion is accepted. 
4) Steps 2 and 3 are repeated as necessary until a reasonable conclusion is found. 
 
 Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) found that, when asked to solve syllogisms, 
people tended to accept conclusions that matched the form of one of the premises, 
regardless of whether or not the conclusion was valid. In such instances, valid 
conclusions are accepted as necessary without the investigation of possible alternative 
solutions, whereas invalid conclusions require construction of an alternative falsifying 
model to be refuted (Hardman & Payne, 1995; Stupple & Ball, 2007). 
 The process of searching for counter examples (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984) 
or fleshing out of initially implicit mental models (Johnson-Laird & Byrne 2002) is 
effortful, error prone, and constrained by working memory capacity. Mental Models 
theory argues that sources of difficulty in syllogistic reasoning are due to the number 
of possible models that can be considered at the validation stage, as well as the figure 
of the syllogism at the description stage (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Stupple and 
Waterhouse (2009) suggest that these factors burden working memory, and the 
amount of difficulty is dependent on the number of rules required to complete an 
analysis. The greater the number of rules the greater the demand on working memory 
and the more likely an error will occur.  
 Working memory refers to the processes involved in control, regulation and 




system consisting of the central executive that coordinates activities of two 
subsidiaries or ‘slave’ systems, the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological loop 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley & Logie, 1999). The phonological loop processes 
spoken and written information. The visuospatial sketchpad processes visual or spatial 
information. The central executive does not have the ability to store information but it 
directs attention to either the phonological loop or the visuospatial sketchpad. There is 
also an episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000a) that is described as a back-up store that 
communicates with long-term memory and the components of working memory. 
 The role of working memory in reasoning with syllogisms has been 
investigated mainly using dual task paradigms where participants perform a secondary 
task, such as simple pattern tapping or random number generation, designed to engage 
the various components of working memory. The idea being that disruption of the 
primary task can highlight which component of working memory the reasoner is using 
to solve the problem at hand. Vandierendonck and De Vooght (1997) found that 
tapping in a spatial pattern, shadowing a random pattern, or a memory load task such 
as repeating a string of digits, impaired performance of the visuo-spatial subsystem of 
working memory when reasoning on linear syllogisms. On the other hand, Toms, 
Morris and Ward (1993) found that repeating a string of digits affected performance 
on conditional syllogism whereas tapping tasks had no effect. Gilhooly, Logie, 
Wetherick and Wynn (1993) found a similar effect for categorical syllogisms. 
 
1.4. Mental Logic 
 Mental Logic argues that human beings reason through an innate system of 
formal rules of logic which are abstract and general purpose in nature (Braine & 




to the premises in order to draw out any relevant information. Any new information is 
added to the existing information in memory and then reassessed. This process is 
repeated until a conclusion is formed or the rules are exhausted. Braine and O’Brien 
(1998) distinguish between direct rules of inference, which are applied effortlessly and 
accurately, and indirect rules, which require conscious effort and are much more error 
prone. Some conclusions are easier to deduce than others because they are direct 
rather than indirect (Braine, Reiser & Rumain, 1984), or made forwards (production 
tasks in which answers are generated from the premises) rather than backwards 
(evaluation tasks which involve proving the conclusion can be made from the 
premises given) (Rips, 1983). In terms of syllogistic problem solving, a production 
task is one where the reasoner is given both premises and asked to come up with a 
conclusion (whether valid or invalid) based on the relationship between the terms of 
the premises or determine that there is no valid conclusion. An evaluation task is one 
where a reasoner is given the conclusions from both premises and asked to determine 
if the conclusion is valid or not valid. 
 A drawback with mental logic is that it cannot explain many of the findings in 
the experimental literature, such as belief bias (this will be discussed later), so 
theorists have proposed the operation of pragmatic reasoning schemas as well (Rips, 
1994). Markovits and Nantel (1989) suggest a two-stage process in which reasoners 
first generate possible conclusions from the premises and then evaluate them. The first 
stage employs innate logical rules, while the second stage employs the use of 
knowledge already held about the terms in the premises. Using both production and 
evaluation tasks, Markovits and Nantel (1989) presented participants with two sets of 
syllogisms: neutral syllogisms designed to produce conclusions about which they had 




is a YOF, not a YOF, or not certain that it is a YOF or not), and positive syllogisms 
designed to produce conclusions which were unbelievable but logically valid (e.g., All 
mammals walk, Whales are mammals, therefore whales walk). The same forms were 
used in both production and evaluation conditions. Belief scores consisted of one 
point for each believable conclusion judged as valid or each unbelievable conclusion 
judged as invalid for evaluation tasks, and one point for each logically invalid but 
believable conclusion or logically valid but unbelievable conclusion for production 
tasks. 
 The results showed that belief scores were higher for positive forms than for 
neutral forms in both production and evaluation tasks. Analysis of the written 
responses indicated that subjects generated conclusions through inferential reasoning 
from the premises, and subsequent evaluation of those conclusions resulted in the 
introduction of real-world knowledge. This study provides evidence that subjects may 
resort to their beliefs when faced with uncertainty about a conclusion. However, the 
possibility exists that people either misinterpret or incompletely interpret the material 
and they reason logically, or they do not use complete or logical operations (Evans, 
1989). Dual Processing theory provides an explanation for this. 
 
1.5. Dual Processing 
 The current view of the dual process theory is there are two types of processes, 
Type 1 and Type 2 (Evans, 2018, 2019). Type 1 processing is defined as fast and 
autonomous and does not rely on working memory. It functions unconsciously to 
generate what are considered intuitive solutions to a problem (Bago & DeNys, 2017; 
Evans, 2018). It has been suggested that Type 1 processes may be influenced by 




controlled. It functions consciously and comes into play when analytic thinking and 
reasoning is required. It requires working memory and is focused on cognitive 
decoupling and mental simulation, which are important aspects of analytic thinking. 
Cognitive decoupling is the act of separating concepts into distinctive parts and 
thinking of them abstractly. The fast and intuitive nature of Type 1 processing can 
lead to incorrect solutions. Type 2 processing takes over when there is uncertainty and 
conflict which results in the need to seek alternative solutions. Evans (2019) suggests 
that Type 1 is the default process and Type 2 processing serves two purposes, the 
default process to support the Type 1 response and to provide further reasoning should 
the Type 1 response fail or does not sufficiently answer the question at hand. Rather 
than simply taking over the reasoning process if the initial solution is inadequate, 
Type 2 process first tries to justify that response before attempting to seek an 
alternative solution. 
 Type 1 and Type 2 processes are often described using the same terms as 
previous versions of the dual process theory, ‘intuitive’ or ‘heuristic’ vs. ‘deliberate’ 
or ‘analytical’ (Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). Earlier versions of the dual process theory 
of reasoning (Evans, 1989) distinguished between heuristic and analytic processes.  
Heuristic processes are automatic, associative, unconscious, and undemanding of 
executive working memory capacity; while analytic processes are consciously 
controlled, deliberate and effortful (Gillard, Van Dooren, Schaeken & Verschaffel, 
2009). It was suggested that the heuristic system focused on the surface features of a 
problem, those features that appear at first glance to be relevant, while the analytic 
system is time-consuming and sequential, and operates on ‘decontextualised’ 
representations (Gillard et al., 2009). This means that when a person is trying to solve 




then try to match their solution to the original premises. If they are unable to generate 
a reasonable conclusion, they resort to analytic processes to work on those selected 
features of the problem. Heuristic processes seem to initially take precedence over 
analytic processes which are recruited only if further analysis of the problem is 
required. Since analytic processes can only be applied to selected features, biases will 
occur when either logically relevant information is excluded or when logically 
irrelevant information is included by heuristic processing (Evans, 1989). In other 
words, while heuristics often provide correct solutions, they can bias reasoning in 
situations where more complex, analytic processing is needed (Evans, 2006). 
 The heuristic system was thought to rely on prior knowledge about the factors 
involved with or related to a problem in order to generate a solution (Sloman, 1996). 
Similar to the Mental Models theory, the heuristic system creates a representation or 
image of the problem to be solved. The heuristic system processes the problem based 
on whatever related information already resides in the problem solver’s mind. Thus, 
problem solving and reasoning may initially be limited by a person’s prior beliefs. 
However, sometimes the heuristic and analytic systems will conflict and cue different 
responses (Gillard et al., 2009), and a correct response can be found only when the 
analytic system overrides the heuristic system and the reasoner purposely tries to 
generate alternative solutions. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) suggest people often 
use shortcut heuristics rather than logical reasoning when they think about the 
probabilities of everyday events. In other words, solutions are based on the heuristic 
system working on the surface features of problems, rather than attempting to reason 
logically with the analytic system. This reduces the cognitive demands but increases 




 Research has shown that under severe time pressure (Evans & Curtis-Holmes 
2005) and concurrent working memory load (De Neys, 2006) reasoners shift from 
logical reasoning to belief-biased reasoning. When time and cognitive resources are 
limited, only heuristic processes are used, leading to a greater likelihood of errors. 
Rather than search for a valid link between the premises and a conclusion, a 
conclusion is accepted based on its believability (Evans, Handley & Bacon, 2009). 
This can also lead to more matching as this would be less cognitively demanding for 
the reasoner. Stupple and Ball (2008) have further suggested there may be a parallel 
dual process model for belief-biased syllogisms in which heuristic and analytic 
processes work alongside each other.  
 Another factor thought to affect reasoning is the amount of information 
presented at one time to the problem solver. Gilhooly (2005) has argued that when 
cognitive loads increase, participants tend to use less cognitively demanding strategies 
such as matching, therefore an increase in the frequency of matching responses can be 
expected when more demanding negated premises are presented.  Matching occurs 
when participants select conclusions that have the same quantifier as one of the 
premises. The most conservative quantifier, the one with the easiest fit, is selected, 
and matching is more likely to take place when the same quantifier is featured in both 
premises (Wetherick, 1989; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1995).  
 Franssens and De Neys (2009) demonstrated that a load task affected 
performance on problems that required analytic reasoning, but it did not affect 
performance on problems for which heuristic reasoning was adequate. A load task is 
an additional task designed to take working memory resources away from the 
experimental task at hand. In their study, participants solved three types of base-rate 




member of the smallest group within a sample), congruent (base-rate and description 
pointed to the same answer), and neutral (non-stereotypical description). Base-rate 
neglect refers to the phenomenon where people ignore a much more likely probability 
of a fact or event in favour of a much less likely, but more attractive option 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Half of the participants were required to solve the 
problems under a secondary load which was a recall task, the aim being to limit 
cognitive resources that could be directed towards the problem solving task. Results 
showed that load manipulation only affected performance on the problems that 
required analytic reasoning: incongruent (47% no load, 35% load) and neutral (94% 
no load, 80% load). It did not affect the congruent problems (98% no load, 97% load) 
where heuristic reasoning was sufficient. This provides further support for the dual 
process theories that analytic reasoning is resource demanding, whereas heuristic 
reasoning is not. Thompson (2006) suggests that heuristic responses to reasoning 
problems are accompanied by a certain feeling of rightness or intuition and the 
strength of these feelings determines whether or not analytic responses are used. It has 
been suggested that both systems may simply be operating on a continuum 
(Cleeremans & Jimenez, 2002), where the quality of representation lies on a 
continuum and as the quality of the representation increases, there is a corresponding 
progression in the type of learning from implicit to explicit to automatic. Cleeremans 
and Jimenez (2002) refer to it as the dynamic graded continuum (DGC), where the 
role of consciousness changes for each type of learning (Cleeremans, Detrecqz & 
Boyer, 1998). Rather than separate systems, DGC is viewed as different levels of the 
same system. Representations allow the cognitive system to monitor the intermediate 




they need to be active enough to gain strength, become stable in time, and be 
sufficiently distinctive (O’Brien & Opie, 1999; O’Reilly & Munkata, 2000). 
 Osman (2004) compared dual process theories with the DGC system. She 
claims that the dual processing theory (Evans & Over, 1996), the dual-system theory 
(Sloman, 1996) and the two-systems theory (Stanovich & West, 2000) share some 
similarities in the way they are described: System 1 which is associative, automatic 
and fast, and System 2 which is rule-based, deliberate, flexible and slow. Osman 
argues that dual processing theories do not adequately explain the range of processes 
identified in studies of reasoning, and the terms implicit/explicit and automatic are 
used interchangeably, whereas DGC distinguishes between the two. Implicit reasoning 
involves making inferences without being consciously aware of them, explicit 
reasoning is having an awareness of inferences that are made, and automatic reasoning 
results from interacting with information until it becomes familiar. Osman (2004) 
further suggests that certain types of reasoning have been misclassified by dual 
process theorists as implicit and should instead be classed as automatic reasoning.  
 Various theories imply that the reasoning process is governed by one universal 
system (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) or the application of logical mental rules 
(Rips, 1994). There is a growing body of research that suggests that reasoning 
strategies are influenced by individual differences. 
 
1.6. Meta-reasoning 
 A reasoner’s level of confidence also plays a part in the reasoning process. The 
basis for the level of confidence is metacognition, the reasoner’s awareness and 
understanding of their thought processes and a feeling of rightness (Ackerman & 




whether a conclusion is accepted as valid or invalid, regardless of whether the 
conclusion is correct or incorrect. Borne out of the concept of dual processing, it has 
been suggested that metacognition and the feeling of rightness are both elements of 
fast and autonomous Type 1 processing (Thompson, 2009; Thompson et al., 2011). A 
poor feeling of rightness signals to the reasoner that further processing is required then 
Type 2 processing is engaged, thereby increasing the likelihood that the original 
answer will be changed. De Neys (2010; 2014) has demonstrated that people can 
identify when they have made a mistake in reasoning. Factors that might trigger a 
poor feeling of rightness include conflicting answers (Thompson & Johnson, 2014) 
and unfamiliar terms in the problems (Markovits, Thompson, & Brisson, 2015). A 
feeling of rightness signals to the reasoner that no further processing is required, and 
the conclusion is accepted (Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson, Evans, & Campbell, 
2013; Thompson & Johnson, 2014). A strong feeling of rightness and greater 
confidence is engendered when an answer comes to mind quickly, even if the answer 
is not quite right (Thompson et al., 2013; Ackerman & Zalmanov, 2012; Thompson & 
Morsanyi, 2012). 
 Meta-reasoning is responsible for the regulation of thought processes, as well 
as the allocation of attention and time towards problem solving (Ackerman 
&Thompson, 2017 & 2018; Thompson et al., 2011). The mechanisms involved in the 
process operate at two levels. The objective level identifies the separate parts of the 
problem and the expected outcome, generates an initial autonomous response, initiates 
analytic processing if necessary, and then generates an answer. The monitoring level 
assesses current knowledge and potential reasoning strategies, produces an initial 




and then provides a judgement of solvability (Ackerman & Beller, 2017; Payne & 
Duggan, 2011), a decision to seek help or not, or conclude there is no solution. 
Prior knowledge, past experiences and beliefs influence how people reason and solve 
problems. Beliefs can distort interpretation of information and influence the deductive 
process (Garnham & Oakhill, 1994) and pre-existing beliefs may indeed influence the 
perception of new or additional data (Kormblith, 1993). The reliability of the 
monitoring process is dependent on how accurately these factors treat the nature of the 
problem at hand (Koriat, 1997). The monitoring process assesses the reasoner’s level 
of certainty about their progress in solving the problem and determines the likelihood 
of success. 
 Markovits, Thompson and Brisson (2015) suggest that confidence is based on 
cues from experiences associated with problem solving, such as fluency. Fluency 
creates a sense of positivity (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001) for the reasoner and is a 
strong predictor of feeling of rightness (Thompson et al., 2011). It increases the 
probability that the reasoner will reconsider a conclusion and change it. As far as 
confidence is concerned, fluency does not discriminate between correct and incorrect 
answers (Ackerman & Zalanov, 2012). Markovits et al. (2015) examined how people 
evaluate their level of confidence in deductive reasoning. They hypothesised that a) 
representations of logical validity are the same across various contexts and confidence 
should be higher for logically correct than incorrect responses for both familiar and 
abstract problems, b) the evaluation of a conclusion is based on how congruent it is to 
their prior knowledge or beliefs, and c) the evaluation changes as a function of the 
characteristics of the problem at hand. The characteristics of a problem are 
incorporated into the reasoning process when they are available (Markovits, Lortie 




 Participants were presented with three inferential problems in four logical 
forms: one problem with conditional relations in the major premise, one abstract 
problem with nonsense terms, and two problems with causal conditional premises. 
They were first given a brief description of what is involved in making logical 
inferences but with no information about the content of the problems. They were then 
asked to evaluate their confidence in providing logical responses. They were asked to 
rate their confidence in their responses immediately after the experimental trials. 
The results revealed that confidence was higher for familiar premises than for abstract 
premises regardless of the logical correctness of the answers, suggesting that the 
ability to make decisions on the basis of prior knowledge promotes confidence 
(Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006) and the meta-reasoning monitoring process is 
inferential and based on cues from the problem itself (Costermans, Lories, & Ansay, 
1992; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001). In addition, when the material is familiar to the 
reasoner, a judgment of confidence is influenced by the characteristics of the problem 
at hand, so was higher when the characteristics were more congruent with their prior 
knowledge and lower when they were not congruent. 
 
1.7. Verbal versus Spatial Reasoning 
 Ford (1995) suggests that it is wrong to treat everyone as if they reason in the 
same way. She identified two groups of reasoners – verbal and spatial. In her study, 
twenty participants were presented with 27 syllogisms with valid conclusions and 
asked to solve them, speaking their thoughts out loud and also showing their workings 
in a workbook. The syllogisms contained distinct terms such as vegetarians and 
gymnasts, and common terms such as lawyers. The results showed that verbal 




as equations, substituting words with letters and using arrows to indicate relationships 
between the terms of the premises. They appeared to be using rules that are similar to 
modus ponens and modus tollens (see Ford 1995, pg 21 for an explanation of the 
rules).  Spatial reasoners, on the other hand, tended to use shapes in different spatial 
relationships to represent different classes and their relationships. They used 
representations where the class itself was represented rather than the members of the 
class. Many of the spatial reasoners drew shapes that were similar to Euler circles to 
denote classes while at the same time, Ford notes, keeping the verbal tag of the 
syllogism in their mind. Some participants even appeared to use a combination of both 
strategies. 
 Verbal and spatial participants seemed to be affected differently by the forms 
of syllogisms. For example, in the case of constrained syllogisms such as All/None, 
where the first premise begins with ‘All’, the second begins with ‘None’, spatial 
reasoners appeared to examine the relationship between the terms in one premise and 
then add the third term from the other premise, ensuring it had the correct relationship 
with the term that was in common with the other premise. Their performance was 
worse on less constrained syllogisms such as All/Some, where the first premise begins 
with ‘All’, the second begins with ‘Some’, though not significantly so. In contrast, 
verbal reasoners demonstrated near perfect performance on less constrained 
syllogisms. In different form syllogisms, None/Some and None/All, spatial reasoners 
performed worse (20-46.7% correct) than verbal reasoners (6.3-73.3% correct). In the 
case of syllogisms containing premises Some X are not Y there was a tendency for 
participants to take it to mean that some X are Y. These were difficult for both verbal 




 For symmetric syllogisms where the correct conclusion had the same form as 
one of the premises but where either order of the terms in the conclusion was correct, 
for example “All politicians are potters, Some of the politicians are chess players, 
Therefore some of the potters are chess players (or some of the chess players are 
potters)”, results were similar to that observed by Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984): 
Verbal participants tended to produce a conclusion in the same form as one of the 
premises, and to keep the A or C term of that premise in the same position in the 
conclusion (93.3% of correct responses belonged to the same form, same position 
category; 6.7% same form, different position). Spatial participants did not show a 
similar effect (43.5% same form, same position; 52.2% same form, different category; 
4.3% different form). In contrast, spatial participants showed an effect of position for 
the non-symmetric figures (89% same form, same position; 5.5% same form, different 
position; 5.5% different form). Verbal participants were affected to a lesser extent 
(71.9% same form, same position; 7% same form, different position; 21.1% different 
form). Ford proposes this effect may depend on which rule the verbal participants 
were trying to apply. The verbal participants in Ford’s (1995) study seemed to not be 
reasoning with mental models, and the spatial participants appeared to be using a type 
of representation but not what Johnson-Laird described (1983).  
 
1.8. Visual Imagery 
 In order to reason spatially, participants need to be able to construct visual 
reconstructions of the problem, likely requiring visual imagery. Shaver, Pierson, and 
Lang (1975) reported that the performance on three-term series problems (see DeSoto, 
London & Handel, 1965) depends on the type of materials and instructions presented, 




found that materials rated as easy to imagine led to fewer errors in verbal reasoning (at 
least if the material is related to knowledge). In contrast, several studies found no 
effect of imageability on reasoning (Sternberg, 1980; Richardson, 1987; Johnson-
Laird, Byrne, & Tabossi, 1989). An important consideration is what type of image a 
person holds in their mind and how this affects their decision making. Based on the 
Mental Models theory, a person first creates an image in their mind. The image will 
most likely be based on their impression of the premises concerned. So, if the 
premises presented use concrete objects, the resulting image will be of those objects. 
Therefore, if the objects have an explicit meaning for that person, the mental 
representations or images will relate to the meaning of those objects.  
 According to Knauff and Johnson-Laird’s visual imagery impedance 
hypothesis (2002), irrelevant visual detail evoked by the relationship between terms 
can impede the reasoning process. For example, take the phrase “the hat is dirtier than 
the cup”. It is easy to visualize a dirty cup in varying degrees of dirtiness. However, 
the resulting image contains a large amount of information that is irrelevant to the 
transitive inference (understanding of the relationship between two objects by 
knowing the relationship of each to a third object). For example, irrelevant 
information may be the style of the hat or design of the cup, or even the nature of the 
dirt on the cup or the hat. The large number of possible images puts unnecessary load 
on working memory. The reasoner has to determine what information is relevant but 
might be distracted by irrelevant visual details or images. There are four main types of 







1) Visuospatial relations, such as above and below, which are easy to envisage 
visually and spatially. 
2) Visual relations, such as cleaner and dirtier, which are easy to envisage 
visually but hard to envisage spatially. 
3) Spatial relations, such as ancestor of and descendant of, which are hard to 
envisage visually but easy to envisage spatially. 
4) Control relations, such as better and worse, which are hard to envisage either 
visually or spatially.  
 
 When confronted with any one of these types of relations, the inferential 
system has to sift out the irrelevant from the relevant factors from information 
presented. In a series of three experiments (Knauff & Johnson-Laird, 2002), visual 
relations were shown to slow down the process of reasoning in comparison with 
control relations, whereas visuospatial and spatial relations affected the reasoning 
process similarly to that of control relations. Knauff and Johnson-Laird (2002) argue 
that if a relation yields a model that is relevant to an inference, it should speed up 
reasoning; in comparison to those that elicit neither images nor spatial relations. 
 
1.9. Ethics 
 Ethics approval for the studies in this thesis was granted by the Lancaster 
University Research Support Office. There were three ethics applications as follows: 
- Chapter 3: Syllogism solving (Study 1) and Sentence-Picture verification 
(Study 2). 
- Chapter 4 (Verbal strategy training) and Chapter 5 (Spatial strategy training). 




 In all studies, participants were asked to read an information sheet explaining 
the tasks they would be undertaking, that they had the right to withdraw at any time 
without having adverse consequences and no explanation needed to be given. They 
were then asked to sign a consent form indicating that involvement in this study was 
of their own free will and if they were unsure about anything mentioned in the form 
then they could ask the researcher present for help. After the experimental trials they 
were given a debriefing sheet explaining the outline of the study and that their 
personal data (name and age) would be immediately separated from the experimental 
data and it would not be possible to link this data back to them. See Appendix 1 for 
copies of the information sheets, consent form, and debriefing sheets. 
 
1.10. Outline of the thesis 
 As this thesis focuses on strategies in reasoning for people with dyslexia, 
Chapter 2 describes the theoretical background to dyslexia. It reviews learning styles 
and metacognition of people with dyslexia, and how structure and presentation of 
teaching materials and classes impacts upon their educational experiences. 
 Chapter 3 examines individual differences among reasoners. There are 
different strategies used by individuals in problem solving. Key strategies involve 
spatial or verbal strategies. People with dyslexia tend to use spatial strategies but can 
be affected by visual noise in their problem solving. However, certain problems are 
solved more effectively by spatial than verbal strategies, according to Ford (1995), 
and this has not yet been taken into account in terms of people’s strategic preferences. 
Furthermore, we do not yet know if we can influence people’s strategy use. If a spatial 
strategy is more appropriate for certain people, is it effective to train them in that 




strategy particularly useful for those types of problems? This thesis investigates these 
issues in a series of experimental studies with people with and without dyslexia. 
 The syllogisms used in chapters 3, 4 and 5 were selected from those identified 
by Ford (1995) as easiest for spatial reasoners, easiest for verbal reasoners and equally 
difficult for both types of reasoners. The rationale for this is to determine which types 
of syllogisms might be made easier or more difficult to solve using different 
strategies. For example, a syllogism that is deemed easy for verbal reasoners should 
be made even easier with a verbal strategy. If a reasoner is using inappropriate 
strategies can they be taught to reason in a different way to their natural inclination. 
Would it be easy or difficult for a reasoner to switch to a different way of working? In 
particular, how does the performance of participants with dyslexia compare to the 
performance of participants without dyslexia? Will forcing a verbal strategy flummox 
the participants with dyslexia because of their phonological deficit (Snowling, 2000) 
or will they outshine their counterparts without dyslexia if learning a spatial strategy 
did indeed enhance their style (Bacon et al., 2007) or play to their visuospatial skills 
(Von Karolyi et al., 2003; Galaburda, 1993)? 
 Chapter 3 examines individual differences in reasoning strategies, individual 
differences in strategy in combining spatial and verbal information, and observing 
figural effects as well as belief bias, focusing on the difference between participants 
with dyslexia and participants without dyslexia. This chapter features two studies. The 
first study investigates strategy selection and figural effects with all 27 syllogisms 
with a valid conclusion, but separated into three categories as per chapters two, three 
and four. The second study examines belief bias with a sentence-picture verification 




 Chapter 4 compares the performance of participants with dyslexia and people 
without dyslexia after being taught a rule-based strategy for solving syllogisms. The 
strategy was based on the algorithm from Stenning and Yule (1998). It was expected 
that reasoners who would naturally process syllogisms primarily in a spatial or visual 
manner would likely experience difficulty when expected to work through a specified 
series of verbal or rule-based steps to reason out a conclusion.  
  Chapter 5 compares the performance of people with dyslexia and people 
without dyslexia after learning to solve syllogisms using a spatial strategy, more 
specifically a method based on Euler Circles. The hypothesis of this study was that if 
people with dyslexia are predominantly spatial reasoners (Bacon & Handley, 2010) 
they would perform better on problems that are easiest for spatial reasoners than on 
problems that are easiest for verbal reasoners.  
 Chapter 6 observes the use of eye tracking to ascertain the focus of attention of 
reasoners while solving syllogisms, and to identify if the pattern of eye movements 
was influenced more by the level of difficulty or the figure of the syllogism. It 
examines the different patterns of attentional focus/information processing according 
to problems that are solved with a spatial versus a verbal strategy. Each syllogism was 
separated into eight areas of interest, one for each of the quantifiers and terms in each 
premise. Treating each quantifier and term as a separate area of interest made it 
possible to track which part of the premise attention was allocated to at any point 
during the experimental trials.  
 Chapter 7 provides a summary and conclusion of my thesis, shows how my 
work has added to the existing body of knowledge about reasoning strategies and how 





CHAPTER 2: DYSLEXIA 
  
2.1.  What is dyslexia? 
 
 The International Dyslexia Association defines dyslexia as “one of several 
distinct learning disabilities. It is a specific language-based disorder of constitutional 
origin characterised by difficulties in single word coding, usually reflecting 
insufficient phonological processing abilities. It is manifested by a variable difficulty 
with different forms of language, including, in addition to a problem with reading, a 
conspicuous problem with acquiring proficiency in writing and spelling” (Snowling, 
2000). 
 Dyslexia affects around 5-10% of the population. It is generally associated 
with reading and spelling difficulties, poor short-term memory, poor concentration, 
poor performance in recalling the visual image of a word, the sequence of letters in 
spelling, or numbers and signs in maths, poor motor integration, directional confusion, 
and problems with sequencing and organisation. People with dyslexia have difficulty 
with tasks that require short-term memory processing such as mental arithmetic, 
writing and learning new information (Ramus & Szenkovits, 2008; Snowling, 2000).  
It has become widely accepted that dyslexia is the consequence of a phonological 
deficit, the way the brain codes or ‘represents’ the spoken attributes of words 
(Snowling, 2000). One of the main characteristics of phonological deficit is 
phonological awareness which is the ability to consciously access and manipulate 
phonological representations of words (Ramus, Rosen, Dakin, Day, Castellote, White 
& Frith, 2003; Wagner and Torgesen, 1987). Ramus and Szenkovits (2008) suggest 
that the phonological deficit surfaces only as a function of certain task requirements, 




 This chapter describes the theoretical background to dyslexia. It reviews 
learning styles and metacognition of people with dyslexia, and how structure and 
presentation of teaching materials and classes impacts upon their educational 
experiences. 
 
2.2. Theories of Dyslexia 
 
2.2.1. Phonological Deficit Hypothesis 
 
 A phonological deficit is an impairment in the ability to access phonological 
representations of words. The phonological deficit hypothesis posits that 
developmental dyslexia is language-specific and is a manifestation of a disorder in the 
speech processing system (Frith, 1985; Snowling, 2000; Stanovich, 1988). Research 
suggests that phonological representations in people with dyslexia are degraded and 
not distinct enough (Mody, Studdert-Kennedy & Brady, 1997; Snowling, 2000), 
coarsely coded, under-specified or noisy (Elbro, 1996; Hulme & Snowling, 1992). 
Wagner and Torgesen (1987) cite three main characteristics of phonological deficit: 
 
a) Poor phonological awareness which involves conscious access, attention to 
and manipulation of phonological representations and their sub-units. This can 
be detected through phoneme deletion tasks. 
b) Poor verbal short term memory, which involves the storage of words for a 
short period of time in phonological buffers or cycling them through the 
phonological loop during processing. This can be detected through digit span 




c) Slow lexical retrieval, which involves the retrieval of lexical phonological 
representations from long term memory. This can be detected through rapid 
automatic naming tasks. 
 
 To gain a better understanding of the phonological deficit in dyslexia, 
Szenkovits and Ramus (2005) used words and nonwords to examine lexical and 
sublexical representations in university students with and without dyslexia. Their 
study consisted of six experiments with two experimental tasks, repetition and 
auditory comparison, as well as a control auditory comparison task. The stimuli were 
either words that required lexical and sublexical representations or nonwords that 
required only sublexical representations. The control auditory suppression task was 
articulatory suppression which was used to prevent participants from explicitly 
rehearsing the words or nonwords while performing the experimental tasks.  
 In experiments 1 and 2, participants were required to repeat each sequence of 
words or nonwords that ranged in length from 3 to 8 words as accurately as possible in 
the correct order. The words were presented in four sequences per block for a total of 
8 blocks. In experiments 3 and 4, participants were required to listen to two sequences 
of nonwords presented by a male and a female speaker. Each sequence was separated 
by one second of unintelligible babble designed to prevent participants from relying 
on echoic memory and to encode the stimuli at the phonological representational 
level. The sequences that ranged in length from 3 to 8 words were presented in 12 
blocks per trial, half were the same (included two identical sequences) and half were 
different (included sequences that differed by one minimal pair of words or 
nonwords). Participants had to decide whether the sequences were the same or 




the added articulatory suppression task of having to say a sequence of nonsense 
syllables, bababa, while deciding whether the sequences were the same or different. 
Articulatory suppression ensured that there was no involvement by the phonological 
loop. 
 The results revealed significant differences between dyslexic and control 
groups in all conditions, suggesting the phonological deficit appears regardless of the 
level (lexical or sublexical) or type (input or output) of representation and whether, or 
not, articulatory suppression was used. Participants with dyslexia were relatively more 
impaired in discrimination than in repetition tasks. Articulatory suppression slightly 
decreased overall performance in both groups. Ramus and Szenkovits (2008) suggest 
the reason people with dyslexia perform poorly under memory load is because 
phonological representations are degraded, and some phonetic features are missing 
when they need to be repeated or discriminated; or the representations are intact but 
there is not enough capacity in their short term memory to carry out the tasks.  
 Ramus and Szenkovits (2008) conducted further tests to check for a 
phonological similarity effect, an effect where the more similar the words the more 
difficult they will be to recall (Baddeley, 1984). Their hypothesis was that if the 
phonological representations of people with dyslexia are degraded then they should 
show a greater similarity effect than for people without dyslexia. There were two 
conditions, minimal and maximal, with sequences made up of two to seven nonwords. 
The minimal condition consisted of sequences that were either identical or differed by 
one phonetic feature such as taz – ta ʒ.  The maximal condition consisted of sequences 
that differed by three phonemes, such as taz – gum, and a few phonetic features. To 




spoken by two different voices which alternated constantly within the sequences and 
in opposite orders between sequences. 
 The results showed a phonological similarity effect where performance was 
poorer in the minimal condition than in the maximal condition, and that participants 
with dyslexia performed more poorly than those without dyslexia. When phonological 
similarity was reduced the performance of the participants with dyslexia increased by 
the same amount as the performance of participants without dyslexia. These results 
did not support the hypothesis that a phonological deficit was the result of degraded 
representations, but rather that a phonological deficit may be associated with the short 
term memory processes operating on phonological representations, such as the input 
and/or phonological buffers or the phonological loop between input and output 
sublexical representations (Ramus & Szenkovits, 2008). Some researchers make the 
claim that deficits in processing depend on the type of task rather than a specific 
stimulus (Amitay, Ben-Yehudah, Banai & Ahissar, 2002; Banai & Ahissar, 2006; 
Ben-Yehudah, Sackett, Malchi-Ginzberg & Ahissar, 2001) or may be an inability to 
form a ‘perceptual anchor’ (Ahissar, Lubin, Putter-Katz & Banai, 2006). 
 Banai and Ahissar (2006) examined the notion that deficits in processing 
depend on the type of task rather than a specific stimulus with a frequency 
discrimination and speech perception study with children with an average age of 14 
years. The frequency discrimination study required the participants to discriminate 
between tones across three conditions. The frequency of the test tone was always 
higher than the others and was always changed in a 2 down/1 up staircase procedure 
(step size was 40 Hz for the first 5 reversals and 5 Hz thereafter) converging at a 




fixed at 1000Hz. The participants were required to tell the researchers their answers to 
reduce the possibility of sensory-motor confusion. The conditions were: 
 
• High-low discrimination: Two 50-ms tones with 1000-ms interstimulus 
interval (ISI) were presented in each trial. The participants were required to 
indicate which tone was higher. 
• Same-different discrimination with two tones: Two 50-ms tones (with 1000-ms 
ISI) were presented in each trial. The participants were required to indicate 
whether the tones were the same or different. Same and different trials had an 
equal probability of appearance. 
• Same-different discrimination with three tones: A fixed reference tone was 
followed by a 1500-ms silent interval and then by two other tones (with 950-
ms interval between them), one of which was a repetition of the reference and 
the other was different. Participants had to indicate which tone was the same as 
the reference tone. 
 
 The speech perception study required participants to discriminate minimal 
phonemic pairs. They were presented with 24 pairs of 2-syllable pseudowords that 
differed by one consonant. The consonant pairs used were d-t, b-d, b-p, v-f, m-n, and 
s-z and they appeared either at the beginning or at the end of the word. Only the 
vowels a, e, i and u were used. All stimuli were spoken by a native female Hebrew 





• Same-different with two words: Participants heard 24 different pairs and 24 
same pairs and they were required to state if the pairs were the same or 
different. 
• Same-different with three words: Participants first heard a pair of 
pseudowords. After a 2-s interval, one of the pseudowords was repeated, and 
the task was to indicate which word from the first pair had been repeated. Each 
pair was repeated twice, each time with a different repeated word. 
 
 The results of both studies revealed that participants with dyslexia were able to 
discern mild frequency changes in simple pure tones and minimal phonemic changes 
in complex speech sounds when task required only simple same or different 
discriminations. However, performance was significantly reduced when they were 
required to determine the direction of frequency change or the ordinal position of a 
repeated tonal or speech stimulus. The results suggest that the deficits occur whether 
processing speech or nonspeech sounds and the level of difficulty is a function the 
structure of the task rather than by stimulus composition or complexity (Banai & 
Ahissar, 2006). 
Perceptual anchoring is the process of forming a connection between the 
characteristics of one stimulus relative to another one (Ahissar, 2007; Banai & 
Ahissar, 2006). Perceptual anchor theorists (Ahissar, 2007; Ahissar, Lubin, Putter-
Katz & Banai, 2006; Banai & Ahissar, 2006) suggest that people with dyslexia are 
less efficient at forming perceptual anchors due to limited working memory capacity. 
Ahissar, Lubin, Putter-Katz and Banai (2006) examined this concept in a two-part 
study using simple tones and speech sounds. The first part of the study was frequency 




were asked which of two sequentially presented tones had the higher pitch. There 
were two conditions: a standard one where participants were presented with a standard 
tone (1,000 Hz) in each trial as well as another tone that was always higher. They had 
to judge which tone was higher. The standard condition facilitated the gradual 
formation of a perceptual anchor based on the repeated standard tone; and a no-
standard one where participants were presented with pairs of tones, none of which 
were standard. This required them to actively listen and compare the tones to 
determine which was the higher one. The no-standard condition was dependent on 
manipulation of the representations involving high-level ‘executive’ working memory 
operations.  
Ahissar et al. (2006) hypothesised that performance of participants with 
dyslexia would be impaired in both conditions but the no-standard condition would be 
more difficult if they were impaired in their ability to manipulate the representations. 
The results revealed that the performance of participants with dyslexia on the standard 
task was very poor. However, their performance in the no-standard task did not differ 
from that of the participants without dyslexia. This finding suggests that the difficulty 
may lie in the process of switching from observing the different tones to recalling 
them from memory for comparison. 
The same participants were tested in the second part of the study on speech 
perception in quiet and in noise. The experimental trials consisted of a small stimulus 
set (a subset of ten pseudo-words chosen from a larger set). Participants were asked to 
repeat the pseudoword that they barely heard, then the experimenter pressed the 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ key so that the intensity of the next pseudoword adapted to the 
participant’s performance. Participants with dyslexia showed difficulties both in tone 




degree of this failure to form perceptual anchors correlated with the degree of their 
difficulties in phonological and working memory tasks, suggesting that attentional 
(Hari & Renvall, 2001) and working memory (Swanson, 1993) impairments in people 
with dyslexia may manifest from the same core deficit. 
Di Filippo, Zoccolotti, and Ziegler (2008) contend that the perceptual anchor 
theory does not account fully for a phonological deficit in dyslexia. They compared 
the rapid naming of objects and numbers in a small set of five repeated items with a 
large set of 50 non-repeated items. One of the post popular measures of naming speed 
is the Rapid Automatized Naming (RAN) test in which a series of high frequency 
letters, numbers, colours or objects are presented to participants in random order.  The 
perceptual anchor theory claims there should not be a deficit with the large non-
repeated set of items (Ahissar, 2007), while the phonological deficit theory claims 
there should be comparable deficits in both conditions (Di Filippo et al., 2008). The 
results revealed significant deficits in RAN for non-repeated sets of numbers and 
objects, with the deficit being bigger for the large-set condition than for the small-set 
condition. 
 
2.2.2.  Double Deficit Hypothesis 
 
 The Double Deficit Hypothesis posits that phonological awareness and naming 
speed are both important for reading skills and a lack of both these elements can have 
a detrimental effect on the reader (Wolf & Bowers, 1999; Wolf, Bowers & Biddle, 
2000). Phonological awareness is the ability to understand words from the sounds that 
make up those words. Naming speed is the ability to retrieve and label an array of 
items presented sequentially, for example letters, numbers, colours and objects. 




naming speed score lower on reading tasks than those that are deficient in only one of 
them (Lovett, Steinbach & Fritters, 2000; Wolf &Bowers, 1999; Wolf, Bowers & 
Biddle, 2000). It has been further suggested that the processes involved in 
phonological analysis, rapid naming and working memory work together but on 
different functions under the umbrella of phonological ability (Torgensen, Wagner, 
Rashotte, Burgess & Hecht, 1997; Wagner, Torgensen & Rashotte, 1994). 
 RAN incorporates attentional, visual, lexical, temporal and recognition 
subprocesses which are all necessary for reading (Wolf et al., 2000). Performance is 
measured by the time taken to provide a label for the items. Participants taking longer 
than average (generally one standard deviation below the mean) are judged to have a 
naming speed deficiency (Wolf and Bowers, 1999; Kail, Hall, & Caskey, 1999), 
suggesting that poor performance on the RAN is linked to poor reading skills. 
 Cirino, Israelian, Morris, and Morris (2005) evaluated the Double Deficit 
Hypothesis (DDH) in college students who had been referred for learning difficulties. 
In particular, they measured the impact of phonological awareness (PA) and visual 
naming speed (VNS) on reading performance. When PA and VNS were examined 
individually, the results showed that, while both PA and VNS influence reading skills, 
VNS did not predict performance in untimed reading comprehension. Cirino et al. 
(2005) suggest the possibility that when time pressures are not involved there is less 
demand for holding syntax and context in memory, particularly for college students 
who have encountered significantly more reading expectations in the course of their 
educational experiences.  
 When examined together, the results showed the impact of PA and VNS 
differed depending on the nature of the stimulus and the task. PA was a stronger 




Interestingly, studies of children show PA and VNS to be equivalent for untimed 
reading of real words (Wolf, Goldberg O’Rourke, Gidney, Lovett, Cirino & Morris, 
2002). Cirino et al. (2005) also found that in timed decoding PA and VNS were 
similar for nonwords, but VNS had a greater impact on real words. 
 With regards to reading comprehension and consistent with the study of 
children (Cornwall, 1992), PA had a greater impact than VNS in the untimed 
condition. In contrast, other studies found VNS to have a significant impact on 
reading skills (Compton, De Fries & Olson, 2001; Wolf et al., 2002). Cirino et al. 
(2005) suggest that VNS may not be overly difficult for college students when they 
are not limited by time, as they would have developed vocabulary and general 
educational skills for this academic level. College students with dyslexia are likely to 
have developed coping strategies throughout their educational career to better aid 
them in the demands of their studies so may not be affected in the same way as their 
younger counterparts. 
 PA and VNS demonstrated similar capability for predicting performance in 
timed reading comprehension. However, the impact of VNS increases when there are 
greater demands on reading time. This is particularly relevant for college students who 
are required to do a lot of reading in limited time to meet the demands of their courses. 
 Comparing the performances of the double-deficit subgroup with the single-
deficit and no-deficit subgroups of PA and VNS, the double-deficit group 
demonstrated the lowest overall performance in all reading conditions.  Looking at the 
pattern of cognitive processing against traditional methods of diagnosing reading 
difficulties, there were a greater number of double-deficit people relative to the single-
deficit and no-deficit groups, suggesting that adults with an impairment are highly 




comprehension. The categorisation of double-deficit hypothesis was not significant in 
predicting whether reading difficulty criteria would be met for timed decoding and 
reading comprehension. These results suggest there is more at play when time 
constraints are involved. 
 
2.2.3.  Automatisation 
 
 Automatisation is the process of learning to do something and then practicing 
it until it becomes automatic. Anderson (1982) states there are two stages in the 
process of acquiring a new skill. First is the process of gathering the necessary 
information required to perform the skill. This is followed by practice of the skill until 
it sets in memory and becomes automatic. For example, a person learning to drive a 
manual car may start off paying close attention to when they need to change gears, 
looking at the gear stick to ensure the correct gear has been selected and consciously 
thinking about pressing and releasing the clutch pedal in tandem with the accelerator. 
After some practice, the task eventually becomes second nature and they change up 
and down with near perfect efficiency throughout their motor journeys.  
 According to Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), “automatic processing is well 
learnt in long term memory, is demanding of attention only when a target is presented, 
is parallel in nature, is difficult to alter, to ignore or suppress once learned, and is 
virtually unaffected by load”. The Dyslexia Automatisation Deficit Hypothesis (DAD) 
posits that children with dyslexia have difficulty in automatising skills (Nicolson & 
Fawcett, 1990) and many are able to ‘hide’ this deficit with conscious compensation. 
Conscious compensation is the process of expending greater effort towards 
concentration and the performance of actions that are usually automatic. The outcome 




suggested that DAD can account for difficulties experienced by people with dyslexia 
under dual task conditions (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990; Yap & Van der Leik, 1994) 
because if the first task is not performed automatically then there are not enough 
cognitive resources available to perform the second task. Hazell, Carr, Lewin, Dewis, 
Heathcote, and Brucki (1999) state that some processes, such as encoding of temporal 
or spatial relationships, frequency monitoring, and the activation of word meaning, 
may be pre-programmed or innate, while others such as riding a bicycle, become 
automatic with practice, and suggest that a deficiency in the pre-programmes or innate 
automatic processing may have some responsibility for DAD. 
 Nicholson and Fawcett (1990) used a dual-task paradigm to compare motor 
balance of children with dyslexia and children without dyslexia. The primary task 
required the children to balance on a beam in one of five different conditions with 
their arms outstretched: balance on a beam on both feet for one minute, balance on 
their left foot only for 30 seconds, balance on their right foot only for 30 seconds, 
walk up and down the beam five times whilst allowed to look at their feet, and walk 
up and down the beam five times but with the requirement to look straight ahead. The 
secondary tasks were a) counting backwards and b) auditory choice reaction to 
computer generated tones. A computer generated a high or low tone once every two 
seconds and the participants had to press the left button when they heard a high tone 
and the right button when they heard a low tone. The auditory choice reaction task did 
not require any phonological processing. The children were required to perform the 
primary task twice, once as a single task and once while performing the secondary 
task as well.  
 Results of the first study using the primary task and the secondary task of 




task only condition between children with dyslexia and children without dyslexia. 
However, under the dual task condition, the children with dyslexia were significantly 
impaired in performance of the primary task. 16 out of the 23 children with dyslexia 
were unable to maintain balance while counting backwards. In addition, the children 
with dyslexia showed a decrease in accuracy in counting backwards. The results 
suggest that poor performance in the dual task condition by the children with dyslexia 
may indeed be due to the fact that they expended more effort in concentrating on the 
secondary task, in effect engaging in conscious compensation for the balancing which 
they cannot do when performing the secondary task of counting backwards. 
 Results of the second study using the primary task and the secondary task of 
auditory choice reaction revealed no significant difference in performance of the 
primary task only between children with dyslexia and children without dyslexia. For 
the dual task condition, significant impairment on the secondary task was found only 
for the children with dyslexia in the beam walking trials, again suggesting that they 
may be engaging in conscious compensation. 
 Nicholson and Fawcett (1990) note that the impairment in the auditory choice 
reaction was less marked than for the counting backwards task. However, while 
calibration was done to ensure the tones were of a similar level of difficulty for all 
participants, there is no mention in the study that the children could all easily identify 
the difference between their left and right. A participant could have performed poorly 
because they simply did not know the difference between left and right rather than not 
being able to tell the difference between the tones they heard. 
 Automatisation is a very important skill in reading and writing (Fawcett & 
Nicolson, 1999) and the better the reader is at automatisation of each of the sub-skills 




processing speed. A deficit in one of the sub-skills required for reading can lead to 
poorer overall reading ability (Hunt, 1978). Research suggests that spatial attention 
(Facoetti, Paganoni & Lorusso, 2000) and central attention (Moores, Nicolson & 
Fawcett, 2003) may be problematic for people with dyslexia because reading requires 
the constant switching of attention between words on the page (Moores, Nicolson and 
Fawcett, 2003). Central attention helps to determine cognitive processes, 
representations, and behaviours for tasks at hand (Tamber-Rosenau & Marois, 2016). 
Brannan and Williams (1987) found differences between adults and children with 
good or poor reading skills on Posner’s spatial cueing task, but only when attention 
needs to be shifted rapidly. It is possible that people with dyslexia process information 
at a normal pace once attention has been allocated to the task in question, but that the 
allocation takes longer than usual (Moores et al., 2003). 
 Moores, Nicolson and Fawcett (2003) examined the role of attention deficits in 
automatisation in teenagers with and without dyslexia across two studies. The first 
study examined whether teenagers had deficits in one of the three main elements of 
selective attention: a) selective or focus attention on a specific stimulus, b) shifting 
attention rapidly from one stimulus to another, and c) sustaining attention over a 
period of time. There were assigned three conditions:  
1. Focus (target - white ovals) 
2. Shift (target - white ovals and blue squares alternately) 
3. Focus 2 (target – dark blue squares).  
 
 The stimuli were presented in the same order for all conditions but with four 
different interstimulus intervals. Shapes were presented one at a time at a mean rate of 




shapes. Participants were required to ignore non-targets and respond to a specific 
target by clicking a button. In focus conditions the target stayed the same. In the shift 
condition, the target alternated between the white ovals and dark blue squares. If the 
target was missed it stayed the same. Responses were recorded as hits if they came 
within 1000ms of the target and were acknowledged as such by a short tone.  
 The results revealed no significant difference between participants with 
dyslexia and participants without dyslexia in speed or accuracy in the focus attention 
task. Participants with dyslexia performed significantly worse than participants 
without dyslexia in speed and accuracy in the shifting attention task. The shifting 
attention task required more cognitive resources to complete because the target had to 
be kept in memory while the participant continued to perform the focus task. 
Therefore, it is necessary for parts of the focus task to be automatised leaving enough 
available resources to follow through on the shifting attention task. 
 To this end, Moores et al. (2003) conducted a second study to examine 
automaticity of shape recognition in dyslexia, again using teenage participants. There 
were four conditions: 
1. Focus normal (target – triangles) 
2. Shift normal (target – alternating triangles and circles) 
3. Focus degraded (target – squares) 
4. Shift degraded (target - alternating squares and diamonds) 
 
 All the stimuli were the same colour to avoid recognition by colour alone. In 
all conditions, focus was always performed first to control for practice and fatigue 




focus stimuli and participants were required to ignore non-targets and respond to a 
specific target by clicking a button.  
 The hypotheses at play were: a) task performance will suffer a qualitative 
change from automatic to controlled or when the resources ceiling is reached, 
otherwise it will decrease linearly with task difficulty, b) degraded stimuli are 
processed in a less automatic way by both dyslexic and non-dyslexic participants, and 
c) DAD predicts a marked decrement for controls but not dyslexics as dyslexics are 
already processing stimuli non-automatically. GRD (general resource deficit) predicts 
greater deficit for dyslexics since they are already close to their ceiling. 
 Results showed that the participants without dyslexia were disproportionately 
affected by the visual degradation of the stimuli while the participants with dyslexia 
were relatively unaffected. This suggests they were performing the shape recognition 
task non-automatically even with intact stimuli.  Degraded stimuli require more 
attentional capacity to process so use more resources and prevent shape recognition 
occurring automatically. These findings are consistent with hypothesised existence of 
an automatisation deficit in children with dyslexia. 
 The shift condition requires the target to be kept in memory and it has to be 
changed after each correct hit. Changing the target was not problematic as the dyslexic 
group performed similarly to the non-dyslexic group. The problem is in having to 
maintain the target in memory while performing the focus task.  
 The Dyslexia Automatisation Deficit Hypothesis (DAD) asserts that people 
with dyslexia have difficulty in automatising skills (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990) and 
this can account for difficulties experienced by people with dyslexia under dual task 




task is not performed automatically then there are not enough cognitive resources 
available to perform the second task.  
 It has been suggested that a dysfunctional cerebellum is associated with 
dyslexia (Ramus, Rosen, Dakin, Day, Callote, White & Frith, 2003; Nicolson & 
Fawcett, 1990, 2007). The cerebellar deficit hypothesis states that the cerebellum is 
active during early stages of skill learning, but less active when the skill becomes 
automatized (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990) and this cerebellar dysfunction is the neural 
implementation of the DAD. 
 Research has shown that people with dyslexia have some motor learning 
difficulties, such as balancing (Fawcett & Nicolson, 1999), rapid pointing and peg 
moving (Stoodley, Fawcett, Nicolson and Stein, 2006). Behavioural and neuroimaging 
tests indicate dyslexia is associated with cerebellar impairment in about 80% of cases 
(Nicolson, Fawcett & Dean, 2001). Some researchers feel that difficulties in 
automatisation are linked to the cerebellum (Ito, 1984; Stein & Glickstein, 1992), 
particularly as a high percentage of children diagnosed with dyslexia show 
behavioural evidence of abnormal cerebellar function in areas such as skill 
automatisation, time estimation, balance and dystonia (Nicolson et al., 2001).  
 The cerebellum is involved in the learning and automatisation of motor skills 
(Ito, 1984; Jenkins, Brooks, Nixon, Frackowiak and Passingham, 1994; Krupa, 
Thompson and Thompson, 1993) and overlearned tasks such as driving and reading 
(Nicolson et al., 2001). Research has also shown that the cerebellum plays an 
important role in language (Ackermann & Hertrich, 2000; Fabbro, Moretti & Bava, 
2000; Silveri & Misciagna, 2000) and reading (Fulbright, Jenner, Mencl, Pugh, 




 Nicolson and Fawcett (1999) measured brain activity in adults with dyslexia 
while performing a finger exercise. Participants were required to carry out a sequence 
of finger movements with their right hand while their eyes were closed. There were 
two conditions, one that was highly overlearned and one that was newly learned. 
Participants with dyslexia showed greater activation in the frontal and pre-frontal 
areas of the brain during the task of learning the new sequence. Participants without 
dyslexia showed greater activation during both tasks. 
 Ramus, Pidgeon and Frith (2003), on the other hand, found that only a small 
proportion of people with dyslexia have motor problems, thereby suggesting that 
cerebellar problems may be associated with factors arising from other developmental 
disorders such as ADHD. Similarly, Irannejad and Savage (2012) found that 
cerebellar tests did not successfully differentiate between participants with and 
without dyslexia. In addition to ADHD, balance deficits can be accounted for by other 
factors such developmental coordination disorder (Rochelle and Talcott, 2006). 
 Kasselimis, Margarity and Vlachos (2008) examined the performance of 
children in cerebellar and cognitive tasks associated with dyslexia. Children with 
ADHD were included to examine the claim by Ramus et al. (2003). The participants 
in their study were made up of three types of children: 10 with dyslexia, 10 without 
dyslexia and 10 with ADHD. They underwent a series of test in three categories: 
cerebellar tests, cognitive tests and an articulation speed test. 
 
The cerebellar tests were: 
• Balance time: Participants were blindfolded and asked to stand up straight, 
with their feet together and their arms stretched forward. The score was the 




• Weight time: Participants were blindfolded and asked to stand up straight, with 
their feet together and their arms stretched forward, while holding the neck of 
two bottles containing 1 litre of water each. They were asked to hold their 
arms outstretched for as long as possible. The score was the time until their 
arms fell by at least 20 degrees. 
• Hand declination: Participants were asked to sit down with their elbows on the 
desk, so their wrists were at the same level with their shoulders and allow their 
hands to flop as if they were paralyzed. The angle between the forearm and the 
top of the hand was measured with a protractor. The score was the difference 
between the measures of the two hands. 
• Kicking speed: Participants were asked to stand up straight with their feet 
together towards a firm vertical surface. Then they were asked to kick the 
surface as fast as possible, letting the sole of their feet touch the floor after 
each kick. The sound and speed of the kicks were recorded. The score was the 
time interval between the second and the twelfth kick. 
• Past pointing: A bullseye target was stuck on the wall at eye level. Participants 
were shown how to point repeatedly to the bull’s eye using a marker. They 
were then blindfolded and were required to perform 10 trials. A score was 
fixed for each annulus of the target, ranging from 0 for the trials that fell out of 
it to 10 for the bullseye.  
 
The cognitive tests were: 
• Word naming processing time speed: Participants were required to read aloud 
12 single words, presented individually, as fast as possible. The score was the 




• Picture naming processing time speed: Participants were required to name 12 
single pictures, presented individually, as fast as possible. The pictures 
corresponded to the words used in the word naming processing time speed 
task. The score was the mean time required to name all the pictures. 
• Verbal short-term memory test: Participants were required to repeat a sequence 
of words uttered by the experimenter with an approximate rate of 1 word/2 sec. 
The test was divided into six levels of difficulty according to the number of 
words to recall. Each level had three conditions of complexity in terms of 
morphology. The test was discontinued after failure in all three conditions of a 
level. The score was the number of conditions (word strings) that were 
correctly recalled. 
• Nonword repetition: Participants were required to repeat 20 single nonwords 
spoken by the experimenter. The nonwords were divided into 4 subgroups: 
two-, three-, four-, and five-syllable nonwords, generated from real words by 
changing one or two consonants. The score was calculated by summing the 
number of correctly repeated nonwords.  
• Nonword rhyme judgment: Participants were presented with 20 pairs of 
nonwords typed on a piece of paper. The nonwords were created in the same 
manner as the nonword repetition task. Participant were given 90 seconds to 
underline the paired nonwords that rhymed (a total of 10 pairs). The score was 
the number of correctly underlined pairs. 
 
The articulation speed test:  
 Participants were required to say out loud the days of the week, then the 12 




Greece). The word-strings were chosen because they are overlearned sequences that 
require minimum effort for recall. Four scores were generated: the time to say the 
seven days of the week, the 12 months of the year, the Greek national anthem twice, 
and the total time required for all three of the word-strings. 
 The results revealed that, for the cognitive tasks, participants with dyslexia 
performed significantly worse than those without dyslexia and those with ADHD on 
the word naming, time speed and non-word tasks. There were no significant 
differences for the rest of the cognitive tasks. With regard to the cerebellar tasks, 
contrary to other studies that found an impairment in several cerebellar tasks (Fawcett 
& Nicolson, 1999; Fawcett, Nicolson & Dean, 1996), the participants with dyslexia 
showed significant impairment only in the balance time task in comparison to those 
without dyslexia. The participants with ADHD performed similarly to those without 
dyslexia on the cerebellar tests, suggesting that cerebellar deficits may not share 
comorbidity with ADHD (Ramus et al., 2003). The results also showed that 
participants with dyslexia demonstrated slower articulation speed than those without 
dyslexia and those with ADHD. Further analysis of the data revealed articulation 
speed to be positively correlated with verbal short-term memory and nonword 
repetition. The results of the study partially support the notion of cerebellar deficit 
hypothesis, as well as suggesting that slower articulation speed can be used as an 
indicator of dyslexia. 
 Van Oers, Goldberg, Fiorin, Van den Heuvel, Kapelle, and Wijnen (2018) 
investigated cerebellar involvement in dyslexia in young adults to determine if they 
showed impaired performance on tasks that rely on cerebellar involvement and if this 
was associated with reduced reading performance. Participants were Dutch university 




threading and time discrimination. The bead threading task required participants to 
thread 15 beads as fast as possible with their left hand while holding the string in their 
right hand (left-handed participants were not used). The time discrimination task was 
used to test non-motor cerebral function. Participants were presented with pairs of 
tones and asked to judge if the second was shorter or longer than the first one. The 
first tone in each pair was 1200 ms long with a frequency of 392 Hz. The comparison 
tones were of longer (1220, 1240, 1260, 1300, 1350, 1400, 1450, 1500, 1600, 1700, or 
2000 ms) or shorter duration (1180, 1160, 1140, 1100, 1050, 1000, 950, 900, 850, 
800, 700, or 400 ms) but identical in frequency. 
 Results showed the participants with dyslexia had impaired performance on 
the bead threading and time discrimination tasks. Those with worse cerebellar 
performance did not show larger literacy impairment. There is no clear support for a 
causal relationship between cerebellar function and reading skills.  
 In summary, automatisation is the process of learning to do something 
and then practicing it until it becomes automatic. It is very important for reading and 
writing (Fawcett & Nicolson, 1999) and the better the reader is at automatisation of 
each of the sub-skills involved in fluent reading, the lower the cognitive load and 
therefore the higher the processing speed. Spatial attention (Facoetti, Paganoni & 
Lorusso, 2000) and central attention (Moores, Nicolson & Fawcett, 2003) may also be 
problematic for people with dyslexia because reading requires the constant switching 
of attention between words on the page (Moores, Nicolson and Fawcett, 2003). It is 
possible that people with dyslexia process information at a normal pace once attention 
has been allocated to the task in question, but that the allocation takes longer than 
usual (Brannan & Williams, 1987; Moores et al., 2003). The Dyslexia Automatisation 




automatising skills (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990) and this can account for difficulties 
experienced under dual task conditions (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990; Yap & Van der 
Leik, 1994) because if the first task is not performed automatically then there are not 
enough cognitive resources available to perform the second task.  
 To further summarise, it has been suggested that a dysfunctional cerebellum is 
associated with dyslexia (Ramus et al., 2003; Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990, 2007). The 
cerebellum plays an important role in language (Ackermann & Hertrich, 2000; 
Fabbro, Moretti & Bava, 2000; Silveri & Misciagna, 2000) and reading (Fulbright et 
al., (1999) and is involved in the learning and automatisation of motor skills (Ito, 
1984; Jenkins et al., 1994; Krupa et al., 1993) and tasks such as driving and reading 
(Nicolson et al., 2001). The cerebellar deficit hypothesis states that the cerebellum is 
active during early stages of skill learning, but less active when the skill becomes 
automatized (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990) and it is this cerebellar dysfunction that is 
responsible for reduced skill automatization in people with dyslexia. Cognitive load 
impacts on working memory, thereby creating the potential for affecting 
automatisation by the impairment of memory rehearsal processes. different 
proportions. 
 
2.2.4.  Magnocellular Deficit Hypothesis 
 
 The magnocellular deficit hypothesis says that people with dyslexia have a 
deficit in the magnocellular pathway while at the same time have a normal functioning 
parvocellular pathway (Stein & Talcott, 1999). Research suggests that a magnocellular 
deficit may influence reading ability through abnormal saccadic suppression processes 
(Breitmeyer & Ganz, 1976), impairments in binocular fixation and rapid eye 




auditory information (Tallal, 1980; Witton, Talcott, Hansen, Richardson, Griffiths, 
Rees & Green, 1998). 
 There are two major pathways in the visual system, magnocellular and 
parvocellular. The magnocellular system responds to low contrast and low spatial 
frequencies (Kaplan, Lee, & Shapely, 1990; Lee, Pokorny, Smith, Martin, & Valberg, 
1990; Stein, 2001) and is sensitive to rapid changes in visual input (Nowak & Bullier, 
1997; Schiller, Logothetis & Charles, 1990). The parvocellular system is sensitive to 
high spatial frequencies and changes in colour (Kaplan, Lee & Shapley, 1990; Kaplan 
& Shapley, 1986). 
 Magnocells are responsible for locating stimuli and tracking their movements 
(Stein, 2012). Research has shown that poor readers and people with dyslexia have 
deficits in the magnocellular system (Lovegrove, Martin & Slaghuis, 1986; McLean, 
Stuart, Coltheart & Castles, 2011; Stein, 2001). Readers briefly fixate each word 
between saccades at which time the fine details of the letters in a word can be 
processed (Stein, 2012). The magnocellular system helps to control eye movements 
and stabilize the eyes during each fixation. If the image unintentionally moves off the 
fovea, signals from the magnocellular system are used to bring the eyes back to the 
target. This sensitivity to visual motion may impact the development of orthographic 
skills. 
 Several studies have not supported the magnocellular deficit hypothesis 
(Amitay, Ben-Yehudah, Banai & Ahissar, 2002; McLean et al., 2011; Sayeur, Béland, 
Ellemberg, Perchet, McKerral, Lassonde & Lavoie, 2013; Skottun, 2000). Ramus, 
Rosen, Dakin, Day, Callote, White and Frith (2003) conducted a multiple case study 
to assess the three leading theories of dyslexia: phonological deficit theory, 




deficit in all participants with dyslexia, with a significant proportion also suffering 
from motor, visual and auditory disorders. 
 
2.2.5.  Memory and Dyslexia 
 
 Research suggests that there are deficits in short term working memory of 
people with dyslexia (Ackerman & Dykman, 1993; Brunswick, McCrory, Price, Frith 
& Frith, 1999; McDougall & Donohoe, 2002; Mcloughlin, Fitzgibbon & Young, 
1994; Plaza, Cohen & Chevrie-Muller, 2002). Working memory is a system of several 
components that work together in the storage of information for manipulation in 
higher level processing (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1996, 2000b). The 
central executive controls two slave systems in working memory, the phonological 
loop and the visuospatial sketchpad (Baddeley, 1986). The phonological loop is 
responsible for language-based material and the visuospatial sketchpad is responsible 
for visual and spatial information. 
 Research has shown that increased cognitive load can lead to deficits on both 
verbal and visuospatial working memory in people with reading disabilities (Swanson, 
Ashbaker & Lee, 1996), and suggests that visuospatial memory deficits in people with 
dyslexia come to the forefront only when the task at hand requires phonological 
processing (Gould & Glencross, 1990; Thomson, 1982). It has also been suggested 
that people with dyslexia are less efficient at forming perceptual anchors,  a 
connection between the characteristics of one stimulus relative to another one, due to 
limited working memory capacity (Ahissar, 2007; Ahissar, Lubin, Putter-Katz & 
Banai, 2006; Banai & Ahissar, 2006). Smith-Spark, Fisk, Fawcett and Nicolson 
(2003) report evidence of verbal working memory impairments in people with 




Winner, Gray and Sherman (2003) found children with dyslexia were significantly 
faster to recognise impossible figures as being impossible than were children without 
dyslexia.  
 Smith-Spark et al. (2003) examined the role of the central executive in people 
with dyslexia, focusing on the phonological loop and visuospatial working memory. 
They conducted two experiments using university students with and without dyslexia. 
Experiment 1 examined the phonological loop, employing digit and word span short 
term memory tasks as well as a letter updating task. Participants were presented with 
auditory lists, previously used by Fisk and Warr (1996), for the digit and word span 
tasks. The lists started with two stimuli. The number of stimuli per list was increased 
to three if the participant was able to recall two or more of the two-stimuli lists 
successfully. The list size increased until the participant could no longer recall at least 
two of the three stimulus sets. The letter updating task consisted of lists of 6, 8, 10 and 
12 consonants. Participants were required to recall the six most recent items. This task 
involved retaining the first six items in memory. If there were more than six items on 
the list, they had to drop that most recent item and replace it with the next item. This 
was to be repeated for each additional item for lists of more than six items. The last 
six items had to be recalled in the order of presentation. The items were presented one 
per second and there was no time limit for each list. The consonants were presented 
randomly, and no letter appeared more than once in the same list. 
 The results showed that participants with dyslexia performed more poorly than 
those without dyslexia on the digital span test, the word span test and the letter 
updating task. Overall performance on the letter updating task decreased as the 
number of letters increased for both groups of participants. With regards to serial 




sequence than for those presented earlier. Smith-Spark et al. (2003) suggest that poor 
performance at the early serial positions may be due to a failure of the articulatory 
control process. The articulatory control process circulates information in the 
phonological loop, refreshing the memory through subvocal rehearsal (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1994). Therefore, the central executive may not be able to function adequately 
if the phonological loop is impaired at the outset (Smith-Spark et al., 2003). 
 Experiment 2 in Smith-Spark et al. (2003) examined the effects on 
performance of participants with dyslexia when the static-dynamic distinction in short 
term memory is made explicit. Static memory tasks require the short-term storage of 
information that is presented simultaneously within the visuospatial working memory.  
Dynamic memory tasks involve the recall of both location and order of stimuli 
presented sequentially. In the static condition, participants were presented with a 5x5 
matrix and were required to recall the location of seven cells marked simultaneously 
with an ‘X’. In the dynamic condition, participants were presented with four cells 
highlighted sequentially in a 5x5 matrix and they were required to recall the location 
of each highlighted cell in the correct order. The updating condition was the same as 
the dynamic condition, except the highlighted cells varied between 4, 6, 8 and 10. 
Participants were required to update their memory when an additional cell was 
highlighted and recall the last 4 in each trial. 
 The results revealed no significant difference between participants with 
dyslexia and participants without dyslexia in their performance on the static, dynamic 
or updating tasks using spatial information. The complexity and serial position of 
pattern elements had a greater effect on performance for both types of participants, 
with recall of later items being better than for earlier items. There was a significant 




participants being affected by the uncertainty associated with that condition in that 
there was no indication about the number of cells that would be highlighted in each 
trial.  
 Smith-Spark et al. (2003) posit that this lack of a difference is consistent with 
the phonological deficit hypothesis as the task is non-verbal. However, further 
analysis indicated that a significant difference becomes apparent as the task increases 
in difficulty. This effect which is brought on by an increased cognitive load can be 
explained by automatisation deficits in the central executive (Smith-Spark et al., 
2003). Disruption and impairment in processing can occur when information has to be 
moved around the systems in the central executive. The ability to manipulate 
information may be hindered by an impaired phonological loop (Smith-Spark et al., 
2003).  
 In summary, an increased cognitive load can lead to deficits on both verbal and 
visuospatial working memory in people with reading disabilities (Swanson, Ashbaker 
& Lee, 1996), and the visuospatial memory deficits in people with dyslexia come to 
the forefront only when the task at hand requires phonological processing (Gould & 
Glencross, 1990; Thomson, 1982) or when the level of difficulty increases (Smith-
Spark et al., 2003) or when there is a need to form a perceptual anchor (Ahissar, 2007; 
Ahissar et al., 2006; Banai & Ahissar, 2006). The etiology of dyslexia is a complex 
combination of many factors, each seeming to affect individuals in different 
proportions. 
 
2.3.  Learning Styles and Metacognition 
 
It cannot be assumed that all students with dyslexia experience reading and 




way as each other. There is a huge range of preferred learning styles among all 
students (Drago & Wagner, 2004). Riding and Raynor (1998) suggested that there are 
two basic types of contrasting learning styles, verbal versus visual and holistic versus 
analytic. Verbal learners prefer to learn in by reading or listening, while visual 
learners prefer to learn with graphs, diagrams, or pictures (Kirby, Moore & Schofield, 
1988). Holistic learners process information based on the whole picture while analytic 
learners build the whole picture from its smaller parts (Wittrock & Alesandrini, 1990). 
It has been suggested that different brain hemispheric processing patterns in people 
with dyslexia may indicate a preference for visuospatial strategies (Bakker, 1990; 
Everatt, Steffert & Smythe, 1999; Galaburda, 1993; West, 1997). Visuospatial 
processing is effective for a concrete word such as ‘cat’ but poses some difficulty for 
an abstract word such as ‘is’ (Mills, 2018). In an effort to form a representation of an 
abstract word, a visuospatial student may end up with a distortion or misrepresentation 
of the word (Kraus, 2012), resulting in the possibility of the student skipping the word 
and trying to understand the text by using any contextual cues that connect to a 
specific visual memory (Flink, 2014; Ramus, 2014; Kang, Lee, Park & Leem, 2016). 
Bacon and Handley (2010) demonstrated that people with dyslexia are more likely to 
use a spatial strategy when reasoning with syllogisms. 
 University students with dyslexia often experience difficulties such as taking 
lecture notes, writing essays, synthesising course materials for examination, or 
comprehending large quantities of text (Gilroy & Miles, 1996; Olofsson, Ahl & 
Taube, 2012; Mortimore & Crozier, 2007; Riddick, Farmer & Sterling, 1997; 
Simmons & Singleton, 2000). In comparison to students without dyslexia, students 
with dyslexia report significantly greater use of study aids and time management 




summaries of recommended readings, looking for alternative and shorter texts and 
collaborating with classmates (Olofsson et al., 2012). This may be due to the fact that 
those who have reached post-secondary education are more likely to have developed 
or been taught strategies for coping with their difficulties, thereby resulting in a 
greater reliance on the use of study aids.  
 Students with dyslexia are more likely to report a deep approach to learning in 
comparison to university students without dyslexia (Kirby et al., 2008). A deep 
approach is described by Biggs, Kember and Leung (2001) as being motivated 
intrinsically to learn and attempting to comprehend underlying meanings of a learning 
task. Conversely, students with a surface approach to learning appear to be motivated 
by a fear of failure and thereby resort to the strategy of rote-learning (Biggs et al., 
2001). Kirby et al. (2008) suggest that students with dyslexia would either have 
difficulty with using a deep approach because of their text processing difficulties or 
would adopt the deep approach to compensate for their lower level text processing 
difficulties. Evidently, different strategies are developed over time to cope with 
learning difficulties. 
MacCullagh, Bosanquet and Badcock (2016) examined the learning experiences of 
university students with dyslexia and how they cope with them. The main issues that 
came to light were: 
 
• Lectures: The students liked face to face lectures because of the ability to 
access visual, auditory and non-verbal cues simultaneously but found it 
difficult when they were longer than two hours. Recorded lectures were 
appreciated and often used in addition to face-to-face lectures. Some students 




the lecture slides before class or just listening in class and ignoring the slides, 
and some felt it was helpful when the lecturer drew diagrams while verbally 
explaining the slides. Some students said they were unable to listen to the 
lecturer and write notes at the same time so just listened during the physical 
lecture and write notes later from the recorded lecture. 
• Readings: Some students found it difficult to read long or complex journal 
articles and recommended readings. There was also difficulty in reading 
materials online. Approximately half of the students said they preferred to read 
printed than online copies, the main difficulties lying in glare and eye strain 
when reading online. 
• Auditory and visual distractions: Some students said they needed a quiet space 
free of distractions for other study tasks such as watching recorded lectures 
and reading while others needed soft music, ambient noise or small group 
discussion in order to study effectively. Students reported choosing their seats 
very carefully in lecture theatres so as to reduce the level of distractions. 
• Assessments/exams: Many students felt that assessments should be divided 
into more frequent, shorter, lower weighted tasks, as well as offering wider 
choice of assessment types such as individual conversations with a tutor, 
practical skills demonstrations and video assignments. 
 
 Everatt, Seffert and Smythe (1999) found that, while primary and secondary 
school children with dyslexia performed on a level with their peers without dyslexia 
on a test which involved making drawings from a number of different shapes (figural 
creativity), adults with dyslexia presented consistent evidence of greater creativity in 




evidence suggests that children with dyslexia learn to use various coping strategies as 
they grow older. Miles (1993) presents observations of compensatory strategies used 
by people with dyslexia which seem very creative, such as the use of mnemonics. He 
cites an example of a boy called Jason who used his own name as a mnemonic to 
remember the middle months of the year – July, August, September, October, 
November (Miles, 1993).  
 Research has shown that people with dyslexia tend to conceptualise 
information in a visuospatial rather than a verbal way (Von Karolyi, 2001; Von 
Karolyi, Winner, Gray and Sherman, 2003) and may compensate for their difficulties 
with language with visuospatial talents (Galaburda, 1993; Miles, 1993). Enhanced 
visuospatial processing may be an important component of creative talents (Garrett, 
1976; Katz, 1978). For instance, Von Karolyi et al. (2003) observed that individuals 
with dyslexia were able to recognise impossible figures more rapidly but no less 
accurately than those without dyslexia. Impossible figures are those that cannot exist 
in three-dimensional space, like an ambiguous illusion. Research has implied that 
people with dyslexia tend toward higher visuospatial processing (Von Karolyi & 
Winner, 2004). In detailed interviews with adults with dyslexia, Gerber, Ginsberg and 
Reiff (1992) found that discovering different and varying approaches to solving 
problems and creatively overcoming obstacles was one of the characteristics used 
earlier in life and more often by those who were deemed successful in their chosen 
careers (there is a high number of people with dyslexia in careers that use more 
creative skills). These types of learned strategies may prove useful in helping a person 





Exley (2003) determined the preferred learning styles of seven 12 to 14- year 
old participants and taught them spelling and numeracy, targeting their strengths. The 
participants were taught in two single-sex groups for one or two lessons a week. All 
the participants improved their performance, with most of them demonstrating a 
preference for a visuospatial/kinaesthetic learning style, lending support to the 
theories of Stein (1995) and West (1997). This research shows that students with 
dyslexia can achieve academically as long as they receive adequate support for their 
learning. 
Metacognition, which is an individual’s awareness and understanding of their 
thought processes and a feeling of rightness (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017; 
Thompson, Prowse-Turner & Pennycook, 2011), can influence the level of confidence 
when performing a task and can affect the learning outcomes for students with 
dyslexia. A strong feeling of rightness creates a greater feeling of confidence 
(Thompson et al., 2013; Ackerman & Zalmanov, 2012; Thompson & Morsanyi, 
2012). Research on metacognition has demonstrated that people can identify when 
they have made a mistake (De Neys, 2010, 2013). A poor feeling of rightness can be 
triggered by conflicting answers (Thompson & Johnson, 2014) and unfamiliar terms 
in the problems (Markovits, Thompson & Brisson, 2015). Furnes and Norman (2015) 
examined three forms of metacognition (knowledge, skills and experience) in students 
with dyslexia in a reading exercise for which the dependent variable was memory of 
the passages of text. Participants self-reported their metacognitive knowledge and 
skills, while their metacognitive experiences were assessed by predictions of 
performance and judgments of learning. The results showed that participants with 
dyslexia rated themselves lower in knowledge about reading strategies than 




use of deep and surface learning strategies. The results suggest that people with 
dyslexia have metacognitive insight into their own difficulties with reading and that 
they are capable of adjusting their expectations in line with their skills. 
 
2.4.  Conclusion 
 
 A vast amount of research has been conducted around the causes and 
manifestations of dyslexia. The varying results suggest there is no single cause and 
every person with dyslexia is not affected in the same way. Giess, Rivers, Kennedy, & 
Lombardino (2012) note that evidence-based approaches that use multi-sensory 
techniques help to increase the learning opportunities for both verbal-linguistic and 
visual-spatial reasoners across all age groups and content areas. 
 Research has shown that increased cognitive load can lead to deficits in both 
verbal and visuospatial working memory in people with reading disabilities (Swanson, 
Ashbaker & Lee, 1996), and suggests that visuospatial memory deficits in people with 
dyslexia come to the forefront only when the task at hand requires phonological 
processing (Gould & Glencross, 1990; Thomson, 1982). Smith-Spark et al. (2003) 
demonstrated that an increased cognitive load can affect processing in the central 
executive. If disruption and impairment in processing can occur when information has 
to be moved around the systems in the central executive Smith-Spark et al., 2003), 
students with dyslexia are likely to spend more time and energy phonologically 
processing problematic words or trying to recognise a word within the context of 
familiar words than typical readers (Ramus, 2014; Shaywitz, 2005). The delay in 
phonological processing causes a decrease in retention in working memory of 
previously decoded words and if the words are remembered, the student is likely to 




 While the key deficit in dyslexia is phonological, different combinations of 
causes will lead to individuals reasoning in different ways. The way study materials 
are presented, such as the type and size of the font, distance between letters, colours of 
words and background on lecture slides, can affect processing and comprehension in 
students with dyslexia. The Public Sector Bodies (Websites and Mobile Applications) 
(No. 2) Accessibility Regulations 2018 in the UK goes a long way to ensuring that 
online documents are user-friendly for people with disabilities, and work software that 
aids students with reading and visual disabilities. Work needs to be done to ensure that 
written documentation meets the needs of students with all types of reading and visual 
disabilities. The studies in this thesis seek to address the way people with dyslexia 
reason in comparison to people without dyslexia and how any differences can be 







CHAPTER 3: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN REASONING STRATEGIES 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 There is a large variety of procedures or strategies that people bring to every 
task they encounter. In many instances, the choice of strategy will be governed by the 
nature of the task at hand (Siegler, 1999; Dierckx & Vandierendonck, 2005). This 
begs the question of which strategy is likely to come to the forefront in any given 
situation and what determines which of all the possible ones will take precedence. 
This chapter discusses individual differences in reasoning strategies and then reports 
two experiments that compared the performance of people with dyslexia to people 
without dyslexia when solving categorical syllogisms, considering factors that may 
affect their performance.  
 Experiment 1 reports one study investigating individual differences in 
reasoning strategy, focusing on the differences between participants with dyslexia and 
participants without dyslexia. The participants were required to solve all 27 syllogisms 
with a valid conclusion (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). The syllogisms were 
separated into three categories based on level of difficulty for verbal and spatial 
reasoners (Ford, 1995): easiest for verbal reasoners (EV), easiest for spatial reasoners 
(ES), and equally difficult for both types of reasoners (HSV). The study also 
examined if the reasoning process was affected by the figure of the syllogism. The 
figure is the structure of the syllogism denoted by the placement of the middle term 
‘B’ in relation to the major term ‘A’ in the first premise and the minor term ‘C’ in the 
second premise. The set of 27 syllogisms was also separated by figure: AB/BC, 




would be most prominent for the respective groups of participants and how this would 
be affected by the problem type or indeed the figure of the syllogism.  
 Experiment 2 reports two studies that observed the effect of belief bias in 
people with dyslexia compared to people without dyslexia. The first study is a 
sentence-picture verification task (Macleod, Hunt & Matthews, 1978) that assessed 
how participants with and without dyslexia represent and process linguistic structures. 
It is particularly important to understand how linguistic and spatial information is 
processed if we are to determine how people with dyslexia reason with syllogisms. 
More so, as some form of verbal coding into memory is required for the premises as 
well as the acceptance of dyslexia as phonological deficit (Snowling, 2000). The 
results suggested that participants with dyslexia tended more towards a visuospatial or 
pictorial strategy. If people with dyslexia tend to adopt a spatial strategy (Bacon et al., 
2007) and conceptualise information in a visuospatial rather than verbal way (Von 
Karolyi et al., 2003), it was expected that they would demonstrate a slower processing 
speed for sentence comprehension than the cost for converting the sentences into 
pictorial representations. Some of the causes of poor reading skills have been 
attributed to shorter working memory span (Bowers & Wolf, 1993; Catts, Gillispie, 
Leonard, Kail, & Miller, 2002) and a slower processing speed (Breznitz, 2003, 2006), 
and these two factors affect the way visual information is translated into its 
phonological form by the phonological loop in working memory (Hulme & Snowling, 
1992b; Palmer, 2000). 
 The second study is a syllogism solving task designed to examine the belief 
bias effect. Participants solved 24 syllogisms in three conditions: abstract (single letter 
terms), neutral (terms describing unrelated people or objects) and belief bias (terms 




dyslexia tend to use a more spatial approach to problem solving and are hindered by 
visually rich stimuli (Bacon & Handley, 2010), then it was expected that they might 
be more affected by visually rich belief bias syllogisms and therefore perform worse 
on those than participants without dyslexia. 
 
3.2.  What is a reasoning strategy? 
 According to Siegler and Jenkins (1989), a strategy is ‘any procedure that is 
non-obligatory and goal directed’. Evans (2000) describes a strategy as a series of 
slow, goal-directed, systematic and conscious processes. In contrast, Johnson-Laird, 
Savary and Bucciarelli (2000) describes it as a series of steps in problem solving, and 
each step within that process is an unconscious tactic. Strategy selection can be 
influenced by factors such as age or expertise in the subject area (Lemaire & Fabre, 
2005). Several strategies for solving syllogisms have been identified by research, such 
as a diagrammatic system of drawing circles around the end terms or a mathematical 
system of treating them like algebraic equations (Ford, 1995; Bacon et al., 2003). 
Some participants have been found to use more than one strategy. Roberts (2000) 
suggests that deductive performance can be accounted for by three strategies: spatial, 
verbal and task specific rather than a single theory such as mental models or rules-
based concepts. Strategies may be influenced by prior knowledge of the terms or a 
related situation, and this has been judged to be one of the causes of failures to apply 
the correct rules when solving a problem (Braine & O’Brien, 1998). Wetherick and 
Gilhooly (1990) claim that when the logic of a problem is not obvious or easily 
discernible reasoners tend to generate a response by choosing a conclusion where the 




choose the most conservative one. For example, in the syllogism “All B are A, Some 
C are B”, they are likely to choose the conclusion “Some C are A”. 
 Newton and Roberts (2000) suggest that the ability to discover new strategies 
for solving problems depends on the quality of the initial representation. According to 
Crowley, Shrager and Siegler (1997), strategy development is born out of “a 
competitive negotiation between metacognitive and associative mechanisms”. An 
unfamiliar or new task increases the workload of metacognitive processes. Practice 
consolidates and automates some of the process, leaving the metacognitive resources 
available to pick up discrepancies and search for alternative solutions. Newton and 
Roberts (2000) demonstrated with a series of experiments that new strategies are 
discovered through experience with a task rather than prior knowledge of one strategy 
or another. They used two categories of direction tasks: the first was instructions to 
use cancellation to solve the problems and the second was a free choice of strategy.  
 Experiment 1 examined whether people with a highly spatial strategy would 
choose a cancellation strategy after being introduced to one. Participants were 
allocated to one of four groups: 
• Baseline: Participants were given two sets of directions tasks. 
• Instructed: Participants were given two sets of directions tasks, one with 
cancellation instructions and one with free choice of strategy. They should 
revert to their initial strategy if there is was a stylistic preference. The results 
revealed that cancellation was the preferred strategy when free choice was an 
option. 
• Dax/Med: Participants were given one set of Dax/Med Word puzzles and one 
set of directions tasks. Dax/Med puzzles consisted of strings of the words dax 




dax cancelled med, and slok cancelled rits, so that (slok dax rits rits dax) 
reduced to (dax rits dax) - equivalent to east southeast (Newton & Roberts, 
2000). The directions tasks were similar to those on the Dax/Med puzzles and 
did not use the words cancellation or opposite. The results revealed no transfer 
of cancellation strategy to the directions tasks. 
• Paper and Pencil: Participants were given two sets of directions tasks. They 
were allowed to use paper and pencil for one set of tasks but not the other. The 
results showed no increase in a cancellation strategy, suggesting that the use of 
paper and pencil may not free enough metacognitive resources for the 
discovery of new strategies. 
  
 Newton and Roberts (2000) concluded that if a strategy can be performed 
reasonably well there is a greater likelihood of a successful search for an alternative 
one, and that being cognizant of  one’s failures may play an important part in the 
process of evaluation and selection of a new strategy. They further state that reducing 
cognitive load, for example the provision of paper and pencil for workings, does not 
raise the probability of discovery of cancellation as a strategy.  
 Experiment 2 investigated the notion that the use of pencil and paper may be 
suppressing the discovery of an alternative strategy. Participants in this experiment 
were allocated to one of two groups: 
 
• Baseline: Participants were given two sets of directions tasks with paper and 
pencil for workings. 
• Instructed: Participants were given two sets of directional tasks, one with 




and pencil. The results showed that they continued to use cancellation for the 
second directions tasks, suggesting that the use of pencil and paper does not 
suppress the strategy of choice. 
 
 Experiment 3 examined the notion that some people may need to evaluate a 
new strategy before using it. They compare the old strategy with the new one and if 
the result is the same, they acknowledge the new strategy is a valid one. Assessing the 
validity of a new easiest for those who can reason well with the original strategy 
(Newton et al., 2000). There were three groups in this experiment, all received two 
sets of directions tasks: 
 
• Group 1: Participants were not given any feedback for their answers. 
• Group 2: Participants were given feedback for correct answers only. 
• Group 3: Participants were given feedback for correct answers and correct 
answers were provided for wrong solutions. 
 
 The results revealed that the level of feedback affected the development of a 
cancellation strategy. The likelihood of strategy development was greater when 
feedback about the required answers was provided, highlighting the importance of 
showing where the reasoner went wrong as well, not just which answers were correct.  
 Morris and Schunn (2005) posit a logical strategy model where an individual 
will draw from a range of strategies depending on the nature of the problem and the 
available information. They assert that no individual will use only one strategy across 
an entire problem set, that the strategy the individual uses is a function of the problem 




 Token based (mental models): A propositional analysis of the premises creates 
a representation of the surface structure which is just enough to encode it in working 
memory where models are generated then searched and evaluated for a solution 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird, Schaeken & Byrne, 1992). This strategy is 
useful for problems with spatial relations such as linear syllogisms, for example “John 
is to the left of Paul, Paul is to the left of Mike, Is Mike to the left of John?”. The 
reasoner has to create a mental picture of John, Paul and Mike in the spaces described 
in the premises in order to deduce Mike’s location. 
 Verbal (mental logic): This strategy is based on content-free and logical 
transformation rules that are applied to linguistically derived mental structures (Rips, 
1994; Braine & O’Brien, 1998). Information is represented in a sentential format and 
processed using a series of logical rules to evaluate it for a solution. This strategy is 
useful for solving abstract problems that focus on relationships between elements, 
such as the syllogism “If A is B, then B is C”. The reasoner has to convert each 
premise sentence into a mental representation then determine the relationship between 
the A and C terms. 
 Knowledge-based heuristics: This strategy relies on prior knowledge of similar 
content for which there are existing rules. Once the content is activated the rules 
become accessible to the reasoner who can then apply them to the present situation or 
problem. This strategy does not need to generate a valid conclusion but may result in a 
logic-like performance (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides, 1989).  
 Superficial heuristics: This strategy focuses on the surface structure rather than 
the content. The reasoner identifies the main surface elements and then applies rules to 
them. For example, in the Wason card selection task, reasoners are reported to pick 




This strategy leads to matching biases (Evans, 1989) and atmosphere effects 
(Woodsworth & Sells, 1935). The atmosphere effect is the tendency for form of the 
premises to set a favourable tone for acceptance of a conclusion in a similar form. For 
example, if a syllogism contains two universal affirmative premises such as All A are 
B; All B are C, the tendency will be to accept the universal affirmative conclusion of 
All A are C. Matching bias occurs when a conclusions is selected because it has the 
same quantifier as one of the premises and is more likely to take place when the same 
quantifier is featured in both premises (Wetherick, 1989; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 
1995).  
 Analogy: This strategy uses existing knowledge to derive solutions to novel 
problems (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989). The reasoner accesses a source from memory 
that is similar to the present problem and uses that similarity to derive a solution 
(Gentner, 1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995).  
 Task specific procedures: The reasoner may develop short cuts (Roberts, 2000) 
that resemble simple rules. This strategy is context dependent and involves the 
reasoner encoding only the relevant features of the problem and then activating an 
appropriate process to derive a solution. Prior knowledge and belief can come into 
play and can lead to errors due to incomplete encoding of the problem features.  
 In order to explore the range of strategies used by participants, Morris and 
Schunn (2005) asked participants to evaluate the conclusions of 24 syllogisms and 
conditionals. There were three sets of stimuli: abstract versus concrete (eg, letters 
versus related items), familiar versus unfamiliar (eg, dogs versus fictitious terms), and 
simple versus difficult (taken from Braine & O’Brien, 1998). Examples of the stimuli 








No A are B 
Some C are B 
Conclusion: Some C are not A 
 
Conditional (familiar) 
If Bill is here, then Sam is here 
If Sara is here, then Jessica is here 
Bill is here or Sara is here 
Conclusion: Sam or Jessica is here 
 
 The task was to evaluate the syllogisms for valid or invalid conclusion, and to 
test the conditionals with a given rule in Wason tasks (Wason, 1961). The researchers 
predicted that the participants would use a variety of strategies and the strategy would 
be related to the problem type. The results showed that the participants used a variety 
of strategies and varied in their preferred one. No subject used just one strategy, two 
used a single strategy for more than 75% of the problems, and two-thirds of them used 
all five strategies at least occasionally. Strategy use was also related to problem type. 
Their participants reported using knowledge-based strategies when there was familiar 
content, superficial heuristics for more difficult and less familiar problems, and token-
based strategies for Wason-type tasks. 
 Ford (1995) also investigated the range of strategies that participants bring to 
bear on syllogism performance. She suggested that it is mistaken to treat everyone as 
if they reason in the same way. She identified two groups of reasoners according to 
their strategy – verbal and spatial. In her study, twenty participants were presented 




thoughts out loud as well as showing their workings in a workbook. The syllogisms 
contained distinct terms such as vegetarians and gymnasts, and common terms such as 
lawyers. The results showed that verbal reasoners tended to treat the syllogisms like 
mathematical problems, re-writing them as equations, substituting words with letters 
and using arrows to indicate relationships between the terms of the premises. They 
appeared to be using rules similar to modus ponens and modus tollens. Modus ponens 
and modus tollens are rules used to make arguments and form conclusions. Modus 
ponens operates by affirming an argument, eg. If A is true, then B is true. A is true. 
Therefore, B is true. Modus tollens operates by denying an argument, eg. If A is true, 
then B is true. B is not true. Therefore, A is not true. 
 Ford’s results (1995) also showed that spatial reasoners, on the other hand, 
tended to use shapes in different spatial relationships to represent different classes and 
their relationships. They used representations where the class itself was represented 
rather than the members of the class. Many of the spatial reasoners drew shapes to 
denote classes while at the same time, Ford notes, keeping the verbal tag of the 
syllogism in their mind. Some participants even appeared to use a combination of both 
strategies. 
 
3.3.  Figural effects of syllogisms 
 Another factor influencing strategy choice is the figure of the syllogism 
(Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Bara, Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 1995; Bara, 
Bucciarelli & Lombardo, 2001), thereby creating a figural effect. The figure is the 
structure of the syllogism denoted by the placement of the middle term ‘B’ in relation 
to the major term ‘A’ in the first premise and the minor term ‘C’ in the second 




been cited as the first researcher to document this phenomenon. Research has shown 
that a figural effect occurs when drawing conclusions from syllogisms (Polk & 
Newell, 1995; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990; Dickstein, 1978; Chater & Oaksford, 
1999) and this is most prominent for Figure 1 (AB/BC) and Figure 2 (BA/CB). The 
figural effect is the tendency to create solutions in the same form as the premise 
containing the subject, also known as a response bias. It has been suggested that the 
figural effect is a result of how information is processed in working memory and this 
is based on the notion of first in, first out (Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978; Johnson-
Laird & Bara, 1984). The reasoner states the conclusion in the order the premises were 
presented and in which the terms were used to construct the mental representation of 
those premises. For example, in Figure 1, the A in the first premise enters working 
memory first, the reasoner focuses on B in that premise and then compares it with B in 
the second premise, and since A was the first term into working memory it will 
naturally be the first term out. Broadbent (1958) demonstrated that it is easier to recall 
a series of digits in the same order as their presentation.  
 Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) further suggest that the effect is caused by the 
difficulty in constructing the representation in working memory. Figure 1 is easier 
because the middle term is adjacent in each premise. In Figure 1 the middle term 
appears together so only one model needs to be constructed. Figure 2 is harder 
because the reasoner must first switch the terms then integrate them together to form a 
conclusion. A bias for A-C answers for Figure 3 and Figure 4 indicates a preference 
for constructing an initial model using the first premise; this process requires fewer 
operations. As the level of difficulty increases and more models are required there is 




processed faster than Figure 1 syllogisms (Espino, Santamaria & Garcia-Madruga, 
2000). 
 
Table 3.1: Syllogism figures and response biases. 
 
 Structure Conclusion 
Figure 1 AB/BC AC 
Figure 2 BA/CB CA 
Figure 3 AB/CB No response bias 
Figure 4 BA/BC No response bias 
 
Wetherick and Gilhooly (1990) argue that the effect is the tendency to place the first 
term in the conclusion as the term that appeared as the subject of one of the premises. 
A is the subject of the first premise in Figure 1 leading to the A-C solution, and C is 
the subject of the second premise in Figure 2 leading to the C-A solution.  
  Rips (1994) felt the figural effects occurred only in deductive reasoning tasks 
where the subject is required to generate their own conclusion from the 
premises. Johnson-Laird and Steedman (1978) found that when participants generated 
their own conclusions there was a preference for A-C conclusions for Figure 1 and C-
A conclusions for Figure 2. In addition, syllogisms where the conclusion coincided 
with the figure were easier to solve than when there was no coincidence. Jia, Lu, 
Zhong and Yao (2009) distinguished between evaluation and generation of 
conclusions and found that the effect appears to be the reverse when participants are 
asked to evaluate a conclusion rather than generate one of their own.   
 Chater and Oaksford (1999) argue that the phenomenon occurs because of the 
attachment-heuristic. The conclusion is determined by which premise contains the end 




becomes the subject of the conclusion. If not, then the end term of the max-premise 
becomes the subject of the conclusion.  The max-premise is the first premise and is the 
basis for consideration in comparison with the second (min-premise) to determine the 
conclusion of the syllogism. The max-premise is the most informative one, while the 
min-premise is the least informative one. For example, in the syllogism: 
 
All B are A (max-premise is most informative as it defines the relationship 
between A and B) 
Some C are B (min-premise is least informative as it contains additional 
information to be considered) 
Some C are A (by attachment the subject of the min premise appears in the 
conclusion) 
  
 Yule and Stenning (1997) use the Source-Founding Hypothesis to explain the 
effect. They state that “the terms from the source premise will tend to precede the 
other end term in conclusions and will tend to retain the order in which they appear in 
the source premise”(Stenning & Yule, 1997, p. 128), suggesting that the figural effect 
occurs when the individual description is constructed from the source premise. The 
source premise contains the end term that forms the basis of comparison. For example, 
in the syllogism “All A are B, All B are C”, A is the end term of the source premise.  
 
3.4.  Belief bias 
 Belief bias is also thought to influence the reasoning process. It is described as 
the tendency for people to produce or endorse a conclusion that they believe to be 
true, even though that conclusion may be logically incorrect (Evans, Barston & 




1992; Roberts & Sykes, 2003). That is, conclusions are accepted not because they are 
necessary, but because they are believable. Therefore, an invalid conclusion may be 
chosen simply because it feels right (Thompson, 2009). Beliefs can distort 
interpretation of information and influence the deductive process (Garnham & 
Oakhill, 1994). Pre-existing beliefs may indeed influence the perception of new or 
additional data (Kormblith, 1993). 
Belief bias responses are also thought to increase under time pressure (Evans 
& Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006; Thompson, Prowse-Turner & 
Pennycook, 2011) or working memory load (De Neys, 2012). Whether or not beliefs 
affect judgement depends on the demands of the task as well as the nature of the 
reasoner (Wiswede, Koranyi, Mueller, Langner & Rothermund, 2013). Research 
suggests that some reasoning processes happen independently of each other (Bago & 
De Neys, 2017; Morsanyi & Handley, 2012; Trippas, Handley, Verde & Morsanyi, 
2016) and some suggest they happen simultaneously (De Neys, 2012, 2014; Handley 
& Trippas, 2015; Pennycook, Fugelsang & Koehler, 2015; Sloman, 2014). 
Default-interventionists claim that belief bias reasoning occurs first because it 
is fast and autonomous Type 1 reasoning, and it is more likely to occur when there is 
conflict between belief and logic and processing time is limited (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013a). Type 1 reasoning is fast and autonomous while Type 2 reasoning requires the 
use of working memory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013a, 2013b). In contrast, proponents 
of Parallel-processing claim that belief-biased and logically based processing 
commence at the same time (Trippas, Thompson & Handley, 2017). Mental Models 
theorists suggest that the type of response is determined by the complexity of the 
problem and the number of representations that are required to solve it (Johnson-




validity affects belief judgments, and vice versa, depends on the complexity of the 
reasoning process required to solve the problem at hand. They suggest that as the 
complexity of the problem increases, so too does the likelihood of logic being affected 
by belief. They examined this hypothesis over a series of experiments. 
Experiment 1 examined the notion that conflict between logic and belief 
should have a greater impact on belief judgements than logic judgments. Participants 
were presented with logical problems (eg. If a child is happy, then it cries; Suppose a 
child is happy; Does it follow that the child cries?) and asked to judge if the 
conclusion was valid or believable. Half of the problems were in modus ponens form 
(i.e., if p, then q; p, therefore q): valid/believable, invalid/unbelievable, and half were 
in modus tollens form (If p, then q; not q, therefore not p): valid/unbelievable and 
invalid/believable. The results showed that when there is a conflict between belief and 
logic, logical validity interfered with belief-judgments more than beliefs interfered 
with logic-judgments for modus ponens problems but this was not the case for more 
complex modus tollens problems. In the case of modus tollens problems, the effect 
occurred both ways. That is, logical validity affected belief judgments to the same 
degree that beliefs affected logic judgments. The results suggest that the effect of a 
conflict between belief and logic is a function of the complexity of the problem at 
hand (Handley & Trippas, 2015).  
Experiment 2 examined the notion that the opposite effect should happen if the 
logical complexity of the problem was increased. The experimental procedure was the 
same as that used in Experiment 1. The results showed that belief judgments interfered 
with logic judgments more when the problems were more complex. The results 
support the notion of parallel-processing, that both Type 1 and Type 2 processes are 




2017; Pennycook et al., 2015; Sloman, 2014) and the process that generates the 
solution is influenced by the complexity of the problem. 
It has been suggested that individuals with a greater working memory capacity 
are better able to avoid belief bias (De Neys, Schaeken, & D’Ydewalle, 2005) by 
overriding Type 1 processing and engaging with Type 2 processing to generate 
additional representations necessary for working through problems (Copeland & 
Radvansky, 2004; De Neys et al., 2005; Johnson-Laird, 2010; Markovits et al., 2002). 
Robison and Unsworth (2017) investigated the hypothesis that individuals with a 
higher working memory capacity were better able to reason independently of their 
beliefs and therefore be less susceptible to a belief bias effect. Participants were 
presented with three tasks measuring working memory capacity (operation span, 
symmetry span, and reading span), two tasks measuring fluid intelligence (letter sets 
and number series), and a syllogistic reasoning task. There were four categories of 
syllogisms: valid/believable conclusion; valid/unbelievable conclusion; 
invalid/believable conclusion; and invalid/unbelievable conclusion. The results 
showed no decrease in belief bias effect for participants with a higher working 
memory capacity. The experiment was repeated using syllogisms with nonsense 
words to rule out the possibility that resistance to belief bias was due merely to a lack 
of verbal reasoning abilities. The results turned out to be similar to those of the first 
experiment, providing further support for the notion that working memory capacity 
may not be an indicator of susceptibility to belief bias. 
Individual differences in reasoning style might affect how beliefs influence a 
person’s approach to problem solving. Past experience may engender a particular 
approach which may or may not lead to the correct solution but may feel right for that 




processing than Type 2 processing and will go with that approach regardless of the 
complexity of the problem. 
 
3.5.  Dyslexia and reasoning 
 Strategies involve either spatial or verbal representations. It is known that 
people with dyslexia have particular difficulty in manipulating written, verbal 
representations, and so they are an interesting group to investigate in terms of whether 
strategy choice is driven by difficulty of representation. The only study found that 
looks specifically at dyslexia in relation to reasoning is one conducted by Bacon, 
Handley and McDonald (2007), which examined how people with dyslexia handled 
reasoning with abstract and concrete or visually rich syllogisms in comparison with 
people without dyslexia, and the effects of visual imagery on dyslexia and reasoning. 
They posit that a visual image may create ‘noise’ (Sperling, Lu, Manis and 
Seidenberg, 2005) for people with dyslexia and this may influence how they reason or 
solve problems. In an earlier study, Bacon, Handley and Newstead (2004) concluded 
that verbal reasoners are able to work with abstract propositional form, drawing 
almost entirely on verbal working memory, while spatial reasoners require explicit 
visual images and use both verbal and spatial memory.  
 In a study observing how different strategies may affect reasoning, Bacon, 
Handley and McDonald (2007) found that verbal reasoners appeared to manipulate 
information in its abstract form. Like the participants in Ford (1995), verbal reasoners 
in the Bacon et al. study (2007) seemed to work the syllogisms like mathematical 
equations, switching and substituting the terms between the premises. They appeared 
to be using rules that related the conclusions with the quantifier and, as a result, 




quantifier to the premises. Their verbal reports described actions such as replacing, 
substituting and cancelling syllogistic terms. In contrast, spatial reasoners manipulated 
the information in a more concrete way. Their workings showed terms within shapes 
which signified spatial relationships between the premises, while their verbal reports 
described terms as groups or subsets. In addition, spatial reasoners consistently 
reported using vivid images of the material when reasoning, whereas verbal reasoners 
did not. Bacon, Handley and Newstead (2004) suggest that while verbal reasoners use 
mainly verbal working memory and seem happy to reason with information in a fairly 
abstract form, spatial reasoners use both verbal and spatial resources and seem to 
require a more explicit visual representation.  
 Bacon et al. (2007) manipulated stimulus content in order to compare 
reasoning strategies across concrete and abstract materials. It was expected that if 
individuals with dyslexia conceptualised information in a visuospatial rather than 
verbal way, then a higher proportion of people with dyslexia should be spatial 
reasoners. 
 Two sets of problems were created from eight of the 27 valid syllogism forms 
identified by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991). The first set contained sporting terms 
in English, for example, “Some golfers are tennis players, All tennis players are 
surfers”. This set was used as the concrete condition because the terms were 
supposedly easier to visualise (Bacon et al., 2007). The second set contained the same 
English sporting terms translated into Welsh, for example, “Some ymholiadou are 
perythnas, All perythnas are diweddaru”. This represented the abstract condition. 
Participants were required to write down all their workings in a workbook and say out 




 Strategies were identified based on the procedure from a previous study 
(Bacon et al., 2003). In this study participants were presented with the same 27 
syllogisms used by Ford (1995) in two conditions, the first employing both verbal and 
written protocols, and the second employing written protocol only.  The results 
revealed participants to be using verbal and spatial strategies. Verbal reasoners 
substituted the common term from one premise into another, drew arrows to signify 
relationships between terms, and their verbal reports described activities such as 
cancelling terms. Spatial reasoners treated terms in the premises as groups or sub-
groups, drew spatial arrays to describe relationships, and their verbal reports described 
group membership and spatial arrangements.  
 Of the participants with dyslexia (N = 20) in the Bacon et al. (2007) study, 
55% demonstrated a spatial approach, 20% a verbal approach, 20% were mixed, and 
5% were indeterminate. Of the participants without dyslexia (N = 19), 32% 
demonstrated a spatial approach, while 58% demonstrated a verbal approach, 10% 
were indeterminate, and none were mixed. Therefore, 75% of all the participants with 
dyslexia (mixed approach participants were included) demonstrated a spatial 
approach, compared to just 35.3% of the participants without dyslexia.  Both groups 
of participants tended to substitute letters for words in the abstract (Welsh) condition 
and performed similarly. With regards to the concrete condition, participants with 
dyslexia produced 10% more correct conclusions to syllogisms with Welsh terms, 
compared to those with English terms. Participants without dyslexia performed 
slightly better in the concrete condition. These results suggest that the reasoning 
strategy used by participants with dyslexia may be impaired with visually concrete 
materials. The imagery clutters the working memory and thereby creates a greater 




 If people with dyslexia are operating under working memory constraints 
(Ackerman & Dykman, 1993; Brunswick, McCrory, Price, Frith & Frith, 1999; 
McDougall & Donohoe, 2002; Mcloughlin, Fitzgibbon & Young, 1994; Plaza, Cohen 
& Chevrie-Muller, 2002), it may be the case that more complex reasoning or conflicts 
between belief and logic are less likely to be carried forward to Type 2 processing (De 
Neys et al., 2005; Trippas et al., 2017).  Research has shown that load task affected 
performance on problems that required analytic (Type 2) reasoning but not on 
problems that required heuristic (Type 1) reasoning (Franssens & De Neys, 2009) and 
that visuospatial memory deficits come to the forefront only when the task at hand 
requires the person to engage with it verbally (Gould & Glencross, 1990; Thomson, 
1982). In addition, a phonological deficit (Frith, 1985; Snowling, 2000; Stanovich, 
1988) may render the representations degraded and not distinct enough (Mody, 
Studdert-Kennedy & Brady, 1997; Snowling, 2000) for further processing. 
 One point to consider with the Bacon et al. (2007) study is that participants 
were not tested for non-verbal ability, to ensure there were no significant differences 
between the participants with dyslexia and those without dyslexia. While it can be 
assumed that a certain level of cognitive ability must be present to pursue university 
level education, differences may be masked by the use of various coping strategies.   
 Another point to note is that the English terms are all sporting terms, thus 
making the assumption that all participants are familiar with them. There may be 
participants with no interest in sports and are thus less capable of visualising many of 
the terms. A difficulty in forming representations of the sporting terms could have 




 To ensure comparability between groups of participants, the studies in my 
thesis tests for non-verbal ability using the Ravens Progressive Matrices test, and the 
terms in the syllogisms come from a variety of areas of people and objects. 
 
3.6.  Purpose of the studies in this chapter 
 The aim of the experiments in this chapter is twofold. The first aim is to 
examine the reasoning strategies of participants with dyslexia compared to 
participants without dyslexia and observe if they were affected differently by figural 
effects.  The figural effect is the tendency to create solutions in the same form as the 
premise containing the subject, also known as a response bias. Participants were 
required to solve all 27 syllogisms with a valid conclusion. The syllogisms were 
separated into three categories based on level of difficulty for verbal and spatial 
reasoners (Ford, 1995): easiest for verbal reasoners (EV), easiest for spatial reasoners 
(ES), and equally difficult for both types of reasoners (HSV). If people with dyslexia 
tend to employ a spatial strategy, the participants with dyslexia were expected to 
perform better on syllogisms that are easiest for spatial reasoners and less well on 
syllogisms that are easiest for verbal reasoners. Participants without dyslexia were 
expected to perform better on syllogisms that are easiest for verbal reasoners and less 
well on syllogisms that are easiest for spatial reasoners. 
 The second aim was to observe the effect of belief bias in participants with 
dyslexia compared to participants without dyslexia. Belief bias is the tendency for 
people to produce or endorse conclusions that they believe to be true, regardless of 
their logical validity. In other words, a conclusion might be accepted not because it is 
logical or necessary, but because it is believable. Dyslexia has been widely accepted 




spoken attributes of words (Snowling, 2000). Bacon et al. (2007) demonstrated that 
people with dyslexia tend to adopt a spatial strategy, while people without dyslexia 
tend to adopt a verbal strategy. They further suggest that when reasoning involves 
visually rich information (concrete terms that evoke strong visual images) the use of a 
spatial strategy may lead to less effective reasoning in people with dyslexia.  
 To determine how people with dyslexia handle reasoning with syllogisms it is 
necessary to understand how linguistic information is processed. A sentence-picture 
verification task (Macleod, Hunt & Mathews, 1978) is one way of assessing how well 
people represent and process linguistic structures involved in deductive reasoning 
problems. However, Roberts, Wood and Gilmore (1994) suggest it is difficult to 
classify people from this type of research into types of strategies. For example, 
participants may not fully understand the nature of the task they are required to 
perform (Marquer & Pereira, 1990), or one strategy may be masked by another if the 
method for measuring them is not robust enough (Siegler, 1987). Roberts et al. (1994) 
report that while there are issues with the various methods for classifying strategy 
choices, the principle that makes the best use of their individual cognitive resources is 
sound. 
 In sentence-picture verification tasks participants compare the representation 
of a negative or affirmative sentence with a picture then decide whether the sentence 
matches that picture or not. The conditions are usually true affirmative (TA), false 
affirmative (FA), true negative (TN), and false negative (FN) in combinations of the 
sentences using the words star and plus, such as STAR IS ABOVE PLUS, STAR IS 
NOT ABOVE PLUS, and PLUS IS BELOW STAR. The sentences are followed by a 
picture of a star and a cross in a form that either matches or doesn’t match the 




comprehension time was significantly longer for negative sentences than for 
affirmative sentences, and picture verification time was longer for false responses than 
for true responses, and negative responses were longer than affirmative responses. 
They found participants tended to use one of two strategies: a pictorial-spatial strategy 
in which the subject reads the sentence, forms a representation of the sentence, 
converts the sentence representation to a picture representation, observes the picture, 
forms a representation of the picture, then compares the picture representation with 
the sentence representation; and a linguistic strategy in which the subject reads the 
sentence, forms a representation of the sentence, observes the picture, converts the 
picture to a sentence representation, then compares the representations. The difference 
between the two strategies is the extra step employed by the pictorial model of 
converting the sentence representation to a picture representation before moving on to 
observing the picture. This extra step increases response time. Hence, participants who 
adopt a spatial style will tend to take longer on the task than those who adopt a verbal 
strategy.   
 
3.7.  Study 1 
 This study investigated individual differences in reasoning strategy selection 
when solving syllogisms, as well as observing any figural effects, focusing on the 
differences between participants with dyslexia and participants without dyslexia. The 
participants were required to solve all 27 syllogisms with a valid conclusion (Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 1991). The syllogisms were separated into three categories based on 
level of difficulty for verbal and spatial reasoners (Ford, 1995): easiest for verbal 
reasoners (EV), easiest for spatial reasoners (ES), and equally difficult for both types 




spatial strategy, then the participants with dyslexia are expected to perform better on 
syllogisms that are easiest for spatial reasoners and less well on syllogisms that are 
easiest for verbal reasoners, and participants without dyslexia are expected to perform 
better on syllogisms that are easiest for verbal reasoners and less well on syllogisms 
that are easiest for spatial reasoners. 
 
3.7.1.  Method 
 
Participants 
 Participants were 43 Lancaster University undergraduate students: with 
dyslexia (13 female, 6 male) and without dyslexia (19 female, 5 male) with mean age 
19.8 years (SD = 2.12). The mean age of participants with dyslexia was 19.9 years 
(SD = 2.25) and the mean age of participants without dyslexia was also 19.7 years 
(SD = 2.05). Participants without dyslexia were recruited via Sona, the department’s 
online participant recruitment system. Self-reported participants with dyslexia were 
also recruited via Sona. On behalf of the researcher, the Student Support office kindly 
contacted students who were recorded by the university as having been officially 
assessed as having dyslexia. Participants with dyslexia and participants without 
dyslexia who were not psychology majors were paid £7.50. Psychology majors were 
given course credit. Twenty-nine of the participants were Psychology majors. 
Reasoning with syllogisms was not a topic on the Psychology syllabus during the 
testing period. The non-Psychology majors were students in Engineering, Natural 






 A shortened version on the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices (Bilker, 
Hansen, Brensinger, Richard, Gur, & Gur, 2012) was used to test general cognitive 
ability of all participants.  
 All 27 syllogisms with a logical conclusion (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) 
were separated into three categories based on level of difficulty for verbal and spatial 
reasoners (Ford, 1995). The categories were: easiest for verbal reasoners (EV), easiest 
for spatial reasoners (ES), and equally difficult for both types of reasoners (HSV).   
The terms of the premises were all taken from Ford’s (1995) study.  The figure of the 
syllogisms was not evenly distributed across the three conditions. Table 3.2 shows the 
distribution. 
 
Table 3.2: Distribution of the figure of the syllogisms x problem type. 
  Problem Type 
Figure HSV ES EV 
AB/BC 0 4 2 
AB/CB 1 4 1 
BA/BC 5 3 1 
BA/CB 1 1 4 
 
 Each syllogism was presented separately in random order on a Mac computer. 
Below each syllogism was a box for participants to type their solutions. Clicking the 
OK button advanced to the next syllogism. 
 
Design 
 A 2 x 3 mixed design was used. The between-subjects factor was dyslexic 




EV, HSV). The dependent measures were the number of syllogisms solved correctly 
and the time taken to solve each one. 
 
Procedure 
 Participants were tested in a single session lasting approximately one hour. 
The shortened version of the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices was presented 
first in a booklet. Participants were given the choice of either circling their selection or 
writing their selection number in the space for the missing piece. They took 
approximately 15 minutes to complete the task. 
 The participants were then presented with all 27 syllogisms, one at a time in 
random order on a Mac computer. They were asked to type their conclusion in the box 
provided and were told they had two minutes (120 seconds) to do so. If no response 
was made after the two-minute time limit, a message would pop up to prompt them to 
write their answer. No participant required prompting. The longest response time was 
118.90 seconds. 
 
3.7.2.  Results 
  The study data were analysed by problem type: easiest for verbal reasoners 
(EV), easiest for spatial reasoners (ES), and equally difficult for both types of 
reasoners (HSV); and by the figure of the syllogism, which is determined by the 
location of the middle term, B, in the standard form, where A is the major term, and C 
is the minor term (Johnson-Laird, 1983). The dependent variables were accuracy and 
response times. The data were not analysed by problem type x figure x dyslexic status 






 A mixed design ANOVA was performed on the number of correctly solved 
syllogisms with the problem type (ES, EV and HSV) as the within-subjects factor and 
dyslexic status (dyslexia v non-dyslexia) as the between-subjects factor, and number 
of correctly solved problems as the dependent variable. The proportion of correctly 
solved syllogisms for each subject was calculated as the total of each type correctly 
solved divided by the number of each type (ES = 9 problems, HSV = 11 problems, EV 
= 7 problems). See Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3: Proportion of correctly solved problems by level of difficulty for verbal  
 and spatial reasoners. 
 
 
ES   HSV   EV 
 Dyslexic 
Non-
dyslexic   Dyslexic 
Non-
dyslexic   Dyslexic 
Non-
dyslexic 





SD 0.29 0.28   0.24 0.27   0.28 0.21 
 
 The main effect of dyslexic status was not significant, F (1, 41) = .66, p = .42, 
η2 = .02. There was a significant main effect of problem type, F(1, 41) = 10.49, p < 
.001, η2 = .20. The number of correctly solved syllogisms was higher for ES (M = 
0.48, SD = 0.28) than for EV (M = 0.36, SD = 0.24) and for HSV (M = 0.35, SD = 
0.25), whereas the number of correctly solved syllogisms was almost identical for EV 
and HSV. See Figure 3.1. A pairwise comparison using Bonferroni correction showed 




significant difference between HSV and EV.  There was no significant interaction 
between problem type x dyslexic status, F(1, 41) = .795, p = .46, η2 = .02.  
 
Figure 3.1: Overall number of correctly solved syllogisms x problem type. 
 
 
 An independent samples t-test using the raw scores from the shortened version 
of the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices showed a significant difference between 
participants with dyslexia (M = 6.47, SD = 2.22) and participants without dyslexia (M 
= 5.25, SD = 1.23), t(39) = 2.29, p = .027.  
 The ANOVA was repeated again with the scores from the Ravens Standard 
Progressive Matrices test as a covariate. The main effect of problem type was not 
significant, F(2, 80) =.49, p = .62, η2 = .01. The interaction between problem type x 
Ravens status was also not significant, F(2, 80) = .05, p = .95, η2 = .001, as well as 
that of problem type x dyslexia, F(2, 80) = .74, p = .48, η2 = .02. The between-




























 In order to test the effect of different syllogistic Figures on performance, the 
data was collated by the figure of the syllogisms and analysed with a repeated 
measures 2 x 4 ANOVA with Figure (Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4) as 
within-subjects factor and dyslexic status (dyslexia, non-dyslexia) as between-subjects 
factor. Table 3.4 shows the proportion of correctly solved syllogisms by Figure. 
 
Table 3.4: Proportion of correctly solved problems by Figure. 
 







dyslexic   
Dyslexic Non-
dyslexic   
Dyslexic Non-
dyslexic 
Mean 0.33 0.38  0.44 0.38   0.51 0.35   0.43 0.38 
SD 0.24 0.24  0.27 0.27   0.30 0.25   0.28 0.25 
 
 There was a significant main effect of Figure, F(3, 41) = 2.66, p = .05, η2 = 
.06. The overall number of correctly solved syllogisms was similar for Figure 1 (M = 
0.36, SD = 0.24) and Figure 4 (M = 0.39, SD = 0.26). Likewise, the overall number of 
correctly solved syllogisms and was similar for Figure 2 (M = 0.42, SD = 0.27) and 
Figure 3 (M = 0.42, SD = 0.28). More Figure 2 and Figure 3 syllogisms were solved 
correctly than Figure 1 and Figure 4 syllogisms.  The main effect of dyslexic status 
was not significant, F(1, 42) = .66, p = .42, η2 = .02. 
 There was a significant interaction between Figure x dyslexic status, F(3, 41) = 
4.52, p = .005, η2 = .10. Figure 2 shows participants with dyslexia solved more 
problems correctly than participants without dyslexia for the Figure 2, Figure 3 and 
Figure 4, and participants without dyslexia solved more problems correctly for the 




 Post hoc comparisons indicated a significant difference between groups only 
for Figure 3, F(3, 41) = 3.83, p = .057, η2 = .09. Participants with dyslexia solved 
significantly more problems correctly than participants without dyslexia for Figure 3. 
There were no significant differences for Figure 1 (F (3, 41) = .44, p = .51, η2 = .01), 
Figure 2 (F (3, 41) = .53, p = .47, η2 = .01), or Figure 4 (F (3, 41) = .57, p = .46, η2 = 
.01). 
 The ANOVA was repeated with the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices 
scores as a covariate to account for the difference in scores between groups. The main 
effect of Figure was not significant, F(3, 41) = .24, p = .89, η2 = .005. There was also 
no significant interaction between Figure x Ravens, F (3, 41) = .22, p = .88, η2 = .006. 
Likewise, the effect of dyslexic status was not significant either, F (3, 41) = .09, p = 
.77, η2 = .002. The Figure x dyslexic status was still significant, although the effect 




 A mixed design ANOVA was performed on the time (in seconds) taken to 
solve the syllogisms with the problem type (ES, HSV, EV) as the within-subjects 
factors and dyslexic status (dyslexia, non-dyslexia) as the between-subjects factors, 
and response time (in seconds) as the dependent variable. The response time score was 
the average time taken for each type of problem for each participant. Table 3.5 shows 
the mean response times for each problem type: easiest for verbal reasoners (EV), 





Table 3.5: Response times (in seconds) for problem type. 
  ES   HSV   EV 
 Dyslexic 
Non-
dyslexic  Dyslexic 
Non-
dyslexic  Dyslexic 
Non-
dyslexic 
Mean 46.33 43.25  46.51 43.57  49.61 41.69 
SD 11.97 11.4   13.85 11.92   14.26 12.18 
 
 The main effect of problem type was not significant, F(1, 41) = .16, p = .85, η2 
= .004. The interaction between problem type x dyslexic status was also not 
significant, F(1, 41) = 1.69, p = .19, η2 = .04. Overall, participants with dyslexia took 
longer to solve the problems than their counterparts without dyslexia, but not 
significantly so. The between-subjects main effect of dyslexic status was not 
significant, F(1, 41) = 1.85, p = .18, η2 = .04. 
 
Figure 
 The data was collated by Figure of the syllogisms and analysed with a repeated 
measures 2 x 4 ANOVA with Figure (Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4) as 
within-subjects factors and dyslexic state (dyslexia, non-dyslexia) as between-subjects 
factors. Table 3.6 shows the average response times for solving the problems when 
analysed by Figure of the syllogism. 
 
Table 3.6: Time taken (in seconds) to solve problems by Figure. 
  Figure 1   Figure 2   Figure 3   Figure 4 
 Dyslexic 
Non-
dyslexic  Dyslexic 
Non-
dyslexic  Dyslexic 
Non-
dyslexic  Dyslexic 
Non-
dyslexic 
Mean 45.18 41.51  48.64 45.86  48.06 44.06  45.28 40.38 






A Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p>.05) (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965; Razali & Wah, 2011) and a 
visual inspection of their histograms, normal Q-Q plots and box plots showed that the 
response times for each syllogism figure type were approximately normally 
distributed for both people with dyslexia and people without dyslexia, with skewness 
and kurtosis as shown in Table 3.7. 
 
Table 3.7: Skewness and kurtosis of dyslexic status x syllogism figure type. 
    Skewness   Kurtosis 
    Statistic Std. Error   Statistic Std. Error 
Figure 1  Dyslexic -0.05 0.52  -0.82 1.01 
 Non-dyslexic -0.37 0.47  -0.92 0.92 
       
Figure 2  Dyslexic -0.28 0.52  -0.49 1.01 
 Non-dyslexic 0.78 0.47  1.50 0.92 
       
Figure 3  Dyslexic -0.11 0.52  -1.07 1.01 
 Non-dyslexic 0.57 0.47  -0.65 0.92 
       
Figure 4  Dyslexic 0.54 0.52  -0.27 1.01 
  Non-dyslexic 0.82 0.47   0.55 0.92 
 
 The ANOVA results showed a significant main effect of Figure, F(3, 41) = 
2.78, p = .04, η2 = .06. As shown in Figure 3.2, overall Figure 2 took the longest to 
solve (M = 47.25, SD = 13.15), followed by Figure 3 (M = 46.06, SD = 13.67), then 
Figure 1 (M = 43.34, SD = 12.43), and then Figure 4 (M = 42.83, SD = 12.56). A 
pairwise comparison showed significant differences between Figure 1 and Figure 2 (p 













 While participants with dyslexia took an average of 4 seconds longer (M = 
46.79, SD = 13.48) than participants without dyslexia (M = 42.95, SD = 12.41) in all 
of the Figures, there was no significant between-subjects main effect of dyslexic 
status, F(3, 41) = 1.34, p = .26, η2 = .03. The interaction between Figure x dyslexic 
status was also not significant, F(3, 41) = .03, p = .86, η2 = .001. 
 Analysing the data with the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices scores as a 
covariate reduced the significance of Figure, F(3, 41) = 2.24, p = .09, η2 = .05. There 
was no significant between-subjects main effect of dyslexic status, F(1,40) = 2.39, p = 
.13, η2 = .06. There was no significant interaction of response Figure x Ravens, F(3, 




























3.7.3.  Discussion 
 This study aimed to determine strategy selection when solving syllogisms, 
focusing on the differences between participants with dyslexia and participants 
without dyslexia. Participants were required to solve all 27 syllogisms with a logical 
conclusion (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). The syllogisms were separated into three 
categories based on level of difficulty for verbal and spatial reasoners (Ford, 1995): 
easiest for verbal reasoners (EV), easiest for spatial reasoners (ES), and equally 
difficult for both types of reasoners (HSV). The results showed no overall difference 
between participants with dyslexia and participants without dyslexia. There was a 
significant main effect when the data were analysed by problem type. Overall, the 
number of correctly solved syllogisms was higher for ES than for EV and for HSV. In 
fact, performance was almost identical for EV and HSV. 
 The results support the notion that people tend to reason in a verbal or spatial 
manner (Ford, 1995), but failed to support the hypothesis that there is a difference in 
strategy selection between participants with dyslexia and participants without 
dyslexia. It should be noted that participants with dyslexia solved more syllogisms 
correctly on average than participants without dyslexia in all categories, but not 
significantly so.  
 Some studies have shown that the figure of the syllogism can affect reasoning 
(Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Stupple & Ball, 2007). Morely, Evans and Handley 
(2004) found evidence that figural bias occurred in the absence of belief bias in a 
production task. Research has suggested that syllogistic reasoning is affected by the 
position of the terms (Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990; Ford, 1995; Polk & Newell, 1995; 
Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Yule & Stenning, 1992). Jia, Lu, Zhong and Yao (2009) 




(B-A, C-B). Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) suggest that figural effects occur when 
participants integrate premises. Results of the present study suggest that the position 
of the end terms in each premise could indeed be an important factor in reasoning 
strategy for participants with dyslexia. Participants without dyslexia performed 
similarly across all Figures. Participants with dyslexia performed better than those 
without dyslexia on Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4. Their performance was best on 
Figure 3, implying that solution is easier for participants with dyslexia if the end term 
is the subject of both premises. 
 This suggests the possibility that syllogisms are easier for people with dyslexia 
to solve if the end term is the predicate in the first premise and the subject of the 
second premise. Therefore, for Figure 1 and Figure 3, the reasoner would have to 
reverse the position of the end term so that it appears last. When it comes to 
integrating the second premise, they would have to reverse the end terms for Figure 1 
and Figure 4. This will result in one change each for Figure 1 and Figure 4, and two 
changes for Figure 1 because the end terms have to be reversed for each of the 
premises. If we assume that the first premise forms the basis of judgment, at least for 
people with dyslexia, it can possibly explain the similarity in performance in Figure 2 
and Figure 4. The first premise is in the correct order, so they only need to adjust the 
end terms in the second premise – meaning that only one additional operation had to 
be performed.  Similarly, for Figure 3, the reasoner only needs to reverse the end 
terms in the first premise. Figure 1 is different from the others in that the end term is 
the subject of the first premise and the predicate of the second premise. This would 
require two operations to prepare it for calculation. The first premise must be adjusted 
so the end term becomes the predicate and the second premise must be adjusted so the 




working memory can affect the calculation process, as disruption and impairment in 
processing can occur when information has to be moved between the modality-
specific memory systems by the central executive. 
 The interaction between figure x dyslexic status provides some support for the 
notion that people with dyslexia tend towards a spatial strategy when reasoning 
(Bacon et al., 2007). Four out of the six Figure 3 (AB/CB) syllogisms were in the 
category that was easiest for spatial reasoners (Ford, 1995).  Research by Smith-
Spark, Fisk, Fawcett and Nicolson (2003) show evidence of verbal working memory 
impairments in people with dyslexia, while spatial memory appears to be largely 
unimpaired. Having to perform fewer operations with syllogisms in their favour may 
have afforded them a measure of advantage over their non-dyslexic peers. 
 Another explanation for the relatively poorer performance on Figure 1 
syllogisms by participants with dyslexia is the notion of backward processing. 
Dickstein (1978) found that more errors occurred when the direction of information 
promotes backward processing of information. He highlights the fact that no 
significant difference occurs when both forward and backward processing leads to the 
same conclusion. The issue of phonological processing problems may hinder 
participants with dyslexia more so than participants without dyslexia.  
 People with dyslexia tend to perform less well in tasks that are particularly 
demanding in terms of phonological processing (Szenkovits & Ramus, 2005). A 
deficit in phonological processing may be due to impairment in forming high-fidelity 
phonological representations or it may be impairment in memory for phonological 
representations. It has been suggested that phonological representations are 
unimpaired, and it is only phonological memory load that makes a difference (Swan & 




certain task requirements, particularly those that involve short-term memory (Amitay, 
Ben-Yehudah, Banai & Ahissar, 2002; Banai & Ahissar, 2006; Ben-Yehudah, Sackett, 
Malchi-Ginzberg & Ahissar, 2001; Ramus & Szenkovits, 2008). Ramus and 
Szenkovits (2008) suggest the reason people with dyslexia perform poorly under 
memory load is because phonological representations are degraded, and some 
phonetic features are missing when they need to be repeated or discriminated; or the 
representations are intact but there is not enough capacity in their short term memory 
to carry out the tasks. 
 Wagner and Torgesen (1987) say the main characteristics of phonological 
deficit are poor phonological awareness involving conscious awareness and 
manipulation of phonological representations; poor verbal short term memory 
involving the storage of words for a short period of time in phonological buffers or 
cycling them through the phonological loop during processing; and slow retrieval of 
lexical phonological representations from long term memory. Research suggests that 
phonological representations in people with dyslexia are degraded and not distinct 
enough (Mody, Studdert-Kennedy & Brady, 1997; Snowling, 2000), coarsely coded, 
under-specified or noisy (Elbro, 1996; Hulme & Snowling, 1992a).  
A phonological deficit creates an impairment in the ability to access phonological 
representations of words (Frith, 1985; Snowling, 2000; Stanovich, 1988).  
 Participants with dyslexia in the present study were faced with having to hold 
their original representations in working memory while trying to switch around the 
terms to solve the problems, meaning that those representations may have gradually 
become degraded over time. Figure 1 (AB/BC) requires backward processing 




In addition, impairments to phonological working memory would affect conversion of 
representations from verbal to non-verbal. 
 A limitation of this study is that background reading and spelling measures 
were not taken for self-reporting participants and for those without dyslexia. The 
participants with dyslexia had already been assessed by the university disabilities 
office. 
 
3.8.  Study 2  
 The aim of this study was to observe the effect of belief bias in participants 
with dyslexia compared to participants without dyslexia. The study was conducted in 
two parts. Part 1 was a sentence-picture verification task to assess how participants 
with and without dyslexia represent and process linguistic structures. If people with 
dyslexia tend to adopt a spatial strategy (Bacon et al., 2007) and conceptualise 
information in a visuospatial rather than verbal way (Von Karolyi et al., 2003), it is 
expected that they will take longer on sentence comprehension as they will be more 
likely to take the extra step of converting the sentences into pictorial representations. 
Carpenter and Just (1975) describe a constituent comparison model which makes three 
assumptions: sentences are represented internally by logical propositions that are a 
function of the surface structure, pictures are represented internally by the logical 
propositions that are equivalent to the affirmative statement which describes them, and 
after both representations are formed they are compared until the constituent 
components are agreed or resolved.  
 Part 2 was a syllogism solving task. If people with dyslexia tend to use a more 
spatial approach to problem solving and are hindered by visually rich stimuli (Bacon 




rich belief bias syllogisms and therefore perform worse on those than participants 
without dyslexia. 
 Each of these stages is presented in turn, in terms of method and results. 
 
 
3.8.1.  Part 1 – Sentence-Picture verification 
 The aim of Part 1 was to compare the performance on a sentence-picture 
verification task of people with dyslexia to people without dyslexia. Participants were 
presented with true affirmative, true negative, false affirmative and false negative 
concrete and less concrete sentences in random order. From this point on, the less 
concrete sentences will be referred to as abstract. The participants could choose when 
to view a picture which either matched or did not match the sentence. Abstract 
sentences were paired with abstract pictures and concrete sentences were paired with 
concrete pictures. The experimental trials were manipulated so that half of the stimuli 
were abstract, while the other half were concrete. The abstract sentence stimuli were 
the words star and plus. The concrete picture stimuli were boat and plane. Boat and 
plane were selected as they were expected to be more likely to evoke strong visual 
imagery.  
  
3.8.2.  Method 
Participants 
 A total of 39 participants took part in the experiment, 20 females (mean age 
20.73, SD = 0.99) and 19 males (mean age 20.26, SD = 1.82).  The participants were 
all Lancaster University students whose first language was English. Of the total 




without dyslexia (11 female, 9 male). One participant’s data was not used as he was 
not able to complete task 2. 
 The participants with dyslexia were recruited through an advertisement in the 
Job Shop section of the Lancaster University Student Union website, a poster on the 
notice board in the department, and the Sona system (the Psychology Department’s 
online participant recruitment system). Participants without dyslexia were recruited 
only through the Sona system. Participants were tested individually in sessions lasting 




 The stimuli for the sentence-picture verification task were modelled from those 
used by MacLeod et al. (1978).  The stimuli consisted of two sets of sentences and 
pictures, one abstract and the other concrete. The abstract set consisted of the 
sentences STAR OVER PLUS, PLUS OVER STAR, STAR NOT OVER PLUS, and 
PLUS NOT OVER STAR followed by a picture of either a star above a plus or a plus 
above a star. The concrete version consisted of the sentences PLANE OVER BOAT, 
BOAT OVER PLANE, PLANE NOT OVER BOAT and BOAT NOT OVER PLANE 
followed by a picture of either a plane above a boat or a boat above a plane. The 
pictures were all sourced from Microsoft Clipart. The stimuli were presented on a Mac 
computer in a research lab in the Psychology Department. The response keys were 
labelled TRUE and FALSE. The same computer was used for all participants. Figure 






Figure 3.3: Example of abstract and concrete stimuli. 
 




Design and Analysis 
 A 2x2x2x2 mixed design was used. The within-subjects factors were sentence 
and picture type (abstract, concrete), positivity of sentence (is, is not), match between 
sentence and picture (match, no match). The between-subjects factor was dyslexic 
status. The dependent measures were the sentence comprehension time (RT1) and the 
picture verification time to identify whether the picture matched the sentence 
presented before (RT2) or not. Two sets of data were recorded for each trial: a) 
response time from presentation of the sentence to when the subject pressed a key for 
presentation of the picture and b) response time for when the subject selected true or 
false.  
 To ensure reliability of the data, only reaction times for correct responses that 
fell within three standard deviations above and below the overall mean within each 




standard deviations above and below the mean, so no data was omitted.  Elimination 
of the incorrect responses resulted in a loss of 7% of the data collected. 
 
Procedure 
Participants in this study were not tested for cognitive ability. The multiple 
parts of this study precluded testing for cognitive ability due to time constraints. After 
reading a brief description of the experiment and signing a consent form, participants 
were given the following instructions: 
 
You are going to be asked to make judgments about whether a 
simple picture is true in relation to a sentence. Here's how the task 
will work.  First, you will see the sentence for as long as you need. 
For example, STAR IS ABOVE PLUS may appear.  When you are 
ready for the picture, click the 'OK' button. A half-second later, a 
picture will appear.  Your task is to indicate whether this picture is 
true with relation to the sentence you just read. If it is, click the 
'TRUE' button; if not click the 'FALSE' button.  Then the next 
sentence will appear, and so on.  What we are interested in is how 
long you spend in reading the sentence and on making your True-
False judgment for the picture. You should try to go as quickly as 
you can, without making errors. 
 
 Participants were then given two practice trials and the opportunity to ask 
questions. The experimental stimuli were presented on a Mac computer in two blocks 
of 32 trials, with a short break in between. The order of sentences and pictures were 
fully randomised by the computer. Participants were instructed to indicate whether or 
not the picture matched the sentence by pressing keys on the computer keyboard 




pressing any key revealed the picture after a half second delay. Most participants 
ended up using the true and false keys to move the stimuli along. 
 
3.8.3.  Results 
  Mean response times were collated for each participant within each test 
condition (dyslexic abstract match, dyslexic concrete match, non-dyslexic abstract 
match, non-dyslexic concrete no match, and so on).  The mean response times for 
sentence comprehension and picture verification across all conditions are presented in 
Table 3.8. 
 
Table 3.8: Mean response time (in seconds) for sentence-picture verification task. 
 Sentence (RT1) Picture (RT2) 
Is Is not Is Is not 
Match No-
match 




Dyslexic abstract 2.61 2.60 3.54 3.52 1.40 1.78 2.14 2.65 
Dyslexic concrete 2.69 2.72 3.40 3.74 1.60 1.56 2.11 2.22 
Non-dyslexic 
abstract 
1.74 1.75 2.60 2.79 1.05 1.38 1.73 1.84 
Non-dyslexic 
concrete 
1.78 1.86 2.72 2.64 1.19 1.50 1.77 1.81 
 
Sentence comprehension (RT1) 
 A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with sentence comprehension 
(RT1) as the dependent variable showed a significant main effect for verification 
response (is/is not), F(1, 35) = 94.19, p < .001. Viewing times were longer for 
negative sentences (M = 3.12, SD = 1.02) than for affirmative sentences (M = 2.22, 
SD = .70). The main effect of dyslexic status was significant, F(1, 35) = 9.43, p < .05. 
Overall, participants with dyslexia took longer to view the sentences (M = 3.10, SD = 




mean response times for participants with dyslexia and participants without dyslexia 
for affirmative and negative sentences. The main effect of sentence type 
(abstract/concrete) was not significant, F(1, 35) = .72, p = .40. The main effect of 
match was also not significant, F(1, 35) = 1.46, p = .24. 
 
Table 3.9: Mean response times (in seconds) for participants with dyslexia and 




Negative (is not) 





 There was no significant interaction between sentence type x dyslexic status, 
F(1, 35) = .11, p = .74. There was also no significant interaction between 
affirmative/negative x dyslexic status, F (1, 35) = .001, p = .98 and between 
match/dyslexic status, F(1, 35) = .11, p = .75. The interaction between sentence type x 
affirmative/negative was not significant, F(1, 35) = .42, p = .52. The interaction 
between sentence type x match/no match was not significant, F(1, 35) = .20, p = .66. 
The interaction between affirmative/negative x match/no match was also not 
significant, F(1, 35) = .51, p = .48. 
 The interaction between sentence type x affirmative/negative x dyslexic status 
was not significant, F(1, 35) = .02, p = .88. The interaction between sentence type x 
affirmative/negative x dyslexic status was not significant, F(1, 35) = 1.96, p = .17. The 
interaction between affirmative/negative x match/no match x dyslexic status was also 
not significant, F(1, 35) = .35, p = .56. The interaction between sentence type x 




.94. The interaction between sentence type x affirmative/positive x match/no match x 
dyslexic status was not significant, F(1, 35) = 2.73, p = .11. 
 
Picture verification (RT2) 
 A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect 
for is/is not F(1,35) = 47.77, p < .001, indicating that response times were longer 
when a picture followed a negative sentence (M = 1.96, SD = .71) than when it 
followed an affirmative sentence (M = 1.43, SD = .41). There was also a significant 
main effect for match/no match F(1,35) = 8.302, p < .05, indicating that responses 
were longer when the sentence did not match the picture (M = 1.77, SD = .51) than 
when the sentence did match the picture (M = 1.63, SD = .59). The main effect of 
dyslexic status was not significant F(1,35) = 3.24, p = .08. The main effect of 
abstract/concrete was not significant, F(1, 35) = 1.10, p = .30.  
 There was a significant interaction between abstract/concrete x is/is not x 
match/no match x dyslexia/non-dyslexia F(1,35) = 5.41, p < .05. Participants with 
dyslexia took longer than participants without dyslexia to solve the problems across 
all conditions, with the longest time being when concrete pictures appeared with a 
negative sentence and did not match (Dyslexia: M = 2.22, SD = .75; Non-dyslexia: M 
= 1.81, SD = .65). See Figure 3.4. Comparing performance in each condition 
percentagewise, performance was most similar when concrete pictures appeared with 
a positive sentence and did not match (Dyslexia: M = 1.56, SD = .45; Non-dyslexia: 
M = 1.50, SD = .45), a difference of 4%, and the least similar was when concrete 
pictures appeared with a positive sentence and matched (Dyslexia: M = 1.60, SD = 
.57; Non-dyslexia: M = 1.19, SD = .32), a difference of 41%. Comparing performance 




appeared with a positive sentence and did not match, but is least similar when abstract 
pictures appeared with negative sentences and matched (Dyslexia: M = 2.14, SD = 
.90; Non-dyslexia: M = 1.73, SD = .85), a difference of 42 seconds. 
 
Figure 3.4: Mean response times (in seconds) for abstract/concrete x is/is not x 
match/no match x dyslexic status. 
 
 
The interaction between is/is not x match/no match was not significant, F(1,35) = 
3.56, p = .067 (see Figure 3.5); as was the interaction between abstract/concrete x is/is 
not x match/no match F(1,35) = 3.74, p = .06 (see Figure 3.6). 
 The interaction between abstract/concrete x dyslexic status was not significant, 
F(1, 35) = .14, p = .71. The interaction between is/is not x dyslexic status was not 
significant, F(1, 35) = .05, p = .83. The interaction between match/no match x 
dyslexic status was not significant, F(1, 35) = 1.17, p = .29. The interaction between 
abstract/concrete x is/is not was not significant, F(1, 35) = .04, p = .85. The interaction 



























.80, p = .38. The interaction between abstract/concrete x match/no match was not 
significant, F(1, 35) = 1.20, p = .28. The interaction between abstract/concrete x 
match/no match x dyslexic status was not significant, F(1, 35) = .20, p = .66. The 
interaction between is/is not x match/no match x dyslexic status was not significant, 
F(1, 35) = .14, p = .72. 
 
Figure 3.5: Mean response times (in seconds) when pictures match or do not match 
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 Overall, response times were longer for negative sentences than for affirmative 
sentences. Response times were also longer for participants with dyslexia than 
participants without dyslexia. The main effect for affirmative/negative sentences 
supports previous research that negatives slow down processing time (Gough, 1965; 
Slobin, 1966), which in turn suggests that individuals may be first converting negative 
terms into positive terms (Trabasso, 1970), thereby increasing sentence 
comprehension time.  
 The significant main effect of dyslexic status supports the notion of a 
phonological deficit in people with dyslexia (Snowling, 2000; Wagner & Torgensen, 
1987). In the current study, participants in with dyslexia demonstrated longer response 
times than participants without dyslexia for both negative and positive sentences, so 
the suggestion that negatives slow down comprehension time cannot account solely 
for the differences. High processing demands increases the cognitive load and this can 
lead to deficits on both verbal and visuospatial working memory in people with 
reading disabilities (Smith-Spark, Fisk, Fawcett and Nicolson, 2003; Swanson, 
Ashbaker & Lee, 1996). Research suggests that visuospatial memory deficits come to 
the forefront only when the task at hand requires the person to engage with it verbally 
(Gould & Glencross, 1990; Thomson, 1982). 
 
Picture verification 
 Overall participants took longer to judge whether a picture matched the 




sentence. They also took longer when the sentence did not match the picture than 
when it did match the picture. The interaction between is/is not x match/no match 
which approached significance suggests that while responses were longer when 
sentences do not match pictures, the effect is greater when the no-match follows a 
negative sentence.  
 Perhaps after forming a representation of the affirmative sentence the subject 
already has an expectation of seeing a matching picture so when the picture turns out 
not to match the sentence, the subject then has to reformulate the picture 
representation and compare it again with the sentence. According to the constituent 
comparison model (Just & Carpenter, 1975), the initial representation of the sentence 
is based on the surface structure and the representation of the picture is based on the 
logical proposition, so the time to process the problem is influenced by whether or not 
there is a match between the sentence and the picture. 
 Another interesting interaction which also approached significance was 
abstract/concrete x is/is not x match/no match. The difference is greater when there is 
a match between an affirmative sentence and a picture. It appears that all things being 
equal i.e. affirmative sentence paired with a picture that matches expectations, 
working memory is ‘free’ to process information without constraints. These two 
interesting results, even though they are not significant, may be explained by the lack 
of a significant main effect of abstract/concrete. However, the power of this study will 
be low for a 4-way ANOVA. 
 One possible explanation for the lack of significant results for abstract/concrete 
conditions in picture verification could be that the cross and star pictures may have 
been seen as concrete images rather than abstract, so the only difference between the 




matched the pictures. It is reasonable to say that everyone would have come across 
drawings of stars, for example in books or on Christmas cards, and crosses on a 
pharmacy sign or band aid box. In that respect, the star and cross would indeed be 
more concrete than abstract. More abstract stimuli can possibly be simple abstract 
drawings or non-alphabetic characters that are less likely to produce vivid imagery. 
 Finally, lack of significance for dyslexic status may be due to the reasoning 
process treating the abstract and concrete stimuli in the same way. Smith-Spark, Fisk, 
Fawcett and Nicolson (2003) have shown evidence of verbal working memory 
impairments in people with dyslexia, while spatial memory appears to be largely 
unimpaired. In the present study, the amount of effort required to process the 
linguistic structure would be relatively similar whether the picture stimuli is abstract 
or concrete. 
 Another possibility is the use of learned coping strategies. Kirby et al. (2008) 
reported that many students with dyslexia who have reached postsecondary studies 
have learnt various strategies, such as time management and the use of study aids, as 
well as deeper learning, for coping with their difficulties. Since the participants in the 
present study were all university students, they may be operating under whatever 
strategies or coping mechanisms they have learnt during their school years. 
 
3.9.  Part 2 – Syllogism solving 
 Part 2 examined the effect of belief bias in participants with dyslexia versus 
participants without dyslexia when solving syllogisms. participants solved 24 
syllogisms in three conditions: abstract, neutral and belief bias. Abstract syllogisms 
contained single letter terms – A, B and C. Neutral syllogisms contained terms 




contained terms describing people or objects that could be related to each other. The 
hypothesis of this study is that participants with dyslexia might be more affected by 
visually rich belief bias syllogisms and therefore perform worse on those than 
participants without dyslexia when trying to solve them. 
 
3.9.1.  Method 
 
Participants  
 The participants were those used in Part 1. 
 
Materials 
 A paper workbook was used for the syllogism solving task. It contained three 
sets of syllogisms: eight abstract (eg All B are C, Some B are C), eight neutral (eg All 
politicians are potters, Some politicians are chess players), and eight belief bias (eg 
None of the snakes are poisonous, Some of the snakes are cobras). See Appendix 2 for 
a complete list of syllogisms used and their correct conclusions. The terms for the 
neutral and belief bias syllogisms, as well as some syllogisms in full, were taken from 
studies by Bacon et al. (2003, 2007), Cherubini, Garnham, Oakhill and Morley (1998), 
and Ford (1995). The problems types of the syllogisms were selected based on their 
level of difficulty for participants in Ford’s (1995) study: one of the hardest for verbal 
reasoners only, one of the hardest for spatial reasoners only, the hardest for both types 
of reasoners, two of the easiest for both types of reasoners, and three of average 
difficulty for both types of reasoners. All problems were randomly sorted within each 




condition contained the same problem types, i.e they contained the same problem 
types but with different terms. In each workbook, there was one syllogism per page, 
with a space for workings and several lines for participants to write their 
conclusion(s). The abstract syllogisms always appeared first, followed by the neutral, 
and then the belief bias ones. Three randomised versions of the workbook were 
produced. An Olympus digital voice recorder was used to capture verbal protocols. 
The time taken to solve each syllogism was timed with a stopwatch.  
 
Design 
 A 2 x 3 mixed design was used. The within-subjects factor was type of 
syllogism (abstract, neutral, belief bias) and the between-subjects factor was 
dyslexia/non-dyslexia. The dependent measure was the number of syllogisms solved 
correctly. 
 A verbal strategy was judged to have been one where participants worked out 
the syllogisms as if they were mathematical equations, using notations such as equal 
signs, substituting letters for words, and using arrows to describe relationships 
between terms. A spatial strategy was one where participants attempted to solve the 
syllogisms by drawing diagrams similar to Euler circles to indicate relationships 
between the terms of the premises.  
 
Procedure 
 Participants were first given an information sheet outlining the study. After 
signing a consent form, they were presented with one of the three randomised 




You are taking part in an investigation about how people use 
information in order to draw conclusions. You will be solving a 
series of syllogistic reasoning problems. A syllogistic problem 
consists of two premises (statements), for example: 
 
Some B are A 
All B are C 
 
Your task is to write down the conclusion (if any) which follows 
logically from these. A logical conclusion is a conclusion which 
must be true, if the premises are true. In this example, notice that 
the B appears twice, once in each premise, and the A and C are 
non-repeated terms. You are to draw a conclusion about these 
non-repeated terms. The conclusion must be in one of the 
following forms, where the question mark stands for a non-
repeated term in the problem. 
 
All ? are ? 
No ? are ? 
Some ? are ? 
Some ? are not ? 
None ? are ? 
 
For example, Some B are A 
 All B are C 
 
Conclusion: Some of the Cs are As or Some of the As are Cs 
 
As we are trying to find out how people solve these problems, it 
is vital that you ‘think aloud’ while you are working out your 
answers. Please speak out loud while solving each problem to 
explain to the experimenter how you reached your conclusion. 
There should not be any silent periods on the tape. We also need 
a written record of your work. Therefore, it is also vital that you 
use the pen and the space below the statements to show any 
working out that you use to help you solve the problems. Feel 
free to write or draw anything that helps you. When you have 
reached your conclusion, simply state that conclusion clearly in 
writing. You will be timed with a stopwatch. You will have 2 
minutes for each problem. Do not refer to previous problems 
once you have completed them. 
 
 
 Participants were required to determine the conclusion for each pair of 
premises and indicate how they arrived at their conclusions. They were also required 




 Upon completion of the testing session, participants were given a debriefing 
sheet that explained the purpose of the study. The information sheet, consent form and 
debriefing sheet are shown in Appendix 1. 
 
3.9.2.  Results 
 The mean score for all correctly solved syllogisms was combined within each 
condition, so each participant ended up with one average score for each of abstract, 
neutral and belief bias. The mean number of correct solutions is displayed in Table 
3.10. A 2 (dyslexia, non-dyslexia) x 3 (abstract, neutral, belief bias) repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of syllogism type, F (2,70) = 6.774, p < 
.01. More syllogisms were solved correctly in the belief bias condition (M = 4.65, SD 
= 1.36) than in the abstract condition (M = 3.68, SD = 1.93) and the neutral condition 
(M = 3.73, SD = 1.56). See figure 3.7. A pairwise comparison showed no significant 
difference between the abstract and neutral condition, but the difference between 
abstract and belief bias was p <.01, and between neutral and belief bias was p < .05.  
 There main effect of dyslexic status was not significant, F(1, 35) = .37, p = .55. 
The interaction between dyslexic status and syllogism type was also not significant, 
F(2, 70) = 1.37, p = .26. 
 
Table 3.10: Mean number of syllogisms solved correctly. 
 Abstract Neutral Belief Bias 
Dyslexic 3.28 3.83 4.56 
Non-dyslexic 4.05 3.63 4.74 







Figure 3.7: Mean number of syllogisms solved correctly. 
 
 
 Despite instruction and, in some cases, a reminder, some participants still did 
not say out loud their workings, resulting in mostly silent recordings. There were five 
silent participants with dyslexia and one silent participant without dyslexia. 
 
3.9.3. Discussion 
 Study 2 focused on the reasoning strategies of participants with dyslexia 
compared to participants without dyslexia when solving syllogisms. Participants 
solved 24 syllogisms in three conditions: abstract, neutral and belief bias. Abstract 
syllogisms contained single letter terms – A, B and C. Neutral syllogisms contained 
terms describing people or objects that were not related to each other. Belief bias 
syllogisms contained terms describing people or objects that were related to each 
other. Results showed only one significant main effect of syllogism type where more 
syllogisms were solved correctly in the belief bias condition than in the abstract and 
neutral conditions. A similar number of both abstract and neutral syllogisms were 
solved correctly. There was no main effect or interaction of dyslexic status. Despite 




workings. Of those that did, the majority demonstrated a verbal strategy. The number 
of participants who demonstrated a spatial strategy was not enough to conduct a 
separate analysis of verbal versus spatial strategies. Participant 27 who did not speak 
her workings out loud said “If I say my thoughts as well, I lose what I think 
sometimes”, while a few others barely spoke. Participants in the present study solved 
25% more belief bias syllogisms correctly than both the abstract and neutral 
syllogisms. This could be due to the fact that belief bias terms were easier to imagine 
even if they did not make sense to the participant.  
 Despite being given instructions to show their workings in the space provided, 
only seventeen out of the thirty-nine participants did so. Of those that showed 
workings, six were male (3 with dyslexia, 3 without dyslexia) and eleven were female 
(4 with dyslexia, 7 without dyslexia). Examination of their written protocols revealed 
that the majority of those participants (6 with dyslexia, 9 without dyslexia) appeared 
to adopt a verbal strategy, while the remaining two participants (1 with dyslexia, 1 
without dyslexia) appeared to adopt a spatial strategy. An examination of the verbal 
protocols did indeed reveal participants speaking of substituting letters for words and 
describing mathematical operations or referring to objects or people in their respective 
groups. 
 Each participant was asked about their experience during the experiment. 
Almost all participants found the abstract syllogisms the hardest, and those with 
neutral and belief bias terms easiest. No participant distinguished between specific 
neutral and belief bias syllogisms, as though all syllogisms in both of these categories 
were considered one and the same. They reported that the problems were easier when 
they had something specific, meaning an object or person description, to think about. 




participant 32 was “worried that if I thought of them as words, the logic would 
contradict what you know”, while participant 30 felt “you have to see past that and see 
it as an arbitrary object” and “objects are easier to visualise even if they don’t go 
together”. Participant 23 felt it was easier to “say it as a sentence, which made it easier 
to reason”, while participant 2 said “the words are easier when you have something to 
picture”, and participant 19 said “I was trying to think of them as numbers not letters”.  
 Interestingly, with the belief bias syllogisms, they reported having to “throw 
reality out of the window” (participant 8) in order to work logically, and the fact that 
you “can always put the other ones in context” (participant 6), and “when it started to 
be animals and stuff, I could visualise it more” (participant 9). Participant 30 said “It 
was very easy to get thrown by the ones that were things that were obviously you 
know would ordinarily expect them to go together, like the red roses, but no flowers 
are red. You’d have to see past that I guess and just see it as an arbitrary object”. 
 Again, despite instruction and, in some cases, a reminder, some participants 
still did not say out loud their workings, resulting in mostly silent recordings. Even 
though there were no significant results for dyslexic status, it is interesting to note that 
the ‘silent’ participants were predominantly dyslexic. It is possible that the dual task 
of narrating and solving the problems affected the performance of participants with 
dyslexia. The Dyslexia Automatisation Deficit Hypothesis can account for the 
difficulties experienced by these participants (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990; Yap & Van 
der Leik, 1994), where if the first task is not performed automatically then there are 
not enough cognitive resources available for them to perform the second task. Solving 
syllogisms is not an everyday type of task and was new to all participants. Having to 




process at the same time will have increased cognitive load competing for working 
memory space in the central executive (Smith-Spark et al., 2003). 
 In comparison with the Bacon et al. (2007) study, when results were combined 
across dyslexic and non-dyslexic status, participants performed similarly in the 
abstract condition. Based on the nature and terms used, Bacon et al.’s concrete 
(English) condition can be equated to the neutral condition in the present study, 
thereby making the performance in that condition also similar. That is, the terms used 
in the concrete (English) condition were of generic sporting occupations, while those 
in the present study were people and generic occupations or activities. The present 
study failed to find any differences between participants with dyslexia and participants 
without dyslexia. In fact, participants appeared not to be hindered by the 
‘concreteness’ of the terms in the belief bias condition. Rather, the concreteness 
appeared to assist the reasoning process regardless of dyslexic status. Using terms in 
the premises that are related to each other may have made it easier for participants to 
reason about them. This is evidenced by the fact that many participants reported that 
the syllogisms containing words were easier and that the belief bias syllogisms were 
judged as easier than the neutral syllogisms.  
 Cherubini, Garnham, Oakhill and Morley (1998) have suggested that belief 
bias is suppressed when previous knowledge is incompatible with the premises, and 
therefore the premises are always considered. Testing English and Italian participants 
on syllogisms (the syllogism presented to Italian participants were translated from 
English to Italian) in which all the conclusions were valid, they found that true invalid 
conclusions were drawn when they were compatible with the premises and the valid 
conclusion was unbelievable. They hardly found instances of participants producing 




hypothesise that the background is modelled first. That is, previous knowledge 
relating the end terms is retrieved first, premises are checked to see if they are 
compatible with that knowledge, and then the previous knowledge is accepted as a 
true conclusion from the premises. If the previous knowledge is incompatible with the 
premises, the reasoning process starts anew and continues until a logical conclusion is 
found.  
 The use of letters in the abstract condition seemed to be confusing for all 
participants as almost all of them stated that the letters were the most difficult and it 
became easier when the problems suddenly switched to words, and even easier when 
they made sense. It can be argued that some of those that did show workings 
substituted letters for terms in the other conditions, so there should not have been 
much difference in performance. The performance by all participants was not much 
better for substituting letters for words in the neutral condition. It is possible that 
neutral terms that are unrelated to each other are treated in the mind as abstract as 
opposed to belief bias terms that bear some sort of relationship. Attesting to this is a 
classic study by Wilkins (1928) found that replacing the abstract letters A, B or C with 
actual words improved syllogistic reasoning, and demonstrated that when the content 
of the syllogism conflicted with the participant’s beliefs their performance was worse, 
but it was not as bad as when abstract or nonsense words were used. 
 A problem with this study was participants not writing out their workings 
despite instructions to do so. One solution may be to provide examples in verbal, 
spatial and non-specific formats and, hopefully, participants would gravitate towards 





3.10.  Conclusion 
 Study 2 observed the effect of belief bias in people with dyslexia compared to 
people without dyslexia when solving syllogistic reasoning problems. It was 
conducted in two stages: a sentence-picture verification task to assess how participants 
with and without dyslexia represented and processed linguistic structures, and a 
syllogism solving task to determine how they were affected by visually rich stimuli in 
belief bias syllogisms. Participants with dyslexia took longer on sentence 
comprehension than participants without dyslexia, suggesting that participants with 
dyslexia tended more towards a visuospatial or pictorial strategy of converting the 
sentence representations into pictorial representations before processing the 
information. However, no difference between participants with dyslexia and 
participants without dyslexia, with regard to belief bias, was found. A phonological 
deficit can also account for the slower processing of the syllogisms by participants 
with dyslexia.  Ramus and Szenkovits (2008) suggest the reason people with dyslexia 
perform poorly under memory load is because phonological representations are 
degraded, and some phonetic features are missing when they need to be repeated or 
discriminated; or the representations are intact but there is not enough capacity in their 
short term memory to carry out the tasks. Impairments to phonological working 
memory would affect conversion of representations from verbal to non-verbal. 
Research by Smith-Spark, Fisk, Fawcett and Nicolson (2003) shows evidence of 
verbal working memory impairments in people with dyslexia, while spatial memory 
appears to be largely unimpaired.  
 The results suggest that while participants with dyslexia demonstrated a more 




performance, both types of participants were affected by the visual imagery of the 
belief bias premises in the syllogism task. Clement and Flamagne (1986) suggested 
that materials that are easy to imagine leads to fewer errors in verbal processing. Since 
the heuristic system is assumed to use prior knowledge (Sloman, 1996), the data from 
the present study adds support to the notion that when there is conflict between the 
premises presented and prior knowledge or beliefs, the analytic system takes over and 
continues to reassess the premises until a logical solution is found. When forced to 
make judgements about real world attributes, those that make sense in the reasoner’s 
frame of reference, people may reason more from a visuospatial sense than a verbal 
sense because the terms of the premises are people or objects that they can relate to. 
This in turn makes it easier to reason logically. 
 
3.11.  General discussion 
 The experiments in this chapter examine individual differences in reasoning 
strategies. An attempt was made to identify the predominant strategy for the different 
groups of participants based on categories of syllogisms identified by Ford (1995) 
with respect to whether they are easy or hard to solve by spatial or verbal reasoners. It 
was found that people with dyslexia are affected by figure. 
 The experiments attempted to show if these same participants are affected by 
belief bias and if this can be related in any way to a verbal or spatial strategy, and how 
strategy is influenced by the believability of the premises. 
 The results of Study 1 showed no overall difference between participants with 
dyslexia and participants without dyslexia, but a significant difference became 
apparent when the data was analysed by problem type. Performance was almost 




that people tend to reason in a verbal or spatial manner (Ford, 1995) but failed to 
support the hypothesis that there is a difference in strategy selection between 
participants with dyslexia and participants without dyslexia.   
 Some studies have shown that the figure of the syllogism can affect reasoning 
(Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Stupple & Ball, 2007). Handley et al. (2004) found 
evidence that figural bias occurred in the absence of belief bias in a production task. 
Research has suggested that syllogistic reasoning is affected by the position of the 
terms (Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990; Polk & Newell, 1995; Chater & Oaksford, 1999; 
Yule & Stenning, 1992). Jia, Lu, Zhong and Yao (2009) demonstrated that Figure 1 
(A-B, B-C) is more cognitively demanding than Figure 2 (B-A, C-B). Johnson-Laird 
and Bara (1984) suggest that figural effects occur when participants integrate 
premises. Results of the present study suggest that the position of the end terms in 
each premise could indeed be an important factor in reasoning strategy for people with 
dyslexia. While participants without dyslexia performed similarly across all Figures, 
participants with dyslexia performed worst with Figure 1. Their performance was best 
on Figure 3, implying that solution is easier for people with dyslexia if the end term is 
the subject of both premises. 
 This suggests the possibility that syllogisms are easier for people with dyslexia 
to solve if the end term is the predicate in the first premise and the subject of the 
second premise. Therefore, for Figure 1 and Figure 3, the reasoner would have to 
reverse the position of the end term so that it appears last. When it comes to 
integrating the second premise, they would have to reverse the end terms for Figure 1 
and Figure 4. This will result in one change each for Figure 1 and Figure 4, and two 
changes for Figure 1 because the end terms have to be reversed for each of the 




people with dyslexia, it can possibly explain the similarity in performance for Figure 2 
and Figure 4. The first premise is in the correct order, so they only need to adjust the 
end terms in the second premise – meaning that only one additional operation had to 
be performed.  Similarly, for Figure 3, the reasoner only needs to reverse the end 
terms in the first premise. Figure 1 is different from the others in that the end term is 
the subject of the first premise and the predicate of the second premise. This would 
require two operations to prepare it for calculation. The first premise must be adjusted 
so the end term becomes the predicate and the second premise must be adjusted so the 
end term becomes the subject. As Jia et al. (2009) suggest, an increased demand on 
the working memory can affect the calculation process. While high processing 
demands can lead to deficits on both verbal and visuospatial working memory in 
people with reading disabilities (Swanson, Ashbaker & Lee, 1996), visuospatial 
memory deficits come to the forefront only when the reasoner has to engage verbally 
with the task (Gould & Glencross, 1990; Thomson, 1982). Earlier representations may 
become degraded (Ramus & Szenkovits, 2008) and thereby not available for use later 
in the reasoning process. 
 The results of Study 2 showed overall response times were longer for negative 
sentences than for affirmative sentences. Response times were also longer for 
participants with dyslexia than participants without dyslexia. The main effect for 
affirmative/negative sentences supports previous research that negatives slow down 
processing time (Gough, 1965; Slobin, 1966), which in turn suggests that individuals 
may be first converting negative terms into positive terms (Trabasso, 1970), thereby 
increasing sentence comprehension time.  
 The significant main effect of dyslexic status supports the notion of a 




1987). Participants with dyslexia had longer response times than participants without 
dyslexia for both negative and positive sentences, so the suggestion that negatives 
slow down comprehension time cannot account solely for the differences. Macleod et 
al. (1978) have suggested that there are individual differences in reasoning, where 
participants tend to adopt either a linguistic or a pictorial-spatial strategy. The 
possibility exists that participants with dyslexia tended more towards employing a 
visuospatial or pictorial strategy of converting the sentence representations into 
pictorial representations before processing the information. While the results fit the 
pattern, participants in this study were not tested for their verbal or spatial ability, so it 






CHAPTER 4: VERBAL STRATEGIES 
4.1.  Similarities and differences between visual or spatial processes and verbal 
or rule-based processes in problem solving 
 Deductive and analytic reasoning has been at the core of psychological theory, 
with William James examining the role of analysis and abstraction in processes of 
deductive reasoning as one of the key properties of human thought (Mayer, 1977). A 
problem must be broken down into parts and each part must be examined in the light 
of its function within the problem at hand. The reasoner must perform a series of 
analytic operations, often in the abstract, by substituting some parts in other places to 
solve the problem or at least come to a viable conclusion (Mayer, 1977). There has 
been much research about the processes employed by individuals when solving 
problems. A major area of research has been on whether problem solving is based on 
visual or spatial processes (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Stenning & Oberlander, 1995), or 
verbal or rule-based processes (Rips, 1994). One way to conceive of this distinction is 
whether the premises are assumed to be mapped onto representations of a set of 
characteristics of a term, as in Mental Models theory, or mapped onto sets of 
relationships or rules as in the mental rules theory (Galotti, Baron & Sabini, 1986). 
Mental Models theory is discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.3. It has been further 
suggested that the computational steps in the deductive process in Mental Models and 
the rule-based strategies are very similar (Stenning & Yule, 1998).  
 The introduction to this chapter focuses on the similarities and differences 
between visual or spatial processes and verbal or rule-based processes in problem 




review the rules based approach, before highlighting the potential overlap and 
distinctions between these approaches in terms of the type of representation used in 
problem solving and the operations over those representations. I will then highlight 
studies that have measured individual differences in use of spatial and verbal 
strategies for problem solving. 
 Mental Models (Johnson-Laird, 1983) is one version of a system using a visual 
or spatial representation for reasoning. It suggests that a spatial representation is used 
to represent sets of individuals with properties described by the problem. Rules-based 
approaches to the process of reasoning (Rips, 1994) suggest that the representation is 
verbal, and the operations are the manipulations of those verbal representations. 
 The main proponent of the Mental Models theory, Johnson-Laird (1983), 
proposes that the reasoner goes through three stages when reasoning through a 
problem. First, the reasoner generates an initial mental representation of the premises. 
The representation is generally based on existing knowledge about the sets of 
individuals referred to in the premises and will usually contain just enough 
information for the reasoner to gain a basic understanding of the problem. The 
knowledge is both explicit (what is stated in the premises) and implicit (what they 
may already know about the individuals). The second stage is to combine information 
from both premises to form a conclusion. If no conclusion is found, then the reasoner 
progresses to the third stage which involves searching for alternative models. The 
process is repeated until a valid conclusion is found or the reasoner decides there is no 
valid conclusion. Errors arise when the reasoner accepts a conclusion that appears to 
be valid. The more representations that need to be generated the greater the likelihood 




 Rules-based processes suggest that people possess an inherent mental logic 
(Rips, 1994; Braine & O’Brien, 1998; Bacon, Handley & Newstead, 2003) and that 
the processes operate solely in manipulations of the premises (Braine & O’Brien, 
1991; Galotti, Baron & Sabini, 1986; Rips, 1983). That is, the reasoner does not 
generate intermediate representations between the stages of reasoning but rather works 
through a sequence of logical operations on each premise. An initial representation of 
the premises is generated but this only acts as a short-term store and does not feature 
in the analysis process (Rips, 1983). The representation manifests as a verbal or 
abstract description of the premises. The reasoner then uses their inherent mental logic 
(Roberts, 1993; Rips, 1989) to work through the problem and generate a conclusion. 
Logical operators such as ‘and’, ‘not’, and ‘if…then’ determine which rules are 
brought to bear on the problem at hand (Manktelow, 1999). Two or more rules can be 
used in conjunction with each other to work on the problem but subsequent 
representations are not generated as is the case with mental models. The system does 
not combine intermediate solutions to form a new representation to be worked on. 
Rather, it applies rules to the abstract logical form that has been extracted from the 
premises and if a conclusion has not been found it moves on to apply further rules. 
Common rules applied are modus ponens (if A then B, and A, then B) or modus 
tollens (if A then B, and not B, then not A) where the problems are re-encoded to 
match a set of rules. If there is no match it is re-encoded again until a solution has 
been found. Errors occur due to the number of logical operations that must be 
performed on the representation in order to draw a conclusion or to determine that 
there is no valid conclusion. The more operations that are performed, the more likely 





 Research suggests that many people tend to adopt either a visuospatial or a 
verbal strategy for problem solving (Ford, 1995; Bacon, Handley & Newstead, 2003; 
Bacon, Handley, Dennis & Newstead, 2008).  Verbal reasoners manipulate the verbal 
form of the syllogism, rearranging the terms of the premises and using rules to 
determine a conclusion. Spatial reasoners manipulate the model, using spatial arrays 
to determine the conclusion. The distinction between visuospatial and verbal strategies 
was also observed in sentence-picture verification studies (MacLeod, Hunt & 
Matthews, 1978) where preferences were associated with performance on independent 
tests of verbal and spatial ability. Roberts, Gilmore and Wood (1997) found some 
participants in their compass point direction study were able to switch their strategies 
according to the demands of the tasks. Chater and Oaksford (1999) suggest reasoners 
may be forced to change their strategy depending on the information presented at the 
time, as well as the demands of the task, and this leads to individual differences. 
 Ford (1995) found that out of 20 participants, eight participants in her study 
used verbal substitutions as reflected in their oral descriptions of problem solving 
strategies, substituting one premise term for another to arrive at a conclusion. She 
reports that the participants viewed one premise as having a term that needs 
substituting and the other premise providing that term. The premise that provides the 
value for substitution acts as a rule for relating B to A, while the premise containing 
the term which needs to be substituted acts as a case whose status with regards to A or 
C is known. She proposed four rules for substitution:  
 
A. If a rule exists affirming of every member of the class C the property P then: 
 (i)  whenever a specific object, O, that is a member of C is encountered it can be 




 (ii) whenever a specific object, O, that lacks property P is encountered it can be 
inferred that O is not a member of C 
 
B. If a rule exists denying of every member of the class C the property P then: 
 (i)  whenever a specific object, O, that is a member of C is encountered it can be 
inferred that O does not have the property P and 
 (ii)  whenever a specific object, O, that possesses the property P is encountered it 
can be inferred that O is not a member of C 
 
 According to Ford (1995), verbal substitutions can predict which syllogisms 
are likely to yield errors. The participants in her study who used verbal substitution 
performed poorly. She reports that neither the spatial nor the verbal reasoners showed 
evidence of using mental models. The spatial reasoners appeared to manipulate a 
model where the class itself rather than the finite members of the class was 
represented. The verbal reasoners tended to use the inference rules of modus ponens 
and modus tollens. 
 Bacon, Handley and Newstead (2003) conducted a study to replicate and 
extend Ford’s findings by testing her predictions on a larger sample. The aims of their 
study were to clearly identify verbal and spatial reasoning strategies, as well as 
gaining insight into strategy choices without the drawbacks of verbal protocols. 
participants were presented with all 27 syllogisms that were used in Ford’s study and a 
questionnaire that was designed to identify the reasoning strategies they used. They 
were randomly assigned one of two conditions: a verbal and written protocols group 
or a written protocol only group. The verbal and written protocol condition was a 




syllogisms and their verbal protocol was tape-recorded. The written protocol only 
condition required the participants to solve all 27 syllogisms and write down their 
reasoning strategies in whichever way suited them best. participants in both conditions 
were asked to complete the questionnaire about the strategies they used. 
 The study confirmed Ford’s finding that reasoners tend to be spatial or verbal. 
participants in the verbal and written protocol group demonstrated evidence of 
individual differences. Verbal reasoners referred to activities such as replacing, 
substituting and cancelling terms. Spatial reasoners described the terms by their 
perceived relationships in groups or subsets. The verbal reports from the verbal and 
written protocol condition did not always provide sufficient evidence of the strategy 
the participants used. The written protocol only reports were more clear-cut, making it 
easier to distinguish between verbal and spatial strategies. 
 Verbal reasoners appeared to apply naive substitution (Ford, 1995) by simply 
taking the value of the B term from the first universal affirmative premise they 
encountered and substituting it into the other premise to get a conclusion with the 
same quantifier as that premise. Bacon et al. (2003) observed that while the verbal 
reasoners appeared to begin the reasoning process with the universal affirmative 
premise, the spatial reasoners appeared to begin with the first premise presented to 
them, regardless of the form or mood, and they simply added the information from the 
second premise. The questionnaires in both conditions supported the notion of spatial 
and verbal strategies. The study failed to find the within-strategy variations that Ford 
(1995) identified as a function of type of substitution rule (verbal) or constraint of 
premises (spatial). Rather, reasoners showed a consistent approach for all problems. 
Verbal reasoners tended to provide a conclusion that matched the form of one of the 




whether that premise was presented first or second. This lends support to Wetherick 
and Gilhooly’s (1995) claim that participants adopt this matching heuristic if they are 
unable or unwilling to reason with logic. Bacon et al. (2003) found evidence that some 
participants appeared to be using a combination of verbal and spatial strategies. This 
raises the question of whether it is possible to teach a particular strategy for solving 
syllogisms.  
 
4.2.  Training and Strategies 
 Training is the process of learning or developing new skills with the ultimate 
goal of improving performance in a particular area. Various studies have considered 
the effect of training participants to solve syllogisms using one or more methods, most 
commonly a spatial or rule-based method. Interventions demonstrate alternative ways 
of solving problems. Training has been shown to improve reasoning skills and 
abilities (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Morris & Nesbitt, 1993; Leighton, 2006; Prowse, 
Turner, & Thompson, 2009). Nisbett et al. (1987) propose that people do make use of 
inferential rules and that they can be readily taught. They argue that when people 
reason with logic they tend to match their process to the solution. Leighton (2006) 
reports a decrease in reported rule-based strategies and a significant increase in model-
based strategies with the improvement of categorical reasoning skills. 
 However, the effects of training might vary according to individual 
differences. Individual differences in abilities and style preferences influence how 
people respond to information presented to them (Monaghan & Stenning, 1998). 
Some people prefer to process information visually through graphics, diagrams and 
illustrations (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Kirby, Moore & Schofield, 1988) while 




Braine & O’Brien, 1998). MacLeod, Hunt and Matthews (1978) demonstrated that 
preferences for visuo-spatial representations are linked to high spatial ability. 
MacLeod et al. (1978) demonstrated that the difference in reaction times on the 
Sentence Picture Verification task is a reliable indicator of style preferences. 
Psychometric tests of verbal and spatial ability of their participants correlated well 
with the RT scores of the Sentence Picture Verification task in terms of whether 
encoding the picture or the sentence took longer for participants. Prowse, Turner, and 
Thompson (2009) report evidence that reasoners may spontaneously use a visual 
strategy as they observed participants drawing diagrams when they were not 
instructed to do so. It has been suggested that constructing a verbal mental model 
influences deductive spatial reasoning (Krumnack, Bucher, & Nejasmic, 2010).  
 Monaghan and Stenning (1998) compared the performance of two groups of 
participants after being trained on either Euler Circles (EC) or natural deduction (ND) 
strategies. Participants were assigned to groups based on their scores on the GRE 
Analytic Reasoning Test (a test for analytic skills) and the PFT (a paper folding test 
for spatial skills (French, Ekstron & Price, 1963). In addition, their processing style 
was assessed as serialist or holist (Ford, 1985). The researchers hypothesised that 
participants with high GRE scores would perform better on EC and worse on ND. 
 The participants were presented with eight syllogisms (five with valid 
conclusions and three with no valid conclusion) and were asked to speak aloud their 
thought processes while they solved the problems. The sessions were recorded on 
video and the verbal protocol was also transcribed. Nine participants were taught to 
use EC and eight were taught to use ND. All participants were taught their respective 
methods for the same amount of time. However, not all of them managed to complete 




number of corrective or directive interventions made by the instructors. Instructors 
intervened if there were queries or the participants needed to be pointed in the right 
direction. The independent variables were the taught strategy, processing style (serial 
or holistic), and the score on the PFT and GRE. 
 The results revealed that participants who scored high on the GRE test 
required more instructor interventions when translating premises into representation 
using the ND strategy and fewer interventions when translating into EC. When 
manipulating the representations, those high in GRE scores made fewer errors and 
required fewer interventions with EC but made more errors and required more 
interventions with ND. The serialists made more errors and required more 
interventions than the holistics with the EC. For the translating-out, the serialists made 
more errors and required more interventions than the holistics with EC. 
 The researchers suggest that serialists made more errors when forming 
conclusions using the EC strategy due to having to simultaneously consider all the 
information represented by each term in order to draw a conclusion. On the flip side, 
the holistics were better on EC because they are purportedly cognitively better at 
seeing the bigger picture than the serialists. 
 It has been further suggested that the computational steps in the deductive 
process in mental models and the rule-based strategies may be very similar (Stenning 
& Yule, 1998). Some reasoners appear to use a form of Euler Circles to solve 
categorical syllogisms (Stenning & Oberlander, 1994; Ford, 1995; Stenning & Yule, 
1997). Euler Circles, attributed to the 18th Century Swiss mathematician Leonhard 
Euler, are diagrammatic representations of sets of items and their relationship to each 
other. Figure 4.1 is an example of Euler Circles representing the syllogism premise 




circle on the right contains all the members of category B. The area within the 
overlapping portion contains those members that are common to both categories and 
they are denoted by the asterisk. The reasoner would then create a similar diagram for 
the second premise followed by one that combines both premises to form a 
conclusion. 
 
Figure 4.1: Example of Euler Circles representing ‘Some A are B’. 







 Stenning and Yule (1998) suggest that operations in Euler Circles can be 
matched to a simple natural deduction method in “a fragment of propositional 
calculus”. This notion suggests it is feasible to compare performances between the 
various strategies. For example, information may be presented graphically as in Euler 
Circles (see Figure 4.2) or in a sentential manner as in natural deduction (see Figure 
4.3) and the reasoner must work through a logical process to determine a conclusion. 
Euler Circles combine the information about the terms from both premises into a 
diagram and then draws a conclusion from the relationship of both terms to the middle 
term. Natural deduction uses modus ponens or modus tollens to derive a conclusion. 
This is done in a serial fashion where each premise is considered separately and then a 
conclusion is drawn. The stages that are common to both methods are: translating the 
premises into the representation, manipulating the information, and translating the 
final representation to a conclusion (Monaghan & Stenning, 1998). 
 






Figure 4.2: Completed example using Euler Circles. 
 
 








Figure 4.3: Examples of natural deduction representations. 
 
 
 Sternberg and Weil (1980) posit that reasoning strategies depend on verbal and 
spatial abilities. They describe several reasoning strategies. A spatial strategy where 
information from both premises is integrated and represented in a spatial array (De 
Soto et al, 1965; Huttenlocher & Higgins, 1972). A linguistic strategy (Clark, 1969) 
















structural linguistic propositions. A mixed model where information is decoded into 
linguistic format and then recoded into a spatial format, the subject scans the spatial 
array for the correct answer then use the linguistic proposition to validate their 
conclusion. An algorithmic strategy (Quinton & Fellows, 1975) which is a surface-
structural linguistic presentation and the subject uses a simple set of rules to solve the 
problem. A spatial-linguistic strategy (Johnson-Laird, 1972; Wood, Shotter & 
Godden, 1974) where the reasoner uses a spatial strategy first then switches to a 
linguistic one after some practice, and a linguistic-spatial strategy that operates in 
reverse (Shaver, Pierson & Lang, 1975) where the reasoner uses a linguistic strategy 
first then switches to a spatial one. 
 Sternberg and Weil (1980) used linear syllogisms to determine if it was 
possible to train participants to use particular reasoning strategies. A linear syllogism 
is one in which a comparison is made between terms that are based on more or less of 
a property or characteristic relative to each other. An example of a linear syllogism is, 
“John is taller than Bill, and Bill is taller than Pete. Who is tallest?”. Linear syllogisms 
can also involve negations, such as “Bill is not as tall as John.” Participants in the 
study were randomly assigned to one of three groups. The first group received no 
training in how to solve linear syllogisms. They were expected to work out their own 
method for solving the syllogisms. The second group received visualisation training in 
how to form spatial arrays. They were told to try and visualise the relationships 
presented in the syllogism statements in a pictorial format. They were also given 
examples of what an array might look like. The third group received algorithmic 
training using methods developed by Quinton and Fellows (1975). They were told to 




first statement and then scan the second statement. The participants were required to 
read the statements and choose the answer they felt was correct from a panel.  
 The results showed a significant difference in mean response times for 
untrained, visualisation and algorithm. Further analysis revealed that the difference 
was only between algorithm and both of untrained and visualisation groups. There 
was no significant difference between the untrained and the visualisation groups. They 
found that algorithm training reduced response times relative to the untrained and 
visualization group, while visualisation training had no effect on response times 
relative to no training. It appeared that the visualisation group were solving the 
syllogisms in the same manner as the untrained group. This finding supports Prowse, 
Turner and Thompson’s (2009) report suggestion that reasoners may be spontaneously 
using a visual strategy. 
 Research suggests that people with dyslexia are more likely to use spatial 
representations for syllogistic reasoning (Bacon & Handley, 2010). Bacon and 
Handley (2010) investigated the role of visual processes of participants with dyslexia 
when solving linear syllogisms by examining written and verbal protocols. 
Participants were presented with 16 sets of problems, eight that contained relational 
adjectives identified by Knauff and Johnson-Laird (2002) as being easy to imagine 
and eight that contained neutral adjectives. They were required to write down their 
workings and speak out loud their reasoning process as they worked. The results 
revealed a significant interaction between strategy and dyslexic status. There was no 
effect for accuracy as most participants achieved over 90% correct. The participants 
with dyslexia tended to generate explicit representations of the properties for both 
relational and abstract problems, while the participants without dyslexia tended to just 




and Grimes-Farrow (1982) who found participants they termed as ‘abstract directional 
thinkers’, which compares to the participants without dyslexia, possessed the ability to 
decipher relationships between items just by placing them in order, and ‘concrete-
properties thinkers’, which compares with the participants with dyslexia, determined 
relationships by making visual comparisons between the properties. 
  
4.3.  Study: Performance of participants with dyslexia and participants 
without dyslexia after being taught a verbal strategy for solving syllogisms 
 Current research focuses more on discovering the processes by which 
participants with dyslexia solve problems, and not on what would happen if they were 
introduced to a new way of thinking about a problem. The present study compared the 
performance of participants with dyslexia and participants without dyslexia after being 
taught a verbal strategy for solving syllogisms. Using the groups of syllogisms that 
Ford (1995) found were easiest for spatial reasoners, easiest for verbal reasoners and 
equally difficult for both types of reasoners, it was predicted that participants with 
dyslexia would perform worse than the participants without dyslexia after learning the 
verbal strategy. Reasoners who would naturally process syllogism problems primarily 
in a spatial or visual manner are likely to experience some difficulty when expected to 
work through a specified series of steps to reason out a conclusion.  
 Research suggests that people with dyslexia may experience some difficulty 
switching from a default strategy (Bacon, Parmentier & Barr, 2013), the default being 
the strategy they would naturally choose to use. Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, 
Howerter, and Wager (2000) make the claim that switching a strategy may involve 
specific executive processes: updating, inhibition, and shifting. Incoming information 




and updated, and then the new information is encoded. Teaching someone a new 
strategy involves a similar revision and updating process until it becomes automatic. 
The extra processing load that verbal (as opposed to spatial) material provides places 
increased pressure on working memory and may hinder the performance of people 
with dyslexia (Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007). 
 
4.3.1.  Method 
 Participants 
 Participants were 30 Lancaster University undergraduate students: with 
dyslexia (13 female, 2 male) and without dyslexia (8 female, 7 male) with a mean age 
of 21 years (SD = 4.0). Due to practical and time constraints we were limited to 
collecting data from 15 participants with dyslexia and 15 participants without 
dyslexia. The mean age of the participants with dyslexia was 20 years (SD = 4.5) and 
the participants without dyslexia was 20 years (SD = 3.0). Participants without 
dyslexia were recruited via Sona, the Psychology department’s online participant 
recruitment system. Participants with dyslexia were recruited, on the basis of self-
identification, through advertisements placed on Job Shop on the Lancaster University 
Students Union website, notices in the stairwell of the Psychology building and via 
Sona. All participants were paid £10.50.   
  
Materials 
 Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices was used as a test of general cognitive 
ability. No significant difference in cognitive ability was found between participants 




  The pre-training workbook consisted of 12 syllogisms using neutral premise 
terms that were not related to each other (e.g. Some of the weavers are historians, 
None of the historians are tennis club members). All 12 syllogisms were taken from 
Ford’s (1995) study and were selected based on the level of difficulty for the 
participants in her study: four that were shown to be easiest for verbal reasoners (EV), 
four that were easiest for spatial reasoners (ES), and four that were equally difficult 
for both types of reasoners (HSV). See Appendix 3 for the list of pre-training 
syllogisms used in the study. The 12 syllogisms were randomly sorted into three 
different orders, resulting in three different pre-training workbooks. Each syllogism 
appeared on a separate page with a clear space for workings and lines at the bottom of 
the page for writing out the solution(s). There was a separate line for each possible 
answer form (e.g. All…………… are…………..; Some………… are 
not…………; etc) to ensure participants correctly formatted their solutions.  
  The training booklet was a step by step guide that demonstrated how to solve 
each of three syllogisms using a verbal strategy based on the algorithm from Stenning 
and Yule (1998).  There was a written description of each premise and how to 
combine the terms to solve the problems. The correct solution was provided for each 
example. The examples were all formats that appeared in the pre-training and post-
training workbooks. Figure 4.4 shows a worked example from the training booklet. 






Figure 4.4: Example from the training booklet. 
An easy way of solving syllogisms is by examining the relationship between the 
terms of the premises. For example, take the syllogism  
  
Some A are B  
All B are C  
  
Some A are B is represented as A & B, which means there’s at least something 
that’s an A and a B. There might still be some A that are not B, and some B that 
are not A, but we are only concerned with facts that we know about the premises.  
  
All B are C is represented as B → C. This means that if you’re a B, you’re also a 
C. But there might also be C that are not B, we just don’t know.   
  
So, now we’ve got:  
  
A & B  
B → C  
  
The next step is to see if we can apply a rule to join the two representations 
together.   
We can break down the A & B into an A, and a B: A, B  
  
Then, the next stage is to see if we can put either the A or the B with the B → C  
 (“if you’re a B you’re also a C”) representation.  
  
In this case, we can:  
  
From B and B → C, we can get C  
  
So, we now have A, B, C. So, we can now get rid of the B:  
  
A, C.  
  
We can only use information we’re certain of, that we have an A that’s also a C, we 




 The post-training workbook consisted of 12 syllogisms in the same forms as 
those in the pre-training workbook. The terms used, however, were different so as to 
prevent any interference from the pre-training set of syllogisms. See Appendix 4 for a 
list of post-training syllogisms. It was felt that some participants may remember the 




post-training terms were also taken from the syllogisms used in Ford’s (1995) 
study. The order was kept the same as for the pre-training workbook to control for 
order effects in the pre-training and the post-training workbooks, so each post-training 
workbook had a matching pre-training workbook. Each syllogism in the post-training 
workbook appeared on a separate page with a blank space for workings and lines at 
the bottom of the page for writing out the solution(s). See Appendix 7 for a copy of 
the pre-training and Appendix 8 for a copy of the post-training answer workbooks. 
  
Design 
 A 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design was used. The between-subjects factor was dyslexic 
status (dyslexia, non-dyslexia) and the within-subjects factors were training (pre-
training v post-training) and problem type (HSV, ES, EV). The dependent measure 
was the number of syllogisms solved correctly.  
   
Procedure  
 Participants were tested in one session lasting approximately ninety 
minutes. They were asked to read an information sheet explaining that the main aim of 
the study was to examine how people reason and the different types of learning 
strategies that people use, and that we were particularly interested in whether there are 
different learning approaches for people with and without dyslexia, as well as the 
tasks they would be required to do. They were then asked to sign a consent form. They 
were free to withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason and with no 




 A shortened form of Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices was 
administered first. The problem solving task was administered immediately 
afterwards. The participants were presented with the pre-training workbook containing 
12 randomised syllogisms. They were allowed two minutes to solve each syllogism. 
Upon completion of the pre-training workbook, participants were presented with the 
training booklet. They were allowed as much time as they needed to study the material 
and to ask the researcher questions for clarification. Immediately after the training 
session, the participants were presented with the post-training workbook containing 12 
randomised syllogisms in the same order as the pre-training workbook, but with 
different premise terms.  Again, they were allowed two minutes to solve each 
syllogism. 
 Upon completion of the experimental trials, participants were given a 
debriefing sheet explaining the aim of the study in greater detail and an outline of the 
study design. 
 
 4.3.2.  Results 
 Results of the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices indicated that all 
participants were of similar cognitive ability. The overall mean raw score was 5.7, 
with SD = 1.6 (dyslexic: M = 5.7, SD = 2.0; non-dyslexic: M = 5.7, SD = 1.2), 
indicating an age equivalence of 18 years. An independent samples t-test of the 
Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices scores revealed no difference between the 
groups, t (28) = .00, p = 1.0, d = 0.  
 The mean score for all correctly solved syllogisms was combined within each 
condition so each participant ended up with one average score for each of HSV, ES 




 The data were analysed in a repeated measures 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA. The 
between-subjects factor was dyslexic status (dyslexia, non-dyslexia). The within-
subjects factors were training (pre-training, post-training) and syllogism type (HSV, 
ES, EV). The dependent measure was the number of syllogisms solved correctly.  
 





Syllogism Type Dyslexia Non-dyslexia   Dyslexia Non-dyslexia 
HSV .27 (.29) .33 (.28) 
 
.30 (.31) .55 (.33) 
ES .48 (.31) .55 (.27) 
 
.43 (.34) .67 (.18) 
EV .55 (.33) .68 (.31) 
 
.48 (.42) .73 (.27) 
Note: N = 30 (15 participants with dyslexia and 15 participants without dyslexia). The 
number is parentheses is the standard deviation. 
 
 The results revealed a main effect of syllogism type F(1, 28) = 17.64, p < .001. 
Overall, performance was significantly better on EV (M = .61) than ES (M = .53) and 
HSV (M = .36). There was no main effect for training, F (1, 28) = 2.17, p = .15. The 
effect of dyslexia group approached significance, F (1,28) = 3.72, p = .06. The 
participants with dyslexia performed slightly worse (M = .42) than the participants 
without dyslexia (M = .59).  
 However, there was a significant interaction between training and dyslexic 
status, F(1,28) = 5.26, p < .05, but not between syllogism type and dyslexic status, 





 Figure 4.5 shows that overall performance improved for participants without 
dyslexia after training (pre-training M = .52, post-training M = .65) but not for 
participants with dyslexia (pre-training M = .43, post-training M = .41, SD = .36). 
Training on a verbal strategy did not have a positive effect on problem solving on the 
performance of participants with dyslexia. 
 
Figure 4.5: Mean number of correctly solved syllogisms before and after training.  
 
 
  A post hoc 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the 
performance of participants with dyslexia to the performance of participants without 
dyslexia before and after training.  The between-subject factor was dyslexic status 
(dyslexia, non-dyslexia), and the within-subjects factor was training (pre-training, 
post-training). There was no main effect of training, F(1, 28) = 2.17, p = .15 or 
dyslexic status, F(1, 28) = 3.72, p = .06. There was a significant interaction between 
training v dyslexic status, F(1, 28) = 5.26, p < .05.  
  A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effects of 






















significant effect of training for participants with dyslexia, F(1, 14) = .31, p = .59. 
There was a significant effect of training for participants without dyslexia, F(1, 14) = 
7.45, p < .05. Training on a verbal strategy benefitted the participants without dyslexia 
but not those with dyslexia. 
  To examine the nature of the interaction between training and dyslexic status, 
separate analyses were conducted between training and dyslexic status and each 
syllogism type, though it is noted that there were no significant interactions with 
syllogism type. Each 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with the between-subject factor as 
dyslexic status (dyslexia, non-dyslexia), and the within-subjects factors as training 
(pre-training, post-training). The results for each analysis are presented separately. 
 
EV (Syllogisms that are easiest for verbal reasoners) 
  There was no significant main effect of training, F(1,28) = .02, p = .90 or 
dyslexic status, F(1,28) = 3.31, p = .08. There was no significant interaction between 
training and dyslexic status, F(1,28) = .80, p = .38.  
 
ES (Syllogisms that are easiest for spatial reasoners) 
  There was no main effect of dyslexic status, F(1,28) = 2.46, p = .13. There was 
a significant interaction between training and dyslexic status, F(1,28) = 4.64, p < .05. 
The performance of participants with dyslexia decreased after training (Before 
training: M = .48, After training M = .43) while the performance of participants 
without dyslexia increased (Before training: M = .55, After training M = .67). Figure 
4.6 shows that after training the percentage of correctly solved syllogisms decreased 




22% for participants without dyslexia. These results indicate that differences exist 
around the learning of strategies rather than their dyslexic status. 
 
Figure 4.6: Mean number of correctly solved ES syllogisms in dyslexia v non-dyslexia 




HSV (Syllogisms that are equally hard for both verbal and spatial reasoners. 
  There was a significant main effect of training for HSV, F(1,28) = 6.28, p < 
.05. Figure 4.7 shows that overall performance improved after training. There was no 
significant effect of dyslexia, p = .12. There was no significant interaction between 
training and dyslexic status approached significance, F(1,28) = 3.38, p = .08, although 
participants without dyslexia showed some improvement (before; M = .33, after M = 
.55) after training compared to participants with dyslexia (before M = .27, after M = 





























Figure 4.8: Mean number of correctly solved HSV syllogisms for participants with 








































4.3.3.  Additional analysis of reasoning strategy data 
  The pre-training workbooks were inspected for evidence of a clear reasoning 
strategy in order to determine whether participants’ spontaneous strategy use in the 
pre-training items had an impact on the effectiveness of the training method. To count 
as clear evidence of a strategy the participant was required to present with at least four 
problems showing workings in a verbal or spatial strategy as described by Ford 
(1995). Four was chosen as the clear strategy criteria because the workbooks consisted 
of four of each type of syllogism - ES, EV and HSV, so a participant showing 
workings should show them in their predominant style corresponding to the relevant 
type of syllogism. Eight out of the 27 participants demonstrated a clear verbal strategy 
(2 with dyslexia, 6 without dyslexia), while four demonstrated a clear spatial strategy 
(2 with dyslexia, 2 without dyslexia). The 15 remaining participants either showed no 
workings at all or not enough workings to determine a clear strategy, so they were 
classified as undefined and their data was not included in the analysis.  
  The data was not analysed by dyslexic status as there were fewer than four 
participants in three out of the four conditions. The data for the verbal and spatial 
participants was analysed in an explorative 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA. The within-participants 
factors were training (pre-training, post-training) and syllogism type (HSV, ES, EV). 
The between-participants factor was reasoning strategy (clear verbal, clear spatial). 
The dependent variable was the number of correctly solved syllogisms. Table 4.2 







Table 4.2: Mean accuracy across all conditions. Standard deviation is shown in 
parentheses. 
Syllogism Type Verbal Strategy  Spatial Strategy 
 Pre-training Post-training  Pre-training Post-training 
HSV 0.34 (0.27) 0.47 (0.31)  0.38 (0.43) 0.44 (0.43) 
ES 0.75 (0.19) 0.78 (0.16)  0.44 (0.38) 0.31 (0.24) 
EV 0.81 (0.22) 0.84 (0.19)  0.63 (0.43) 0.38 (0.48) 
  
 The results yielded a main effect of syllogism type, F(2, 20) = 8.09, p < .05. 
Overall performance was poorer on syllogisms that are equally difficult for spatial 
reasoners as well as verbal reasoners (M = 1.48) than for syllogisms that are easiest 
for spatial reasoners (M = 2.19) and easiest for verbal reasoners (M = 2.55). See 
Figure 4.9.  
 
Figure 4.9: Mean accuracy for syllogism type. 
 
 
  A post hoc separate independent-samples t-test was conducted for each 
problem type (HSV, ES, EV) to further examine the performance for clear verbal and 
clear spatial strategies. There was a significant difference for ES for verbal strategy 




















There was no significant difference for EV for verbal strategy (M = .83, SD = .19) and 
spatial strategy (M = .50, SD = .42), t(10) = 1.92, p = .08. There was no significant 
difference for HSV for verbal strategy (M = .41, SD = .20) and spatial strategy (M = 
.41, SD = .41), t(10) = .00, p = 1.00. Overall, verbal reasoners correctly solved twice 
as many ES syllogisms using a verbal strategy than spatial reasoners. 
  There was a significant interaction between syllogism type and reasoning 
strategy, F(2, 20) = 5.23, p < .05. Verbal reasoners performed similarly to spatial 
reasoners in syllogisms that are equally difficult for both groups, and better than 
spatial reasoners in syllogisms that are easiest for spatial reasoners and in syllogisms 
that are easiest for verbal reasoners. See Figure 4.10. 
 
Figure 4.10: Interaction between syllogism type and reasoning strategy. 
 
 
 There was no significant main effect of training, F(1,10) = .16, p = .70 or of 
strategy, F(1,10) = 3.05, p = .11. There was also no significant interaction between 
training and reasoning strategy, F(1,10) = 2.53, p = .14 or between training and 





















 The data for the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices for verbal and spatial 
reasoners were analysed. The results indicated that all participants were of similar 
cognitive ability. The overall mean raw score was 5.4 with SD = 1.5 (verbal: M = 6.3, 
SD = 1.8; spatial: M = 4.5, SD = 1.3). An independent samples t-test revealed t(10) = 
1.8, p = .11. 
 
4.3.4.   Discussion 
  The study examined the effects of training participants to solve syllogisms 
using a rule-based strategy, comparing the performance of participants with dyslexia 
with that of participants without dyslexia. It was expected that reasoners who would 
naturally process syllogism problems primarily in a spatial or visual manner are likely 
to experience some difficulty when expected to work through a specified series of 
verbal or rule-based steps to reason out a conclusion. Furthermore, if people with 
dyslexia are more prone to using spatial representations for syllogistic reasoning 
(Bacon, Handley & McDonald, 2007; Bacon & Handley, 2010) then they were 
expected to be negatively affected by a rule-based strategy in comparison to their 
counterparts without dyslexia.  
  While the initial results showed that training on a verbal strategy improved 
performance of participants without dyslexia, and had a detrimental effect on 
participants with dyslexia, a separate analysis of the data for each problem type 
revealed the effect to be only for problems that are easiest for spatial reasoners. 
However, a closer inspection of the data for only those participants that showed a 
clear verbal or spatial reasoning strategy suggests that the difference in performance in 
each syllogism type is perhaps more a function of strategy choice rather than dyslexic 




Handley & McDonald, 2007), it would be difficult to distinguish them from spatial 
reasoners without dyslexia under these conditions, and this may account for the lack 
of a significant interaction with dyslexic status in the additional analysis of the data 
for clear strategies.  
  The interaction between dyslexic status and training is an important result. 
Participants with dyslexia were impaired with the training strategy. This has 
implications for how people with dyslexia are supported in their study materials. 
Forcing them to use a verbal strategy will make performance worse compared to their 
peers without dyslexia. While training has been shown to improve reasoning skills and 
abilities (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Morris & Nesbitt, 1993; Leighton, 2006; Prowse, 
Turner, & Thompson, 2009), the training must consider the learning styles of 
individuals to be truly effective. Ramus and Szenkovits (2008) suggest that 
phonological deficit in dyslexia surfaces only as a function of certain task 
requirements, notably short-term memory, conscious awareness, and time constraints. 
A phonological deficit may also be associated with the short term memory processes 
operating on phonological representations (Smith-Spark, Fisk, Fawcett & Nicolson, 
2003; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007) as well as the type of task rather than a specific 
stimulus (Amitay, Ben-Yehudah, Banai & Ahissar, 2002; Banai & Ahissar, 2006; 
Ben-Yehudah, Sackett, Malchi-Ginzberg & Ahissar, 2001). The Dyslexia 
Automatisation Deficit Hypothesis (DAD) can offer another possible explanation for 
difficulties experienced by people with dyslexia under dual task conditions (Nicolson 
& Fawcett, 1990; Yap & Van der Leik, 1994), in this case having to solve the 
problems with a newly learned strategy as well as producing workings on paper, 




cognitive resources available to perform the second task. These factors may impact on 
the ability of some participants with dyslexia to reason with a verbal strategy.  
  Participants demonstrating a clear verbal strategy achieved more correct 
solutions for ES (77%) and EV (83%) problems than those demonstrating a clear 
spatial strategy, ES (38%) and EV (51%). Post hoc tests showed that verbal reasoners 
correctly solved twice as many ES syllogisms using a verbal strategy than spatial 
reasoners. These results suggest that verbal reasoners are better able to apply rules to 
continue searching for solutions and so achieve more correct syllogisms than spatial 
reasoners. Rips (1983) posits that reasoners start with an initial representation that 
remains in place for a short space of time but does not feature in the analysis process. 
The representation is used to generate a verbal or abstract description of the premises, 
then the reasoner uses their inherent mental logic to work through the problem. Rules 
are applied to the problem and if no solution is found then further rules are applied for 
continued processing. This process is repeated until a solution is found. However, the 
greater the number of rules to be applied, and consequently the greater number of 
representations to be generated, results in an increased burden on working memory 
and leads to the likelihood of errors (Stupple & Waterhouse, 2009). Figure 3.9 shows 
where both types of reasoners start with almost identical scores in problems that they 
both find equally difficult to solve. 
  It is not clear why some participants chose to show workings for some 
syllogisms and not others. Examination of the remainder of workbooks that contained 
some workings, but not enough to be included in the analysis, revealed no obvious 
pattern. One possible reason is that participants were not able to manifest the premises 
into drawings or shapes, or to articulate them into equations, so resorted to working 




reported that she struggles with words and it would have been better using pictures, 
and that she did not refer to the training booklet at all during the post-training section 
because it was “too hard”. In fact, she continued to use a spatial strategy for the post-
training section as well. Prowse, Turner and Thompson (2009) suggest that confidence 
levels, the feeling of rightness, and believability of the conclusion (Shynkaruk & 
Thompson, 2006) can affect performance. Research by Quayle and Ball (2000) found 
another factor contributing to reduced confidence is increased load on working 
memory. This may cause the reasoner to resort to belief bias rather than logical 
reasoning. Confidence was not measured so its effect on performance can only be 
speculated upon. 
 Smith-Spark et al. (2003) demonstrated that an increased cognitive load can 
affect processing in the central executive in working memory. If disruption and 
impairment in processing occurs when information is moved around the systems in the 
central executive Smith-Spark et al. (2003), people with dyslexia are likely to spend 
more time and energy phonologically processing problematic words or trying to 
recognise a word within the context of familiar words than typical readers (Ramus, 
2014; Shaywitz, 2005). The delay in phonological processing causes a decrease in 
retention of previously decoded words in working memory and if the words are 
remembered, their meaning are likely to be processed out of order, which can lead to 
improper comprehension (Mills, 2018) and therefore incorrect outward representation 
of the verbal or pictorial information. 
  A limitation of the current study is not employing a specific method for 
detecting strategies during the pre-test. For example, collecting verbal protocol would 
have provided confirmation of the participants’ thought processes, possibly indicating 




which problems to show workings for. Another useful method could be the use of 
psychometric tests such as the GRE Analytic Test and the PFT test used by Monaghan 
and Stenning (1998). The GRE Analytic Test measures the ability to analyse 
information and reason logically through problems and would be useful for 
determining the cognitive level and critical thinking skills of participants. The PFT 
(paper folding) test is a measure of spatial skills and the ability to visualise solutions 
to problems. The GRE Analytic Test and the PFT test can help determine a 
participant’s dominant reasoning style and can offer possible clues as to why they did 
or did not completely follow the experimental trial instructions, as well as predict the 
predominant strategy they might use. Also, using a larger sample of syllogisms in the 
pre-test study would provide a better indication of which type of problems engendered 
one strategy or another for different participants. 
  The results of the current study partially supported the hypothesis that 
participants with dyslexia were impaired with the training strategy for solving 
syllogisms. This has implications for how people with dyslexia are supported in their 
study materials. Forcing the use of a verbal strategy will make performance worse 





CHAPTER 5: SPATIAL STRATEGIES 
5.1.  Spatial processing strategies 
 The aim of this chapter is to consider the effect of a spatial strategy when 
reasoning with syllogisms. It presents a description and evidence of spatial processing 
strategies, then goes on to present a study comparing the performance of people with 
dyslexia and people without dyslexia before and after learning to solve syllogisms 
using Euler Circles, a diagrammatic method used to reason about relations between 
terms.  
 Johnson-Laird, Savary and Bucciarelli (2000) define a strategy as a series of 
steps taken to solve a problem. Some people have been observed to employ a spatial 
strategy as one of the steps in the reasoning process (Ford, 1995; Bacon, Handley & 
Newstead, 2003). A spatial strategy is one where a reasoner creates a visuo-spatially-
structured layout of the information in the problem at hand. Research has shown that 
people imagine a spatial layout when solving linear syllogisms (Byrne & Johnson-
Laird, 1989) or create mental arrays of items and relations between items given in 
premises (De Soto, London & Handel, 1965). It is suggested that this strategy can 
reduce the load on verbal working memory and it is easier to manipulate than 
sentential information.  
  Different theories of reasoning proffer notions about what accounts for errors in 
solving syllogisms. Mental Models theory suggests that errors occur due to the 
number of representations the reasoner has to make to solve the problem (Johnson-
Laird, 1983) because information has to be stored in memory while further 
information is added and integrated. Mental rules states that chains of rules are applied 




working memory, therefore the greater likelihood of errors (Braine, Reiser & Rumain, 
1984). Barrouillet and Lecas (1999) suggest people may reduce working memory load 
by constructing simplified initial models, leaving some information implicit. The 
implicit information can be expanded, fleshed out and made explicit if the need arises. 
 Gilhooly et al. (1993) examined the types of errors participants made in 
generating conclusions under high memory load (verbal presentation of syllogisms) 
and low memory load (visual presentation of syllogisms) conditions with one of six 
dual tasks: articulatory suppression (speaking while being presented with the stimuli), 
unattended speech (one syllable words, eg cat, played continuously over headphones), 
verbal random generation (participants required to generate random numbers from 1-
9), spatial random generation (participants required to tap keys on a keypad 
randomly), tapping in a simple pattern (participants required to tap in a simple pattern 
on a keypad), unattended pictures (line drawn pictures superimposed on a screen). 
Gilhooly et al. (1993) found the most common errors to be forgetting (middle terms 
were included in the conclusion), information integration (incorrect conclusions drawn 
from valid arguments), and incomplete analysis (definite conclusions drawn from 
syllogisms with no valid conclusions). They suggest that the memory loading affected 
retention of the terms and their roles rather than the actual problem solving process.  
Research in the area of working memory in dyslexia (Gould & Glencross, 1990; 
Smith-Spark, Fisk, Fawcett & Nicolson, 2003; Swanson, Ashbaker & Lee, 1996; 
Thomson, 1982) suggests that the increased memory load resulting from dual tasks 
such as finger tapping and digit repetition can have a negative impact on the 
performance of people with dyslexia compared to those without dyslexia, possibly 




 Kosslyn (1980) argues that the knowledge contained in long term memory is 
used to generate a surface representation of the problem and this remains active during 
the reasoning process. The representation can be propositional or analogue. 
Propositional representations are based on the relationship between two sets of 
categories (Smyth, Collins, Morris & Levy, 1994), for example, “All poodles are 
dogs”.  Analogue representations are ones in which categories are represented with 
spatial or visual information (Kosslyn, 1980). An analogue is defined as something 
that is similar to something else and it can be used instead of the original. According 
to Kosslyn (1980), when information needs to be retrieved from memory, a search is 
made using both propositional and analogue representational forms. If the 
propositional form does not find the answer to the problem, then the analogue form 
will attempt to find it. 
 Spatial reasoning serves to preserve explicit or inferred order between several 
elements, to identify relations between dimensions of elements, and to identify 
polarity within a dimension of an element (Gattis & Dupeyrat, 2000). Spatial 
representations are explicit in that we can visualize the order of elements and their 
relationships. De Soto et al. (1965) claim deduction is based on an internal 
representation of ordered spatial relations. In other words, implicit concepts are made 
explicit by the construction of a spatial representation. A reasoner can use the explicit 
spatial representation to make an inference or judgment about an implicit concept. For 
example, take the linear syllogism, “Mary is taller than Jane and shorter than Sue”. A 
reasoner can mentally place the three girls side by side in order of height and, by 
virtue of the internal spatial representation, can easily solve the question of where 




 Von Hecker, Hahn and Rollings (2016) define spatial processing as a 
“correlate or mediating mechanism of the experience of coherence”. Coherence refers 
to how well different bits of information fit together to facilitate understanding and 
evaluation in a way that makes sense to the reasoner. According to Thagard (2000), it 
is a process of mental balancing where information from all aspects of a problem is 
integrated together to make some sort of logical sense. Buehner and Humphreys 
(2010) claim that spatial perception is influenced by causal links, so objects are more 
likely to be perceived as closer together when they are causally linked than when they 
are not.   
 Von Hecker et al. (2016) examined the notion of coherence on spatial 
perception when solving categorical syllogisms. A categorical syllogism is made up of 
two premises and a conclusion that describes the nature of the relationship between 
two categories of members. A categorical proposition asserts that all or some 
members of one category are included within another category. The syllogism is 
logically valid if the conclusion follows on from the premises. It is invalid if the 
conclusion does not follow. The logical necessity of the syllogism determines its 
coherence. That is, it is necessary for both premises to be true for the syllogism to be 
logically valid and therefore coherent. For example,  
All A are B 
All B are C 




All A are B 
All B are C 





 Von Hecker et al. (2016) hypothesised that if coherence is reflected in spatial 
reasoning processes then the distance between on-screen presentations of premises 
should be perceived as closer together for the valid syllogisms than for the invalid 
syllogisms. To avoid a content effect, they created artificial contexts so previous 
knowledge contained in the participants’ long-term memory would not influence the 
reasoning process (Kosslyn, 1980). Participants were told they were entering a garden 
where genetic manipulation had taken place and normal biological rules did not apply, 
and they were to think of the experience as science fiction. They were presented with 
12 syllogisms (six valid and six invalid), with an equal number of quantifiers and 
logical forms. Each set of valid and invalid syllogisms contained three ‘All’ and three 
‘Some’ quantifiers in the same logical form.  
 The participants were allowed as much time as they needed to work on each 
syllogism but were not allowed to give the solution right away. Next, they were given 
a spatial task in which they were told to fixate on the gap between the premises where 
a cross had been, then a string of small x’s was presented for 700ms at a distance of 
15cm below the premises. For half of the trials the string of x’s fit in the gap between 
the premises and for the other half it would overshoot to the left or to the right by one 
character. The premises stayed on screen for 1500ms longer and then the participants 
were asked to indicate if the string of x’s overshot or did not overshoot the gap. After 
providing their response, a new window opened for them to indicate if the syllogism 
they were working on before the string of x’s appeared was valid or invalid. 
 The results revealed that valid syllogisms were judged as valid more correctly 
as valid than invalid syllogisms as invalid. The participants were more likely to say 
the string of x’s did not overshoot the gap when the premises in question came from 




a set of propositions high in coherence than from a set of propositions low in 
coherence. The data were further analysed in the light of the participants’ perception 
of validity (regardless of whether the syllogisms were valid or invalid) and the results 
showed a similar pattern. The researchers suggest that the higher coherence of valid 
syllogisms is indicative of a spatial reasoning process. It should be noted that only the 
AB/BC figure of syllogism was used in the study and this figure is cited as being more 
cognitively demanding (Jia, Lu, Zhong & Yao, 2009) than the other three figures, 
AB/CB, BA/BC and BA/CB. It could very well be that the participants resorted to a 
spatial strategy due to the difficulty of the syllogism rather than judging it as valid due 
to coherence. Von Hecker et al. (2016) suggest that reasoners may use spatial 
simulation to represent coherence between the propositions in a problem, as well as 
the individual terms featured in the propositions, and that the participants perceived 
logically valid syllogisms as more coherent than logically invalid ones. 
They posit that perception of coherence is dependent on simultaneous consideration of 
all three propositions rather than just the relationship between the two terms in a 
single proposition.  
 Roberts, Gilmore and Wood (1997) claimed that spatial ability predicts 
strategy selection in problem solving. They demonstrated this with a compass 
direction task where participants were asked to determine the compass point at which 
a person would end up relative to the starting point if the same size steps in the given 
directions are taken. Figure 5.1 is an example of a compass point direction task. There 
are two ways to solve the problem. The first is a spatial method that involves 
generating a spatial representation of each step, one at a time as per the instructions 
and then identifying the final bearing in relation to the starting point. The second is a 




through a process of elimination of redundant steps and then deducing the final 
position from the remaining steps. All participants were pre-tested for verbal and 
spatial ability. The results revealed an “inverted aptitude-strategy relationship” where 
participants with low spatial ability used a spatial strategy and participants with high 
spatial ability used the cancellation method. Verbal ability was found not to be related 
to strategy selection. Roberts et al. (1997) concluded that the participants with high 
spatial ability were better at forming accurate representations of the problem and 
determining that the opposites steps were redundant, thereby enabling them to execute 
the spatial strategy more successfully than the participants with low spatial ability. 
 






 It has been further suggested that some people may use a form of Euler Circles 
to solve categorical syllogisms (Stenning & Oberlander, 1994; Ford, 1995; Stenning 
& Yule, 1997). Euler Circles are diagrammatic representations of sets of items and 
their relationship to each other. They are a form of spatial reasoning. Figure 5.2 is an 
example of Euler Circles representing the syllogism premise ‘Some A are B’. The 
circle on the left contains all the members of category A and the circle on the right 
contains all the members of category B. The area within the overlapping portion 
contains those members that are common to both categories. Stenning and Oberlander 
(1995) added the use of an asterisk to denote the necessity in the overlapping portion 
 
 One step East 
One step East 
One step East 
One step South  




of the circles. The reasoner would then create a similar diagram for the second 
premise followed by one that combines both premises to form a conclusion. 
 
Figure 5.2: Example of Euler Circles representing the syllogism premise  
‘Some A are B’. 
 
 According to Larkin and Simon (1987), diagrams can facilitate a faster search 
and recognition for solutions to a problem compared to sentential representations 
because several steps in the process can be considered simultaneously. 
 There are individual differences in whether people seem to use a spatial or a 
verbal strategy as shown by Ford (1995), rather than use both types of representation 
as suggested by Kosslyn (1980). The focus of this thesis is the strategies used by 
people with dyslexia when reasoning with syllogisms. Individuals with dyslexia may 
be particularly prone to differences in performance with different types of 
representations.  
Bacon, Parmentier and Barr (2013) have demonstrated that increased cognitive 
load can affect visuospatial performance in people with dyslexia and this can be 
improved with instructions for reasoning with a visual strategy. While studies using 
the Corsi Block Test suggest that the visuospatial sketchpad is intact in people with 
dyslexia in the forwards recall version of the task (Gould & Glencross, 1990; Jeffries 










backwards recall version of the task may rely on functions other than short-term 
visuospatial sketchpad storage capacity. The difficulty in backwards recall is 
attributed to the additional demands on the central executive that are necessary to 
transform the sequence into reverse order (Corsi, 1972; Schofield & Ashman, 1986). 
As people with dyslexia show deficits in the executive, Bacon et al. (2013) 
hypothesised that they would perform less well than people without dyslexic people 
on backward recall. They presented participants with a computerised version of the 
Corsi Block Task under both forward and backward recall conditions. Arranged 
following Corsi’s (1972) original array, the squares turned black for 1000 ms, one at a 
time and with a stimulus-onset asynchrony of 2000 ms, to form the sequences 
participants were required to remember. The sequences increased in difficulty from 
two to nine locations, with two trials at each level. The span score was defined as the 
highest level at which a participant could recall at least one sequence correctly. The 
Corsi Block Task was followed by a computerised version of the Visual Patterns Test 
in which each pattern was presented for 3 seconds. The participants’ task was to 
remember these patterns so they could reproduce them immediately afterwards in an 
empty grid. The results revealed that while participants with dyslexia performed 
comparably with participants without dyslexia in the forward recall task, they showed 
deficits in the backward version of the task.  
It has been suggested that backward recall involves the encoding and 
maintenance of locations as a static visual pattern, rather than a sequence (Pickering, 
Gathercole, Hall & Lloyd, 2001; Vandierendonck, Kemps, Fastame & Szmalec, 2004) 
and people with dyslexia may compensate for their difficulties with verbal material by 
using a strategy that converts written information into more ‘dyslexia-friendly visual 




processing demands of backward recall, participants with dyslexia may resort to their 
visual abilities instead of a serially based spatial strategy. The researchers noted that 
participants with and without dyslexia perform equally well when instructed to use a 
visual strategy. 
While research has shown that people with dyslexia tend to adopt visual 
strategies in reasoning (Bacon & Handley, 2010a, 2010b; Bacon et al., 2007), the 
nature of the Corsi Block Task might naturally prompt participants with dyslexia to 
use a sequential recall strategy to match the sequential presentation of the stimuli, 
thereby creating difficulty in the process of switching from a default serial strategy to 
a more effective visual approach. 
 According to Miyake et al. (2000), switching strategies may involve three 
distinct executive processes: updating, inhibition, and shifting. Updating is the process 
of monitoring incoming information to check if it is relevant to the task at hand and 
then revising what is held in working memory and replacing it if necessary. This 
process requires the reasoner to be actively moving information around in working 
memory. Smith-Spark, Fisk, Fawcett and Nicholson (2003) demonstrated evidence of 
an executive deficit in adults with dyslexia in a task where participants were asked to 
recall the x most recent items in lists of varying lengths. This meant the participants 
had to keep the first x items in memory and then, if there were more than x items in a 
list, they had to drop the least recent item and update the contents in their memory by 
replacing the dropped item with the new addition. The results revealed that the length 
of the list did not adversely affect the performance of participants with dyslexia, while 
the longer lists reduced the performance of participants without dyslexia, implying 
that the central executive does not have much involvement in the task for participants 




 Metacognition, which is an individual’s awareness and understanding of their 
thought processes and a feeling of rightness (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017; 
Thompson, Prowse-Turner & Pennycook, 2011), can influence the level of confidence 
when performing a task. Furnes and Norman (2015) examined three forms of 
metacognition (knowledge, skills and experience) in people with dyslexia in a reading 
exercise for which the dependent variable was memory of the passages. Participants 
self-reported their metacognitive knowledge and skills, while their metacognitive 
experiences were assessed by predictions of performance and judgments of learning. 
The results showed that participants with dyslexia rated themselves lower in 
knowledge about reading strategies than participants without dyslexia, but no different 
to participants without dyslexia in their use of deep and surface learning strategies. 
The results suggest that people with dyslexia have metacognitive insight into their 
own difficulties with reading and they are also capable of adjusting their expectations 
in line with their skills.  
 Research suggests that people with dyslexia tend to use a spatial strategy when 
solving syllogisms compared to people with non-dyslexia (Bacon & Handley, 2010). 
Some have made the claim that people with dyslexia have greater visuospatial skills 
that compensate for their language difficulties (Galaburda, 1993; Miles, 1993). 






5.2.  Study: Performance of participants with dyslexia and participants 
without dyslexia after being taught to solve syllogisms using Euler Circles 
 
 The current study compared the performance of people with dyslexia and 
people without dyslexia before and after learning to solve syllogisms using Euler 
Circles. It was expected that people with dyslexia would perform better than people 
without dyslexia after being trained on a spatial strategy. 
 
5.2.1.  Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 31 Lancaster University undergraduate students: with 
dyslexia (10 female, 6 male) and without dyslexia (10 female, 5 male) with mean 
age 19 years (SD = 1.8). The mean age of the participants with dyslexia was 20 years 
(SD = 1.8) and the participants without was 19 years (SD = 1.5). Participants without 
dyslexia were recruited via Sona, the department’s online participant recruitment 
system. Self-reported participants with dyslexia were recruited through advertisements 
placed on Job Shop on the Lancaster University Students Union website, notices in the 
stairwell of the Psychology building, and via Sona. On behalf of the researcher, the 
Student Support office kindly contacted students who were recorded by the 
university as having been officially assessed as dyslexic, either by provision of 
evidence to the Disabilities Office of a diagnosis by a medical professional or 
educational psychologist. Due to time and resource constraints, and the multiple parts 
of the study, participants were not tested for IQ. In addition, research studies that have 
reported IQ scores have found no difference between participants with dyslexia and 




and participants without dyslexia who were not psychology majors were paid 
£13.50 across both sessions. Psychology majors were given course credit. 
 
Materials 
 Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices was used as a test of 
general cognitive ability in order to ensure a comparable level of cognitive 
ability between participants.   
  The pre-training workbook consisted of 12 syllogisms using 
neutral premise terms that were not related to each other (e.g. Some of the weavers are 
historians). All 12 syllogisms were taken from Ford’s (1995) study and were selected 
based on the level of difficulty for the participants in her study: four that were shown 
to be easiest for verbal reasoners (EV, that is participants in Ford’s study that 
indicated they solved the syllogisms with a verbal based strategy), four that were 
easiest for spatial reasoners (ES, i.e., participants who reported using spatial based 
strategies), and four that were equally difficult for both types of reasoners (HSV). See 
Appendix 2 for the list of syllogisms used in the pre-training workbooks. The 12 
syllogisms were randomly sorted, resulting in three different pre-training workbooks. 
Each syllogism appeared on a separate page with a clear space for workings and lines 
at the bottom of the page for writing out the solution(s). There was a separate line for 
each possible answer form (e.g. All…………… are…………..; Some………… are 
not…………; etc) to ensure participants correctly formatted their solutions.  Accuracy 
was recorded as having placed the correct terms in the correct space. Not all 
participants filled out the answer format as instructed. Some participants wrote 
sentences or phrases to explain their solution, some wrote more than one solution, but 




was accepted as accurate regardless of how it was displayed. For example, for the 
syllogism All B are A, some B are C, if a subject wrote “some A are C [correct] but 
also all C are A [not correct]” then that problem was counted as correct. 
  The training booklet was a step by step guide that demonstrated how to solve 
each of three syllogisms using Euler Circles. Each premise was represented 
separately with a diagram and a written explanation of how the circles are or are not 
combined, as well as how placement of the asterisk is used to denote where there is 
certainty that something exists. The third diagram in each example demonstrates how 
both syllogisms are combined to show the correct solution. Again, this was followed 
by a written explanation of how the asterisks “survive”.  The correct solution was 
provided for each example. The examples were all formats that appeared in the pre-
training and post-training workbooks. See Appendix 5 for a copy of the training 
booklet. The training process was derived from Stenning and Oberlander’s method 
(1995). Figure 5.3 shows one of the examples in the training booklet.  
 
Figure 5.3: Example problem from the training booklet. 
An easy way of solving syllogisms is by using Euler Circles. In logic, these are circles 
used to represent the terms of categorical statements. For example, take the syllogism 
Some A are B 













 The post-training workbook consisted of 12 syllogisms in the same 
forms as those in the pre-training workbook. The terms used, however, were different 
so as to prevent any interference from the pre-training set of syllogisms. It was felt 
that some participants may remember the terms from the pre-training set and this may 
influence their solution or strategy. The post-training terms were also taken from the 
syllogisms used in Ford’s (1995) study. The random order was kept the same as the 
pre-training workbook to try and maintain as much control as possible, so each post-
training workbook had a matching pre-training workbook. Each syllogism in the post-
training workbook appeared on a separate page with four numbered boxes, instead of 
a single blank space, for workings and lines at the bottom of the page for writing out 




by step method of solving the syllogisms. The steps were to draw a representation of 
premise one in the first box, then draw a representation of premise two in the second 
box, then the final drawing that combines both premises to form the conclusion goes 
in the third box. Figure 5.4 is an example of a participant’s workings in the post-
training workbook. 
 






  An Olympus digital voice recorder was used to record each participant’s verbal 
protocol in the pre-training and post-training sessions. A stop watch was used to 
record solution times.   
 
Design 
 A 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design was used. The between-subjects factor was dyslexic 
status (dyslexia, non-dyslexia) and the within-subjects factors were training (pre-
training v post-training) and problem type (HSV, ES, EV). The dependent measures 
were the number of syllogisms solved correctly and the time taken to solve each one.  
  
Procedure 
 Participants were tested in two sessions lasting approximately one 
hour each. The Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices was administered in groups of 
no more than four in the first session and took approximately 45 minutes per 
participant. The problem solving task was administered individually in the second 
session within seven days of the first session. The participants were presented with the 
pre-training workbook containing 12 randomised syllogisms. They were asked to say 
aloud their workings and write them on the spaces provided in the workbooks. Their 
verbal protocol was recorded with an Olympus digital voice recorder. The solution 
time for each syllogism was recorded using a stopwatch. The turning of the page was 
used as an indication of completion of each syllogism.   
 Upon completion of the pre-training workbook, participants were presented 
with the training booklet. They were allowed as much time as they needed to study the 
material and to ask the researcher questions for clarification. Immediately after the 




workbook containing 12 randomised syllogisms in the same order as the pre-training 
workbook, but with different premise terms. The procedure was exactly the same as 
for the pre-training session, except that they were asked to draw their workings in the 
numbered boxes provided instead of using the open space on each page.  
 
5.2.2.  Results 
 An independent samples t-test was conducted on the data from the Ravens 
Standard Progressive Matrices to determine if there were any group differences 
between the participants with dyslexia and those without dyslexia. The results 
indicated that participants with dyslexia and participants without dyslexia were of 
similar cognitive ability. The overall mean raw score was 40.13, with SD = 
4.43 (dyslexic: M = 39.19, SD = 4.97; non-dyslexic: M = 41.13, SD = 3.66), 
indicating an age equivalent of 18 years. The independent samples t-test revealed t 
(29) = -1.23, p = .23, d = -0.44.  
  The mean score for all correctly solved syllogisms was combined within each 
condition so each participant ended up with one average score for each of HSV, ES 
and EV. The mean number of correct solutions is displayed in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1: Mean number of correctly solved syllogisms. The figure in parentheses is 
the standard deviation. 
 
  Pre-training 
 
Post-training 
Syllogism Type Dyslexia Non-dyslexia 
 
Dyslexia Non-dyslexia 
HSV .22 (.27) .43 (.24) 
 
.28 (.27) .48 (.29) 
ES .44 (.25) .53 (.23) 
 
.53 (.22) .45 (.25) 
EV .50 (.27) .63 (.27) 
 





 A 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design ANOVA was performed on the mean number of 
correctly solved problems with problem type (ES, EV, HSV) and training (pre-
training, post-training) as within-subjects factors, and dyslexic status (dyslexia v non-
dyslexia) as between-subjects factor. This revealed a main effect of problem type, 
F(2,28) = 8.98, p < .05, ηρ2 = .24. The number of correctly solved syllogisms 
was higher for ES problems (M = 1.95, SD = .95) and EV problems (M = 
1.94, SD = 1.04) than for HSV problems (M = 1.42, SD = 1.14). See Figure 5.5.  
  
Figure 5.5: Overall mean number of correctly solved syllogisms.  
  
  
 The main effect of training was not significant F(1, 29) = .904, p = .35, ηρ2 = 
.03. The between-subjects main effect, dyslexia v non-dyslexia, was not 
significant, F(1, 29) = 3.29, p = .08, ηρ2 = .10. Overall, participants without dyslexia 
correctly solved more problems (M = 1.99, SD = 1.02) than those with dyslexia (M = 
1.55, SD = .98), but not significantly so.  
  The results also showed a significant interaction between problem type x 
dyslexia, F(2, 28) = 3.87, p < .05, ηρ2 = .16. Figure 5.6 demonstrates that participants 

















(M = 1.83, SD = 2) on HSV problems. Participants with dyslexia also scored lower 
on EV problems (dyslexic: M = 1.72, SD = .91; non-dyslexic: M = 2.17, SD = 1.03). 
Both participants with dyslexia and participants without dyslexia were evenly matched 
on ES problems (dyslexic: M = 1.94, SD = .94; non-dyslexic: M = 1.97, SD = .96).  
  




 The results also revealed a significant interaction between training x problem 
type, F(2, 28) = 5.52, p < .01, ηρ2 = .16. The number of correctly 
solved HSV problems was lower in the pre-training condition (M = 1.3, SD = 1.10) 
than in the post-training condition (M = 1.52, SD = 1.18), and almost identical 
for ES problems in both the pre-training (M = 1.94, SD = .96) and post-training (M = 
1.97, SD = .95) conditions. However, the number of correctly 
solved EV problems was much lower in post-training (M = 1.61, SD = 1.09) than pre-
training (M = 2.26, SD = 1.10), indicating that training affected the way in which the 


























 A paired samples t-test revealed that participants performed worse 
on problems that were easiest for verbal reasoners after training (M = 1.61, SD = .88) 
than before training (M = 2.26, SD = 1.09), t(30) = 2.87, p < .05, d = .66. While 
participants performed slightly better on problems that were easiest for both types 
of reasoners after training (M = 1.52, SD = 1.18) than before training (M = 1.29, SD = 
1.10), t(30) = -1.16, p = .88, they were relatively equal on problems that were easiest 
for spatial reasoners before training (M = 1.94, SD = .96) and after training (M = 
1.97, SD = .95), t(30) = -.15, p = .26.   
  There was no significant interaction between training x dyslexia, F(1, 29) = 
1.21, p = .28, ηρ2 = .04 or between training x problem type x dyslexia F(2, 58) = .81, p 
= .45, ηρ2 = .03.  
 The data were further analysed to examine the nature of the interactions 




















ANOVA was conducted for each problem type (HSV, ES, EV) with the within-
subjects factors as training (pre-training, post-training) and the between-subjects 
factor as dyslexic status (dyslexia, non-dyslexia). The results of each analysis are 
presented separately. 
 
EV (Syllogisms that are easiest for verbal reasoners) 
 There was a significant main effect of training, F(1, 29) = 8.04, p < .05. There 
was an overall reduction in accuracy from pre-training (M = .56, SD = .27) to post-
training (M = .40, SD = .22). There was no significant effect of dyslexia, F(1, 29) = 
2.76, p = .11. There was also no significant interaction between training and dyslexic 
status, F(1, 29) = .14, p = .71. 
 
ES (Syllogisms that are easiest for spatial reasoners) 
 There was no significant main effect of training, F(1, 29) = .01, p = .92, or of 
dyslexic status, F(1, 29) = .01, p = .92. There was no significant interaction between 
training and dyslexic status, F(1, 29) = 2.88, p = .10.  
 
HSV (Syllogisms that are equally difficult for verbal and spatial reasoners) 
 There was a significant main effect of dyslexic status, F(1, 29) = 6.28, p < .05. 
Participants without dyslexia solved almost twice as many syllogisms correctly (M = 
.46, SD = .27) than participants with dyslexia (M = .25, SD = .27). See Figure 5.8. 
There was no significant main effect of training, F(1, 29) = 1.28, p = .27. There was 











5.2.3.  Additional analysis of reasoning strategy 
 The pre-training workbooks were inspected for evidence of a particular 
reasoning strategy in order to determine whether participants who had a particular 
strategic approach (verbal or spatial) might be affected differently by training to use a 
spatial method. The same criteria as explained in Chapter 3 were applied. To count as 
clear evidence of a strategy the participant was required to present with at least four 
problems showing workings in a verbal or spatial strategy as described by Ford 
(1995). Eight out of the 31 participants demonstrated a clear verbal strategy (5 with 
dyslexia, 3 without dyslexia), while three demonstrated a clear spatial strategy (0 with 
dyslexia, 3 without dyslexia). The remaining 22 participants either showed no 
workings at all, or not enough to determine a clear strategy, so were classified as 


















 It is interesting that so few participants showed a clear strategy compared with 
Bacon et al. (2007). However, Bacon et al. (2007) do not indicate exactly how many 
of the 40 participants wrote down their protocol. They only mention 4 that used a 
mixed strategy and 3 that were unidentified. They showed examples of 4 participants’ 
protocols. They used 2 sets of problems (8 syllogisms with sporting terms and 8 with 
Welsh terms) but did not state how many had to be shown per set to identify a clear 
strategy. The differences may be due to the use of sporting/Welsh terms in Bacon et 
al.’s (2007) syllogisms, or a more constrained set of syllogism types in the current 
study. The data were not analysed by dyslexic status as there were fewer than four 
participants in three out of the four conditions. The data for the verbal and spatial 
participants were analysed in a 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA in an explorative analysis. The 
within-subjects factors were training (pre-training, post-training) and syllogism type 
(HSV, ES, EV). The between-subjects factor was reasoning strategy (clear verbal or 
clear spatial). The dependent variable was the mean number of correctly solved 
syllogisms. Table 5.2 shows the mean performance across all conditions. 
 
Table 5.2: Mean accuracy across all conditions. Standard deviation is shown in 
parentheses. 
 
Syllogism Type Verbal Strategy  Spatial Strategy 
 Pre-training Post-training  Pre-training Post-training 
HSV .28 (.28) .38 (.23)  .41 (.14) .75 (.25) 
ES .50 (.27) .47 (.28)  .58 (.14) .67 (.14) 
EV .65 (.27) .28 (.16)  .75 (.25) .50 (.25) 
 
 There was no main effect of training, F(2, 18) = .12, p = .74 or of syllogism 
type, F(2, 18) = 1.56, p = .24. The only significant result was an interaction between 




subset is similar to that of the larger set. Training had a detrimental effect on 
performance for EV problems, as was also shown in the analysis of the entire data set 
(see Figure 5.7 above). 
 
5.2.4.  Discussion 
 The present study compared the performance of people with dyslexia and 
people without dyslexia before and after learning to solve syllogisms using a spatial 
strategy, more specifically a method based on Euler Circles. To this end, I examined 
whether individuals demonstrated evidence of using a verbal or spatial strategy (Ford, 
1995) and how this might be affected by learning a strategy that may be compatible or 
incompatible to what they presently used. The hypothesis is that if people with 
dyslexia are predominantly spatial reasoners (Bacon & Handley, 2010) they would 
perform better on problems that are easiest for spatial reasoners than on problems that 
are easiest for verbal reasoners. 
 The results are consistent with existing research that suggests individuals tend 
to favour a verbal or spatial strategy (Ford, 1995). The results of the present study 
revealed an interaction of problem type x dyslexia, where participants with dyslexia 
performed worse than participants without dyslexia on both EV and HSV problems 
but were evenly matched on ES problems. This gives credence to the notion that 
people with dyslexia tend to favour a spatial strategy (Bacon & Handley, 2010). 
Interestingly, inspection of the pre-training workbooks for those that showed their 
workings revealed that none of the participants with dyslexia demonstrated clear 
spatial strategy but five of them demonstrated a clear verbal strategy. The poorer 
performance of participants with dyslexia compared to participants without dyslexia 




problems that are easiest for verbal reasoners, suggests that they may be applying 
inappropriate strategies to solve these types of problems. Having to solve the 
syllogism as well as producing written workings, seemed to have affected their ability 
to write or draw what they were thinking. In addition, the introduction of a training 
regime could be seen as the introduction of a dual task paradigm where the 
participants were expected to learn a new skill and use it to solve a series of problems. 
Swanson, Ashbaker and Lee (1996) suggest that high processing demands can lead to 
deficits on both verbal and visuospatial working memory in people with reading 
disabilities. Other research suggests that visuospatial memory deficits come to the 
forefront only when the task at hand requires the person to engage with it verbally 
(Gould & Glencross, 1990; Thomson, 1982). 
 If participants with dyslexia do not have sufficient verbal working memory 
capacity for problem solving, they may choose the easiest strategy, which is not 
necessarily the right one for them. The more models required to build the conclusion, 
the more strain on their working memory, resulting in a failure to search for all 
possible alternatives (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Therefore, the more difficult the problem 
the more likely errors are to occur.  
  Training slightly improved the overall performance on problems that are 
equally difficult for verbal as well as spatial reasoners but had a detrimental effect on 
performance on problems that are easiest for verbal reasoners. There was no 
discernible difference for problems that are easiest for spatial reasoners. This is 
demonstrated in the analysis of data from participants that showed clear evidence of a 
verbal strategy. The reduction in accuracy for EV problems was approximately 45% 
from pre-training to post-training. Teaching the spatial strategy did not have an overall 




dyslexia. It appears to make problems that are easier with a verbal strategy harder to 
solve. Therefore, the strategy in the way it is being taught impacted the approach to 
learning but did not promote problem solving. It is possible that strategy style rather 
than dyslexic status impacts upon problem solving.  
 Considering the evidence presented by participants demonstrating a clear 
verbal or spatial strategy, as indicated in the overall results, there is an almost 
complete reversal in performance from pre-training to post-training on problems that 
are easiest for verbal reasoners. It may be the case that individuals who possess lower 
spatial ability may be less able to form accurate representations of the problems 
(Roberts, 1997) so would be negatively affected by having to work with a spatial 
strategy. Some participants may be capable of switching strategies and the training 
enabled them to see the problems from a different perspective. In fact, some 
participants were observed writing the conclusion first and then drawing the diagrams 
of the method in order to match that conclusion. In some instances, they appeared to 
realise the conclusion was incorrect so revised the workings and amended the 
previously written conclusion. It may be argued that they were simply satisfying the 
demands of the study by filling in the required parts of the workbook, though there is 
some evidence overall of the effect of the training strategy on syllogism performance 
after compared to before the training – for the group as a whole, the training affected 
problem solving.  
 There are some limitations to the present study. There was no verbal or written 
protocol recorded so it is not known in many cases what strategy was being used in 
the pre-training session. Despite the instructions, many participants did not show their 
workings. Inspection of each workbook revealed that, 11 out of 31 participants 




strategy was judged as at least four instances of the same strategy in the pre-training 
workbook, i.e. at least four problems showing workings of either a verbal or a spatial 
strategy as described by Ford (1995). Eight participants showed a clear verbal 
strategy, rewriting the premises as mathematical equations and drawing arrows or 
symbols to indicate relationships between terms. Three participants demonstrated a 
clear spatial strategy, drawing shapes such as circles to indicate relationships between 
terms. Four participants demonstrated a mixed strategy. One participant demonstrated 
a clear verbal strategy throughout and interestingly had drawn circles for the first few 
problems in the booklet but never filled them in with terms. As the circles were drawn 
underneath the verbal workings, this suggests that they may have started with one 
strategy then thought about trying a different one before deciding to stick with the 
original plan.  
 Another limitation is the inequality of syllogism figures used in the study. 
Figure 5.9 shows the distribution of figures in the pre-training and post-training 
workbooks. AB/CB and BA/BC are the only figures that are common to all 
conditions. A Fisher’s exact test resulted in p = .689, so the distribution of figures was 
not significantly different across the categories of syllogism. Future research can 
consider a study that balances the figures across all conditions. 
 
Figure 5.9: Distribution of syllogism figures in the training booklets. 
 
Figure HSV ES EV 
AB/BC 0 1 2 
BA/CB 0 0 1 
AB/CB 1 1 0 





 The study partially supported the hypothesis that participants with dyslexia 
differ to participants without dyslexia in the way they reason with syllogisms. It was 
expected that people with dyslexia should perform better after training on a spatial 
strategy. The results revealed that, as expected, both types of reasoners were affected 
by problems that are equally difficult for both (Ford, 1995). The results also showed a 
significant interaction between problem type and dyslexia. Participants with dyslexia 
scored lower on HSV and EV problems than participants without dyslexia but were 
evenly matched on ES problems. 
 The results also revealed a significant interaction between training and 
problem type. The number of correctly solved HSV problems was lower in pre-
training. ES was identical in pre and post training and EV was lower in post-training. 
Further testing confirmed HSV improved after training. So, it might have made some 
problems easier with a new strategy, either with a new strategy for some reasoners or 
made some problem types easier with a different strategy. Training did not have any 
impact on dyslexia as demonstrated by the lack of interaction between training and 
dyslexic status. 
 Further analysis confirmed EV was worse after training. HSV was affected by 
dyslexic status. It is possibly the case that if people with dyslexia are hindered by 
phonological difficulty and verbal working memory capacity, they were not able to 
adopt the new strategy, whereas people who were not affected by these things could. 
 Exploratory work with a clear strategy confirmed earlier finding that training 
had a detrimental effect on performance of EV problems. That is, training in a spatial 
strategy hindered the performance of participants who tend toward a spatial strategy 





CHAPTER 6: EYE TRACKING 
 
6.1.  Eye movements and problem solving 
 Eye tracking has been widely used in the research of cognitive processes, such 
as memory, attention, language, problem solving and decision making (Thomas & 
Lleras, 2007; Knoblich, Ohlsson & Raney, 2001; Espino, Santamaria, Meseguer & 
Carreiras, 2005). The information from eye tracking research can be used to infer that 
cognitive processing has taken place (Rayner, 1998). Despite the name eye tracking, 
the focus of this type of research method has been largely on when the eyes remain 
still rather than when they are actually moving (Yeh, Tsai, Hsu & Lin, 2014). It is felt 
that eye movements not only reflect what we are thinking, but they can also influence 
how we think (Thomas & Lleras, 2007).  
 The main types of eye movements in reading and information processing are 
saccades and fixations. Saccades are the rapid movement of the eyes between fixation 
points. Saccades occur when reading a passage or looking at a scene or object. Some 
studies have shown that cognitive processes are suspended during a saccade (Irwin & 
Carlson-Radvansky, 1996; Sanders & Houtmans, 1985; Sanders & Rath, 1991; Van 
Duren & Sanders, 1992 & 1995). According to Uttal and Smith (1968), no new 
information is gained during a saccade due to the rapid movement of the eyes. 
Fixations, which last around 200-300ms, are the period of time when the eyes remain 
still between saccades. The general assumption is that the fixation is the focus of 
attention and its duration is the processing effort at that location (Holmqvist, Nystrom, 
Andersson, Dewhurst, Jarodzka & Van de Weijer, 2011). A greater number of overall 




one area suggests that particular area is more important to the viewer than other areas 
(Poole & Ball, 2005), longer fixations in an area can signify processing difficulty 
(Rayner, 1998), and concentrated fixations tend to be considered focused and efficient 
(Cowen, Ball & Delin, 2002). Focused attention helps maintain information in 
memory and in retrieving information from memory (Theeuwes, Belopolsky & 
Olivers, 2009) which is essential for efficient information processing in working 
memory. 
 Research suggests a strong relationship between what someone is looking at and 
what they are thinking about, as well as fixation between duration and the amount of 
processing (Just & Carpenter, 1976; Rayner, 1978, 1998). Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook and 
Rao (1997) suggest longer fixation times can mean deeper processing and short 
fixation times serves to re-encode information about the problem into working 
memory. They point out that re-encoding does not necessarily mean further 
processing. The problem solver may have “abandoned or overcome attention 
allocation” and just rearranged their representation to process the information from a 
different angle.  
 Research indicates that readers tend not to fixate in the blank spaces between 
sentences (Abrams & Zubir, 1972; Rayner, 1975). In addition, eye movements seem 
to be different for silent reading and reading aloud. Fixations are longer for silent 
reading (Levy-Schoen, 1981). When the text is more difficult saccades decrease while 
fixations and regressions increase (Jacobson & Dodwell, 1979; Rayner & Pollastek, 
1989). Regression in reading is the process of going back to re-read a passage. Dillon 
(1985) suggests that the examination of eye fixations provides more direct information 
about the processes of problem solving than is possible through the analysis of test 




being used to solve a problem. However, standard testing can fall prey to participants 
not clearly understanding the nature of the task or the instructions, forgetting or not 
paying attention to relevant information, using irrelevant methods or just guessing 
answers. Dillon’s previous research also suggests that people with different cognitive 
abilities processed problems differently. She demonstrated that people with different 
abilities differed in strategy, individual differences accounted for significant amounts 
of variance in performance, and that stimuli can be manipulated to elicit different 
strategies. Berthge, Carlson and Weidl (1982) found that scanning patterns of third 
grade children solving the Coloured Progressive Matrices Test varied depending on 
the testing conditions.  
 Eye tracking has become one of the most popular methods of studying human 
visual attention based on the eye-mind assumption (Just & Carpenter, 1980). The eye-
mind assumption is the notion that the eye is fixated on a word for the duration of time 
it takes the reader to process the word. Scan path patterns demonstrate cognitive 
strategies used in goal-oriented tasks (Gandini, Lemaire & Dufau, 2008). Hegarty, 
Mayer and Green (1992) used eye-tracking to examine the comprehension process and 
the strategies for solving mathematics word problems. They found that key 
information such as numbers and variable names to solving problems were fixated 
longer and were critical in determining the solution.   Verschaffel, De Corte and 
Pauwels (1992) also used eye-tracking techniques to examine word problem solving 
and indicated that students made more comprehension reversal errors (e.g., addition 
used while subtraction was the correct strategy) when the order of the terms in the 
relational statement was not consistent with the preferred order. Research has also 
shown that prior knowledge and expertise had influences on allocating visual attention 




2010; Cook, Wiebe & Carter, 2008). Recognising, selecting, and processing the 
relevant information is essential for successful mathematics word problem solving.  
 
6.2.  Insight problem solving 
 Knoblich, Ohlsson and Raney (2001) argue that attention is allocated in 
different ways to each part of a problem and this is influenced by the initial 
representation of that problem. A problem contains values and operators. The values 
are generally considered to be variable and the operators are considered to be constant. 
Difficulties may arise due to an inappropriate (Knoblich et al., 2001) or incomplete 
(Kaplan & Simon, 1990) representation of the problem and this may lead to an 
incorrect strategy for solving it. The problem solver may end up simply staring at it 
hoping for some sort of inspiration. Knoblich et al. (2001) refer to this as an impasse. 
  Functional fixedness has been cited as one of the reasons for the impasse. This 
is where prior knowledge of a similar problem influences thought processes in 
assessing the problem at hand (Duncker, 1945; Keane, 1989). Another reason is 
mental ruts, where repeated exploration of unsuccessful search paths increases 
activation of those same paths (Smith, 1995), which is essentially the problem solver 
just trying the same unsuccessful approach repeatedly and never achieving the correct 
solution.  
  In some instances, solving a problem may require thinking outside of the box 
or employing insight. Insight involves the ability to mentally detach the components 
of the problem (Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider & Rhenius, 1999) and revise the 
representation. In other words, to see the problem in a whole new light. The problem 
solver must relax the constraint placed on the components, usually the operator 




problem solver is willing and able to ignore prior or assumed knowledge and see 
things differently. 
  Knoblich, Ohlsson and Raney (2001) studied insight problem solving using the 
matchstick problem. This particular problem was used because it was easier to 
determine which component the participants were fixating on at any given point in 
time. It was felt that the matchsticks would activate the participants’ prior knowledge 
of maths which in turn will bias the assessment of the problems, rendering it difficult 
for the participants to “detach a component that has no meaning of its own”. They 
further suggest that an impasse only occurs after initial explanation of the problem so 
the duration of eye fixation should increase for difficult problems, and the length of 
fixation should be similar for successful and unsuccessful problem solvers. They used 
eye tracking as research indicates that what a person is looking at tends to be what 
they are processing (Just & Carpenter, 1976). 
  Participants in their study were presented with three incorrect mathematical 
statements expressed in Roman numerals with the matchsticks. They were required to 
correct the statements by moving only one matchstick. Figure 6.1 shows the 
statements that were used in the study.  Problem A required the value of the result 
(shown on the left side of the equation) to be changed. This could be accomplished by 
moving the stick in IV to the right of the V to make it VI. Problem B required the 
operator to be changed and this could be accomplished by replacing the second plus 
sign with an equal sign. Problem C required the decomposition of the X and this could 
be accomplished by shifting the left-slanted stick to further to the left so the value 
becomes a V. The problems were presented in random order with a time limit of five 
minutes for each one. If the solution was incorrect they had to continue working on 




variables in this study were the frequency of solution during a five-minute interval, the 
solution time for problems solved, and the position and the duration of each fixation 
on the display.  
  If the values are viewed as variable and the operators as constant, then the 
focus in the initial exploratory phase should be on the values rather than the constants. 
Since the values have to change in order to solve the problem then the participant 
should demonstrate a longer fixation time overall on the values and this should 
increase over time due to a faulty representation. Impasses were expected in Problem 
B and Problem C only. This should last only until constraint is relaxed on the 
operators. 
  




  The results revealed that Problem B was solved significantly less often than 
Problem A and Problem C. Problem C was solved significantly less often than 




than Problem B and Problem A was solved significantly faster than Problem C. 
Problem C was solved significantly faster than Problem B.  
   With regards to eye tracking data, only fixations longer than 100ms were 
included. The problem solving process was divided into three equal portions for each 
participant and then aggregated across all of the participants. The results indicated that 
the overall fixation duration was higher in Problems B and C than in Problem A, and 
the mean fixation duration increased steadily across intervals in Problems B and C, 
but remained constant after the second interval in Problem A. These results appear to 
agree with the hypothesis that the participants faced more impasses in Problems B and 
C than in Problem A.  
  In a similar vein to the matchstick problem, syllogisms require manipulation of 
the terms in each premise to draw a conclusion. How easy or difficult the task is 
depends on several factors such as the figure of the syllogism or the style of the 
reasoner. Observing the eye movements of reasoners can provide valuable information 
about the reasoning process. 
 
6.3.  Eye movements and embodied solutions 
  Grant and Spivey (2003) suggest cognitive processing and eye patterns are 
linked, that the pattern of eye movements can influence spatial reasoning “by way of 
an implicit eye movement–to–cognition link where successful participants moved 
their eyes in a pattern that embodied the solution”. Using Duncker’s (1945) radiation 
problem, they demonstrated that participants who successfully solved the problem 
within 10 minutes had spent more time looking at the tissue area than those who were 
unable to solve it without hints. Duncker’s radiation problem asks participants to 




inoperable and there is a ray that can destroy the tumor but the intensity of the ray will 
also destroy healthy tissue as well. The task is to work out how to destroy the tumor 
while preserving the healthy tissue. The pattern of eye movements of the successful 
participants followed a path that embodied the solution. 
  Thomas and Lleras (2007) took this a step further to examine whether forcing 
an eye movement pattern that embodied the solution to the problem could make 
participants more successful. They used a tracking task to occasionally guide their 
participants’ eye movements while attempting to solve Duncker’s (1945) radiation 
problem. The tracking task was to identify a digit among letters within the problem 
diagram. The participants were allocated to one of four groups: an embodied-solution 
group where their eyes were guided across the skin areas, focusing on the pattern that 
embodies the laser path; an areas-of-interest group that were only guided to the same 
areas as the embodied-solution group but with far fewer instances of crossing the skin 
areas; a repeated skin-crossing group that were guided between the same two points 
without focusing on the skin areas; and a tumour–fixation group which served as the 
control group by looking only at the tumour.  
  The researchers hypothesised that if skin-crossing saccades heavily influenced 
cognition of the problem then the embodied-solution group should perform best. If 
simply directing the eyes to the relevant areas is sufficient then the embodied-solution 
and the areas-of-interest groups should perform best. If skin-crossing helps but has no 
bearing on embodiment, then the embodied-cognition and the repeated-skin-crossing 
groups should perform best. If guiding the eyes has no influence on embodiment then 
all groups should perform similarly.  
   The results showed that the embodied-solution group were more likely to solve 




movement patterns can influence thought in spatial reasoning tasks and is most 
effective when the guidance embodies the solution. This is further evidenced in a 
study by Litchfield, Ball, Donovan, Manning and Crawford (2010) demonstrating that 
novice radiologists were better able to identify nodules after being shown the search 
patterns of more experienced colleagues. 
  In another study, Susac, Bubic, Kaponja, Planinic and Palmovic (2014) 
observed 40 students while they tried to rearrange algebraic equations. These 
researchers found a correlation between the number of fixations and the efficiency of 
problem solving, suggesting that more efficient participants had developed adequate 
strategies. Their results indicate that eye tracking data provide insights into implicit 
cognitive processes and can be used as an indirect measure of cognitive load and level 
of difficulty for participants and could also be a useful way of assessing problem 
solving strategies during the task. They reported that scan path analysis provided an 
objective measure of the frequency of participants’ checking the offered solution 
during the equation rearrangement. Similarly, Tai, Loehrb and Brighamc (2006) 
suggest that eye‐gaze tracking may potentially be a useful approach to furthering 
understanding of students’ problem‐solving behaviours. In particular, “eye movements 
may be useful in discriminating different levels of expertise on complex academic 
tasks within groups of students who have similar levels of performance” (Tai et al., 
2006, p. 189).  
  Research has shown that a figural effect occurs when drawing conclusions 
from syllogisms (Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Dickstein, 1978; Polk & Newell, 1995; 
Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990) and this is most prominent for Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
The figural effect is the tendency to create solutions in the same form as the premise 




were presented and in which the terms were used to construct the mental 
representation of those premises. These figures relate to the relative order of the terms 
in the syllogism premises, and are: 
Figure 1: AB/BC 
Figure 2: BA/CB 
Figure 3: AB/CB 
Figure 4: BA/BC 
 
  The figural effect is that Figure 2 tends to generate more answers in the C-A 
pattern while Figure 1 generates more answers in the A-C pattern. In addition, Figure 
1 syllogisms are generally processed faster than Figure 2 syllogisms (Espino, 
Santamaria & Garcia-Madruga, 2000). 
  Several theories abound about the cause of figural effects in the processing of 
syllogisms. The process may be dependent on how and when the elements of the 
problem are represented in the mind of the reasoner. According to the Probability 
Heuristic Model (PHM, Chater & Oaksford, 1999), the min-heuristic selects the 
quantifier and the attachment heuristic selects the order of end terms in the conclusion, 
therefore the figure does not affect the difficulty of the task because the conclusion 
has already been determined. In contrast, the Mental Models theory (Johnson-Laird & 
Bara, 1984) claims that figure does affect the difficulty of the task and this occurs 
when separate representations of the premises are combined in order to solve the 
problem. They suggest Figure 1 is easier because the middle term is adjacent in both 
premises and Figure 2 is harder because it requires the reasoner to rearrange the 
representation, either by changing the order of the terms within the premises or the 




  Espino, Santamaria, Meseguer and Carreiras (2005) used eye tracking to 
investigate if the level of difficulty and the figure of the syllogism affects the 
processing time. As Mental Models Theory indicates, there can be an early process 
effect where the figure affects the difficulty due to initial representations having to be 
reviewed and additional representations having to be created, or as PHM indicates, a 
late process effect where figure has an effect only after all other factors have 
determined the mode or quantifier. 
 Espino et al. (2005) examined First Pass Time (the sum of duration of fixations 
in a given part of a sentence during the initial reading of the passage), comparing it 
with the Total Reading Time (the sum of the duration of all the fixations in a given 
part of a sentence).  First Pass Time relates to early processes around the initial 
viewing of the premises, while Total Reading Time relates to the later processes 
relates around the total time taken to draw a conclusion (Rayner, Sereno, Morris, 
Schmauder & Clifton, 1989).  
 The dependent variables in the study were First Pass Time v Total Reading 
Time. Participants were presented with 8 problems: 4 each of Figure 2 (BA/CB) and 
Figure 1 (AB/BC) problems, with 8 additional syllogisms serving as fillers.  The test 
problems were 4 simple (two of each figure) and 4 complex (two of each figure) 
models. The complex models always included negative quantifiers. The problems 
were presented individually in random order and participants were required to press a 
key when they reached a conclusion and give a verbal answer to the experimenter. 
  The results for First Pass Time showed no significant effects or interactions of 
difficulty or type of figure. However, there was an effect of type of figure for the 
second premise. Participants took longer to read the second premise in Figure 2 than 




additional processing of the second premise. The shorter reading times for the second 
premise in Figure 1 syllogisms suggests that reasoners can integrate the information of 
the second premise more quickly in Figure 1 syllogisms than in Figure 2 syllogisms.   
  The results for Total Reading Time showed reliable effects of difficulty for the 
first premise. Participants took less total time in solving simple problems than 
complex problems. The second premise showed reliable effects of difficulty and of 
type of figure. Participants took less total time for simple problems than for complex 
problems and they took less total time for Figure 1 problems than for Figure 2 
problems.  The results may have also been affected by the fact that the complex 
problems always included negative quantifiers. 
 With regards to accuracy, participants gave more correct conclusions to simple 
than to complex problems and they gave more correct conclusions to Figure 1 than to 
Figure 2 problems. In addition, there was an interaction between figure and difficulty. 
Participants gave more correct conclusions to Figure 1 simple problems than to Figure 
2 simple problems. There was no effect for complex problems.  
  The results of this study are more in keeping with Mental Models Theory that 
suggests a figural effect is caused by reasoners rearranging their mental 
representations of models in order to solve the syllogism. The close proximity of the 
middle term in both premises makes it easier to process those syllogisms as there is no 
need to rearrange the representations. It is easy to construct the first premise then 
immediately integrate the information from the second premise (Johnson-Laird, 
1983). For the Figure 2 problem they would have had to construct the second premise 
then review the arrangement for the first premise in light of the new information, thus 




 Jia, Lu, Zhong and Yao (2009) further distinguished between evaluation and 
generation of conclusions in an eye-tracking study of syllogism solving. The effect 
appears to be the reverse when participants are asked to evaluate a conclusion rather 
than generate one of their own.  Participants in their study were asked to evaluate 
whether a given conclusion in ninety Figure 2 (BA/CB) and ninety Figure 1 (AB/BC) 
syllogisms were true or false. Two important factors in their study were early and late 
processes. Early processes were defined as the duration of the fixation from the time 
the participant entered the area of interest and left it for the first time. Late processes 
were defined as the sum of the duration of all fixations except the first one. 
Interestingly, they found the Figure 1 syllogisms were more cognitively demanding 
than the Figure 2 syllogisms. The early processes were longer for the major premise 
and the conclusion of Figure 1 than Figure 2. The late processes were longer for the 
major premise, minor premise and the conclusion of Figure 1 than Figure 2. These 
findings suggested there were differences in figural effects between evaluation and 
generation of conclusions. Figure 1 appeared to engender a backward-chaining 
process that was more cognitively demanding than Figure 2 that appeared to engender 
a forward-chaining process. 
 Eye tracking studies have revealed a lot of valuable information in terms of 
strategies that people use for problem solving, with the possibility of different 
strategies being exhibited through different regions of the syllogism problems, and in 
terms of the processes around figural effects. An interesting question is how this 
method of study can be used to determine which type of syllogistic problems are 





6.4.  Study examining eye movements while solving syllogisms 
  The aim of the current study was to examine eye movements of participants 
while solving a set of 12 categorical syllogisms with valid conclusions to identify 
where attention is focused during the reasoning process (Espino et al., 2005), and if 
they were influenced by the level of difficulty or the figure of the syllogism (Jia et al., 
2009). The syllogisms used in the study were those identified by Ford (1995) as being 
easiest for spatial reasoners (ES), easiest for verbal reasoners (EV), and equally 
difficult for both spatial and verbal reasoners (HSV). Each syllogism was separated 
into eight areas of interest, one for each of the quantifiers and terms in each premise. 
Treating each quantifier and each term as a separate area of interest made it possible 
to track which part of the premise attention was allocated to at any point during the 
experimental trials. It was expected that participants would be affected more by the 
figural effect than the level of difficulty.  
  Observing eye movements while solving syllogisms can show where, if any, 
impasses occur (Knoblich et al., 2001), and if there is an impasse, what type of 
problem is it more likely to occur with. Hegarty et al. (1992) found key information 
such as numbers and variable names were fixated longer and were critical in 
determining solutions. Therefore, I consider the possibility that the pattern of fixation 
on problems with varying levels of difficulty (ES, EV and HSV) as well as the figure 
of the syllogism (AB/BC, AB/CB, BA,BC, BA,CB) can identify which parts of the 
premises are most important for deducing a conclusion for verbal or spatial reasoners. 
The hypothesis is that reasoning strategy would be affected more by the figure of the 




6.4.1.  Method 
Participants 
  Participants were 23 Lancaster University students with a mean age of 23 
years (SD = 5.3). They were recruited by Sona, the research participation system used 
by the Department of Psychology, and by posting notices around the university 
campus. They were paid £7 for participation.  None of the participants took part in the 
previous studies in this thesis. Four participants were tested but the data was not 
included in the analysis as it had not been collected effectively due to computer 
malfunction, resulting in the final n = 19.  
  
Materials  
  A shortened form of the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (Bilker, 
Hansen, Brensinger, Richard, Gur & Gur, 2012) was used as a test of general 
cognitive ability in order to test for the effect of non-verbal cognitive ability between 
participants.   
   The test stimuli consisted of 12 syllogisms with neutral premise terms that 
were not related to each other (e.g. Some of the weavers are historians). All 12 
syllogisms were taken from Ford’s (1995) study and were selected based on the level 
of difficulty for the participants in her study: four that were shown to be easiest for 
verbal reasoners (EV), four that were easiest for spatial reasoners (ES), and four that 
were equally difficult for both types of reasoners (HSV). All 12 syllogisms had valid 





  The syllogisms were presented in random order on a 57.5cm (23”) HPs2331a 
computer monitor with resolution 1024 x 768. Eye movements were recorded with a 
Tobii Pro X60 table mounted eye tracker at a rate of 60Hz, with a maximum gaze 
angle of 35 degrees. Participants sat approximately 50cm away from the monitor but 
were free to adjust their position slightly to ensure that the eye tracker picked up their 
eye movements. The syllogisms were displayed in the centre of the monitor screen. 
Each premise was divided into four areas of interest (AOIs), for a total of eight AOIs. 
Each AOI was either a term or a quantifier in each of the premises. For example, in 
the syllogism ‘None of the sculptors are columnists’, AOI1 is ‘None of’, AOI2 is ‘the 
sculptors’, AOI3 is ‘are’, and AOI4 is ‘columnists’. AOI5-AOI8 followed the same 
pattern. 
  The first premise was positioned 8cm from the top of the screen, with each 
AOI in that premise positioned a minimum of 2cm away from the previous one. The 
space for each AOI was governed by the length of the longest phrase. The second 
premise was positioned 12cm from the top, 4cm below the first premise, with each 
subsequent AOI positioned directly under its counterpart in the first premise, for 
example AOI5 was positioned directly under AOI2. All AOIs were displayed in font 
size Courier New 18, with black letters on a white background. Figure 6.2 shows the 






Figure 6.2: Presentation layout of the syllogisms during experimental trial. Each block 











  A repeated measures design was used. The within-subjects factors were 
problem type (HSV, ES, EV) and AOI (AOI1, AOI2, AOI3, AOI4, AOI5, AOI6, 
AOI7, AOI8) in the analysis of verbal versus spatial problem strategy. For the analysis 
by Figure, the within-subjects factors were Figure (AB/BC, AB/CB, BA/BC, BA/CB) 
and AOI (AOI1, …, AOI8). The dependent variables were the looking proportion 
(proportion of the total time of fixations in any AOI) of each AOI and the response 
times for level of difficulty and figure of syllogisms.  
  
Procedure  
  Participants were tested individually in one session lasting approximately 60 
minutes. The shortened form of Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices test was 




 None of the sculptors are columnists 






   Instructions for the problem-solving task were presented on paper and 
participants were given the opportunity to ask questions before proceeding to the 
second part of the study. The instructions were as follows:  
You are taking part in an investigation about how people use information in order to 
draw conclusions. You will be solving a series of syllogistic reasoning problems. A 
syllogistic problem consists of two premises (statements), for example:  
 
Some B are A  
All B are C  
   
Your task is to determine the conclusion (if any) which follows logically from these. 
A logical conclusion is a conclusion which must be true, if the premises are true. In 
this example, notice that the B appears twice, once in each premise, and the A and C 
are non-repeated terms. You are to draw a conclusion about these non-repeated terms. 
The conclusion must be in one of the following forms, where the question mark stands 
for a non-repeated term in the problem.  
   
All ? are ?  
No ? are ?  
Some ? are ?  
Some ? are not ?  
None ? are ?  
   
For example,  Some teachers are tap dancers  
 All teachers are bookworms  
   
Conclusion: Some of the bookworms are tap dancers, or   
                    Some of the tap dancers are bookworms  
   
Feel free to write or draw anything that helps you.   
   
When you have reached your conclusion, simply type that conclusion clearly in the 
box provided on the computer monitor. You do not need to position the cursor as 
anything you type will automatically go in the box.  
  
  The Tobii Pro X60 eye tracker was calibrated at the start of each session. This 
was followed by online instructions for progression through the session on the 
computer.  Each trial began with the presentation of a central fixation cross in the 
centre of the computer screen. After five seconds the cross disappeared, and a problem 
appeared with a box underneath for the participant to type their conclusion. 
Participants were allowed to study the problem for up to two minutes. A two-minute 




participant required prompting for a response within that time frame. The longest 
response in that experiment was 118.90 seconds. If participants in the current study 
had not typed a conclusion within that time frame, a message appeared above the 
problem to tell them their two minutes were up and to type their conclusion in the box 
provided. They were then given a further two minutes to type a conclusion. After 




  The results for the shortened version of the Ravens Standard Progressive 
Matrices showed a mean of 5.2 and standard deviation of 1.3 across all participants. 
  The total number of times each AOI was looked at was calculated as the mean 
of the proportion of the total amount of looking time across all eight AOIs for each 
syllogism. The data were collated by problem type or by figure according to the 
analysis. The results of each analysis are presented separately. 
 
Problem type x AOI 
  A 3 x 8 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the data collated by 
problem type. The within-subjects factors were problem type (HSV, ES, EV) and AOI 
(AOI1, AOI2, AOI3, AOI4, AOI5, AOI6, AOI7, AOI8). The dependent variable was 
the proportion of looking time for each AOI. Table 6.1 shows the looking proportion 







Table 6.1: Looking proportion for problem type x AOI. The standard deviation is in 
parentheses. 
 
AOI HSV ES EV Overall 
AOI1 .05 (.04) .05 (.03) .06 (.03) .05 (.03) 
AOI2 .19 (.05) .25 (.06) .25 (.05) .23 (.05) 
AOI3 .09 (.04) .06 (.03) .08 (.04) .08 (.04) 
AOI4 .14 (.06) .13 (.05) .11 (.05) .13 (.05) 
AOI5 .07 (.05) .06 (.03) .08 (.05) .07 (.04) 
AOI6 .24 (.07) .27 (.10) .25 (.07) .25 (.08) 
AOI7 .11 (.06) .07 (.03) .06 (.04) .08 (.04) 
AOI8 .10 (.07) .12 (.09) .11 (.07) .11 (.08) 
 
  There was a significant main effect of AOI, F(7,126) = 42.86, p < .001. The 
first term in each premise (AOI2 and AOI16) was looked at twice as long as the 
second term in each premise (AOI14 and AOI18). See Figure 6.3.  
 




























  There was a significant interaction between problem type x AOI, F(14,252) = 
4.40, p < .001. This was due to significant differences between problem type in AOI2, 
AOI3, AOI4 and AOI7. See Table 6.2 for details. 
 
Table 6.2: p-values of pairwise comparisons between problem type x AOI. 
 
  HSV v ES HSV v EV ES v EV 
AOI1 1.000 .717     .231 
AOI2        .006**     .004** 1.000 
AOI3       .003** .707       .043* 
AOI4    .726     .006**     .359 
AOI5 .483  1.000  .917 
AOI6 .203  1.000  .707 
AOI7    .023*       .012* 1.000 
AOI8 .431     .675 1.000 
Note: * significant at .05 level; ** significant at .01 level. The alpha level has been corrected for 
multiple comparisons using Bonferroni. 
 
 
HSV x ES: The proportion of looking is greater for the first term in premise 1 (AOI2) 
in ES (M = .25) than in HSV (M = .19). The proportion of looking for the second 
quantifier in premise 1 (AOI3) was greater in HSV (M = .09) than ES (M = .06). The 
looking proportion for the second quantifier in premise 2 (AOI7) was also greater for 
HSV (M = .11) than for ES (M = .07).  
 
HSV x EV: The proportion of looking for the first term in premise 1 (AOI2) is greater 
in EV (M = .25) than in HSV (M = .19). The proportion of looking for the second 
term in premise 1 (AOI4) is greater in HSV (M = .14) than in EV (M = .11). The 




(M = .11) than for EV (M = .06). This suggests a longer processing time for premise 2 
for problems that are difficult to solve with a verbal or spatial strategy. 
 
ES x EV: The proportion of looking for second quantifier in premise 1 (AOI3) is 
greater in EV (M = .08) than in ES (M = .06). 
 
In post hoc tests, the results displayed in Figure 6.4 are as follows: 
 
EV (Syllogisms that are easiest for verbal reasoners) 
  The looking proportion for the first term in premise 1 and premise 2 is 
identical (M = .25), as well as for the second term in premise 1 and premise 2 (M = 
.11). The first term in each premise was looked at 56% more than the second term in 
each premise. 
 
ES (Syllogisms that are easiest for spatial reasoners) 
  The looking proportion for the first term in premise 1 (M = .25) was almost 
identical to the first term in premise 2 (M = .27), as well as the second term in premise 
1 (M = .13) and premise 2 (M = .12). 
 
HSV (Syllogisms that are equally difficult for verbal and spatial reasoners) 
  The looking proportion for the first term in premise 1 was 20% smaller (M = 
.19) than for the first term in premise 2 (M = .24). The looking proportion for the 
second term in premise 1 was greater (M = .14) than for the second term in premise 2 










 A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. The within subjects 
factor was problem type (HSV, ES, EV) and the dependent variable was the response 
time. Interestingly, the overall response time for HSV problems was quicker (M = 
43437ms) than for ES (M = 47702ms) and for EV (47982ms) problems. See Figure 
6.5. A Shapiro-Wilk’s test and a visual inspection of the histograms, normal Q-Q plots 
and box plots showed that the response times for each level of difficulty were not 
normally distributed, with each level demonstrating p < .001. The data were 
transformed using Log10.  The main effect for response time was not significant, 






































Figure x AOI 
  A 4 x 8 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for the data collated by 
figure of the syllogism. The within-subjects factors were figure (AB/BC x BA/BC x 
AB/CB x BA/CB) and AOI (AOI1 x AOI2 x AOI3 x AOI4 x AOI5 x AOI6 x AOI7 x 
AOI8). The dependent variable was the looking proportion for each AOI. Table 6.3 























Table 6.3: Looking proportions of figure x AOI. The standard deviations are in 
parentheses. 
 
AOI AB/BC BA/BC AB/CB BA/CB Overall 
AOI1 .06 (.03) .06 (.04) .05 (.04) .05 (.04) .05 (.04) 
AOI2 .27 (.06) .18 (.04) .32 (.09) .22 (.07) .25 (.07) 
AOI3 .06 (.03) .09 (.04) .09 (.04) .07 (.04) .08 (.04) 
AOI4 .09 (.05) .16 (.06) .07 (.04) .12 (.07) .11 (.06) 
AOI5 .06 (.03) .08 (.04) .06 (.04) .07 (.05) .07 (.04) 
AOI6 .27 (.01) .21 (.07) .31 (.11) .33 (.09) .28 (.07) 
AOI7 .05 (.03) .10 (.04) .06 (.03) .07 (.06) .07 (.04) 
AOI8 .14 (.12) .12 (.09) .04 (.03) .06 (.05) .09 (.07) 
 
  There was a significant main effect of AOI, F(7,126) = 67.78, p < .001. The 
first term in each premise (AOI2 and AOI16) were looked at approximately twice as 
long as the second term in each premise (AOI14 and AOI18). See Figure 6.6.  
 





























  The F value for the main effect of figure is not available as the data was 
collated by proportion so each syllogism type will be the same in terms of its means. 
There was a significant interaction between figure x AOI, F(21,378) = 10.59, p < .001. 
This was due to significant differences between the figures in AOI2, AOI3, AOI4, 
AOI6, AOI7 and AOI8. See Table 6.4 for details. 
 















AOI1  1.000       .535 1.000   .541  1.000 1.000 
AOI2         .000**      .626 .052       .000**   .125       .010** 
AOI3         .000**         .005** 1.00 1.000     .011*   .291 
AOI4         .000**     .549 .464       .000**     .020*     .029* 
AOI5     .962  1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 
AOI6     .061  1.000 .166       .001**       .000** 1.000 
AOI7        .000**    .514 .627     .011*   .730 1.000 
AOI8       1.000       .006** .042*       .003**     .022*   .245 
Note: * significant at .05 level; ** significant at .01 level 
 
  AB/CB: The looking proportion for the first term in premise 1 (M = .31) was 
equivalent to that of the first term in premise 2 (M = .31). The looking proportion for 
the second term in premise 1 (M = .07) was slightly higher than for the second term in 
premise 2 (M = .04).  
  BA/BC: The looking proportion for the first term in premise 1 is (M = .18) 
was similar to the first term in premise 2 (M = .20). However, there was a reverse 
effect for the second term in premise 1 (M = .16) and premise 2 (M = .12).  
  BA/CB: The looking proportion for the first term in premise 2 was higher (M 




the second term. The looking proportion for the second term in premise 1 was twice as 
long (M = .12) than for the second term in premise 2 (M = .06).  
  AB/BC:  The looking proportion of the first term in premise 1 (M = .27) was 
similar to the first term in premise 2 (M = .27). The looking proportion of the second 
term in premise 2 (M = .14) was higher than for the second term in premise 1 (M = 
.09). See Figure 6.7. 
 




  Collapsing the results across all AOIs for each figure shows opposing patterns 
for the symmetrical figures, AB/CB and BA/BC, and an identical pattern for AB/BC 
and BA/BC. See figure 6.8. This suggests that the terms in premise 1 of AB/BC are 
switched to make the figure symmetrical and consequently is less cognitively 


























  There was a main effect of response times, F(3,54) = 2.93, p < .05. The 
response time for BA/BC was quicker (M = 36567ms) than for AB/BC (M = 
55005ms), AB/CB (M = 56671ms) and BA/CB (M = 57886ms). See Figure 6.9. 
  For AB/BC problems, participants produced more A-C (68%) responses than 
C-A (47%). For the BA/CB problems, they produced more C-A responses (79%) than 



































  The aim of the current study was to examine eye movements of participants 
while solving a set of 12 categorical syllogisms with valid conclusions to identify 
reasoning strategies, and if they were influenced by the level of difficulty or figure of 
the syllogism. The syllogisms used in the study were those identified by Ford (1995) 
as being easiest for spatial reasoners, easiest for verbal reasoners, and equally difficult 
for both spatial and verbal reasoners. Each syllogism was separated into eight areas of 
interest, one for each of the quantifiers and terms in each premise. Treating each 
quantifier and term as a separate area of interest made it possible to track which part 
of the premise attention was allocated to at any point during the experimental trials. It 
was expected that participants would be affected more by the figural effect than the 
level of difficulty of the syllogisms.  
  The looking patterns for problem type (HSV, ES and EV) and figure (AB/BC, 























between terms based on the figure rather than the level of difficulty of the syllogisms. 
The greater proportion of looking was allocated to the first term in each premise, on 
average twice as much as for the second term in each premise. Surprisingly, a small 
proportion of looking time was allocated to the quantifiers. Knoblich et al. (2001) 
found in their matchstick experiment that prior knowledge of arithmetic biased people 
to seeing the values as variable, so the focus of attention tended toward the values 
rather than the operators. The current study suggests a similar pattern where the focus 
of attention was primarily on the terms rather than the quantifiers. For each respective 
syllogism figure, the quantifiers will be the same regardless of the level of difficulty 
or whether the participant is using a spatial or verbal strategy. If the preferred 
response for that figure is C-A, then participants are likely switching the terms in 
premise 2 as well as the premise order, thereby increasing cognitive demand. The key 
information for participants appeared to be the terms (Hegarty, Mayer & Green, 
1992). They appear to view the quantifiers just long enough to establish the nature of 
the link between the terms. In addition, it is possible there may be an element of belief 
bias occurring where the participants are reasoning about the relationship between the 
literal meaning of the terms instead of logically between the sets of characteristics. For 
example, the syllogism ‘All of the engineers are sculptors, All of the engineers are 
alcoholics’ elicited a smile from some participants. Also, some participants queried 
whether the relationship was general or specifically about a group of people in a room, 
suggesting they were using their implicit knowledge of the terms to guide their 
workings. However, while the looking pattern is similar for problem type and figure 
of the syllogism, the proportion of attention differed. 
  Normal reading would result in few returns (Jacobson & Dodwell, 1979; 




so the eyetracking data goes beyond the patterns that would be observed in a standard 
reading study. 
  There was an interaction between problem type x AOI, with the significant 
differences due to AOI2, AOI3, AOI4 and AOI7 (See Table 6.1). Pairwise 
comparisons between HSV v ES and HSV v EV problems suggests a longer 
processing time for premise 2 for problems that are difficult to solve with a verbal or 
spatial strategy. The results support previous research that fixations increase for 
difficult problems (Stupple & Ball, 2007). More attention seems to be paid to the 
operators/quantifiers rather than the values for problems that are equally difficult to 
solve with a verbal or spatial strategy. According to Knoblich et al. (2001), the focus 
in the initial stage of reasoning should be on the values and fixations should increase 
for difficult problems.  
  Collapsing the results across all AOIs for each figure showed opposing 
patterns for the symmetrical figures, AB/CB and BA/BC (See Figure 6.7). Premise 1 
garnered more attention in the AB/BC figure, while premise 2 garnered more attention 
in the BA/BC figure. In keeping with other research, the terms are switched around 
equably between premises 1 and 2 of these figures (Ford, 1995; Espino & Santamaria, 
2013). If we consider A-C to be the preferred response, as well as the first-in-first-out 
theory for the conclusion, then for AB/CB the terms in premise 2 are switched to 
make the middle term contiguous, thereby increasing the looking proportion for 
premise 1 as this needs to be reassessed in the light of the new order of terms. The 
first-in-first-out theory works on the assumption that working memory operates on a 
first in and first out basis, the evidence being that lists tend to be easier to recall by the 
order in which the items were presented (Broadbent, 1958). Applying this theory to 




the terms were used to construct representations of the premises.  Likewise, for 
BA/BC the terms in premise 1 are switched, increasing the looking proportion in 
premise 2 during reassessment of the problem. Interestingly, there is an identical 
pattern between the asymmetrical syllogisms, AB/BC and BA/BC. This supports the 
notion that the terms in premise 1 of BA/BC are switched to make the middle term 
contiguous.  
  Premise 2 is looked at more than premise 1 in the BA/CB figure, lending 
support to the Stupple and Ball (2007) finding of longer inspection times for BA/CB 
which leads to increased processing times when the middle terms are not contiguous. 
If the preferred response for this figure is C-A, then participants are likely switching 
the order of the premises (making CB premise 1 and BA premise 2) to make the 
middle term contiguous, resulting in the added process of reassessing the problem and 
thereby increasing the cognitive load. Jia et al. (2009) point out that figural effects 
tend to occur when participants are required to generate their own solution rather than 
evaluate one that is given to them.  
  Another factor to consider is the time constraints imposed on the experimental 
trials. Imposing a time limit of two minutes per problem may have been a source of 
increased pressure for some participants, possibly inducing a shift from logical to 
belief bias reasoning (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005) or matching (Gilhooly, 2005). 
Heuristic processes come to the forefront when time and cognitive resources are 
limited (Evans & Curtis-Homes, 2005). 
  While participants were not assessed for the reasoning strategy style, it is 
interesting to note that HSV problems (43436.8ms) were solved 8.3% faster than ES 
problems (47701.61ms) and 9.5% faster than EV problems (47982.28ms). With 




(36566.59ms). It was 33.5% faster than AB/BC (55004.88ms), 35.5% faster than 
AB/CB (56671.11ms), and 36.8% faster than BA/CB (57886.26ms). It should also be 
noted here that of the 12 syllogisms used in this study, six were the figure BA/CB and 
three of those were in the HSV category. One possible explanation for this is that 
participants settle on the first reasonable solution that seems valid to them. 
  The current study was limited by the uneven distribution of figure type. The 
set of syllogisms used in the study was the same that was used in the verbal and 
spatial strategies studies. The criteria for selection resulted in a pool of three AB/BC, 
two AB/CB, six BA/BC, and one BA/CB figures. The aim of the study was to 
examine eye movements while solving the same types of syllogism problems as all 
other studies in this thesis. While it creates a limitation in the study, maintaining 
consistency across all studies means less likelihood of other factors affecting 
interpretation of the results. There needs to be further research using equal numbers of 
each figure type. While the looking pattern is similar for all figure types, providing 
strong indication of how attention is allocated across all problems in the study trials, 
the data will be more robust with a larger pool of stimuli. 
  The current study supported the hypothesis that looking proportion is 
influenced by the figure of the syllogism but did not support the hypothesis that it is 
influenced by the level of difficulty. Examining the syllogisms by areas of interest has 
aided in distinguishing those problems which relate to different problem solving 
strategies, in particular verbal and spatial strategies. Future research can consider 
tracking the eye movement path across the premises as this can provide further 
information about which types of problems are better solved by a verbal or a spatial 
strategy, and go even further to look at how this may differ for different types of 




CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 My thesis explored the differences in reasoning strategies, comparing the 
performance of people with dyslexia and people without dyslexia. In particular, in a 
series of studies I examined the way people with dyslexia and people without dyslexia 
reason when solving syllogisms and the effects of training to solve them with a 
different strategy. The aim of my research is to contribute to the understanding of 
reasoning, strategy selection and problem solving, and the development of 
intervention strategies for problem solving for people with dyslexia.  
The main theme running through the thesis is based on a pioneering study by 
Ford (1995) that identifies two groups of reasoners – verbal and spatial. She found 
that verbal reasoners tended to treat syllogisms like mathematical problems, re-writing 
them as equations, substituting words with letters and using arrows to indicate 
relationships between the terms of the premises. Spatial reasoners, on the other hand, 
tended to use shapes in different spatial relationships to represent different classes and 
their relationships. Bacon at al. (2007) furthered research in the area to show that 
people with dyslexia tended towards a spatial strategy. The introduction outlined the 
background to research on the theories of reasoning, as well as dyslexia and learning 
strategies.  
Chapter 2 examined individual differences in reasoning strategies, observing 
figural effects and belief bias. This chapter featured two experiments. The first 
experiment investigated strategy selection and figural effects, comparing the 
performance of participants with dyslexia and participants without dyslexia, with the 
aim of determining whether there are differences in the strategies that both groups use 
and if they are affected by the figure of the syllogism. The second experiment used a 




The results of the study supported previous research that people do tend to reason with 
a verbal or spatial strategy. It showed that people with dyslexia are affected by the 
figure of the syllogism. However, it failed to support the hypothesis that there is a 
difference in strategy between people with dyslexia and people without dyslexia. 
Chapter 3 compared the performance of participants with dyslexia and 
participants without dyslexia after being taught a verbal, rule-based strategy for 
solving syllogisms. While the initial results showed that training on a verbal strategy 
improved performance of participants without dyslexia but had a detrimental effect on 
participants with dyslexia, post hoc tests showed the effect to be only for problems 
that are easiest for spatial reasoners. Closer inspection of those participants that 
showed evidence of a clear verbal or spatial strategy suggested that the difference in 
performance is perhaps more a function of strategy rather than dyslexic status. If 
people with dyslexia are predominantly spatial reasoners (Bacon et al., 2007), it would 
be difficult to distinguish them from spatial reasoners without dyslexia under these 
conditions. While spatial participants without dyslexia may be affected by the verbal 
training, the assumption is that this is due to being made to use a strategy they would 
not normally choose in the first instance. A similar assumption can be made for 
participants with dyslexia, with the added suggestion of a phonological deficit 
affecting the reasoning process (Snowling, 2000). Therefore, forcing participants with 
dyslexia, who are predominantly spatial reasoners (Bacon et al., 2007), to work with a 
verbal strategy may exacerbate the effects of this deficit, more so when visuospatial 
memory deficits are thought to come to the forefront only when the task at hand 
requires them to engage with it verbally (Gould & Glencross, 1990; Thomson, 1982).  
There is evidence of verbal working memory impairments in people with 




Fawcett & Nicolson, 2003). Working memory capacity is an important consideration 
for the results in this thesis. Deficits in short term working memory (Ackerman & 
Dykman, 1993; Brunswick, McCrory, Price, Frith & Frith, 1999; McDougall & 
Donohoe, 2002; McLoughlin, Fitzgibbon & Young, 1994; Plaza, Cohen & Chevrie-
Muller, 2002) and high processing demands can lead to deficits on both verbal and 
visuospatial working memory in people with reading disabilities (Swanson, Ashbaker 
& Lee, 1996). Further study needs to distinguish between participants with dyslexia 
who are spatial reasoners and participants without dyslexia who are spatial reasoners.  
Chapter 4 compared the performance of participants with dyslexia and 
participants without dyslexia after learning to solve syllogisms using a spatial strategy 
based on Euler Circles, more specifically, a strategy developed by Stenning and 
Oberlander (1995). This strategy was identical to the verbal strategy in terms of the 
stages required in the algorithm so it can be seen to be computationally equivalent. 
However, the representations were different. They were based on spatial rather than 
verbal information. In the study reported in this Chapter, participants with dyslexia 
performed worse than participants without dyslexia on problems that are easiest for 
verbal reasoners and on problems that are equally difficult for both verbal and spatial 
reasoners, supporting the notion that people with dyslexia tend to favour a spatial 
strategy (Bacon et al., 2007). The results demonstrated that while training slightly 
improved the overall performance on problems that are equally difficult for verbal as 
well as spatial reasoners, it had a detrimental effect on performance on problems that 
are easiest for verbal reasoners. There was no discernible difference in performance 
on problems that are easiest for spatial reasoners. It appears that using a spatial 
strategy made problems that are easier with a verbal strategy harder to solve. With 




reasoners, the training enabled some participants to see problems from a different 
perspective and understand, whether explicitly or implicitly, that the strategy they 
were using originally was inappropriate for the problem at hand and so were able to 
make the switch. Overall, teaching the spatial strategy impacted learning but did not 
promote problem solving. 
  Chapter 5 used the study of eye movements to ascertain where attention was 
focused while solving the syllogisms. The key questions here were whether the pattern 
of eye movements can provide insight into the reasoning process and whether the 
pattern was affected by the level of difficulty or the figure of the syllogism. 
Interestingly, I found that the focus of attention was more on the terms in the premises 
than the quantifiers. This suggested that the values (Knoblich et al., 2001) are more 
important than the quantifiers to the reasoning process. Interesting also was the fact 
that the pattern of proportions of fixations to different regions of the syllogisms was 
the same regardless of the level of difficulty or the figure of the syllogism.  
  While the studies in Chapter 2 failed to support the hypothesis of difference in 
strategies between participants with dyslexia and participants without dyslexia, the 
study in Chapter 3 revealed that a difference becomes apparent when the focus is on 
specific types of problems and when guidance is provided for how to solve them. 
When the element of free choice was taken away and participants were no longer able 
to work around individual constraints, for example working memory limitations or 
automatisation deficits in the central executive (Smith-Spark et al., 2003), significant 
differences came to the forefront. An introduction of extra cognitive load for some 
participants can cause disruption and impairment in processing, hindering the ability 




  Automatisation is the process of learning to do something and then practicing 
it until it becomes automatic. For a new skill to become automatic, the learner must 
gather the necessary information and then practice the skill until it sets in their 
memory (Anderson, 1982). Moores, Nicolson and Fawcett (2003) found teenagers 
with dyslexia performed significantly worse than participants without dyslexia in 
speed and accuracy in a shifting attention task. The shifting attention task required 
more cognitive resources to complete because the target had to be kept in memory 
while the participant continued to perform the focus task. Solving syllogisms requires 
representations of the premises to be stored in memory while processing possible 
solutions. This may account for the silence of some participants in the studies in this 
thesis who stated that they could not think and write at the same time. An overloaded 
system would shut down some parts in an attempt to maximise the efficiency of the 
remaining parts. This would afford the participant space to consciously compensate 
(Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990) in the performance of the task. 
  Metacognition and a feeling of rightness (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017; 
Thompson, Prowse-Turner & Pennycook, 2011) can influence whether a conclusion is 
accepted as valid or invalid or not. A lack of confidence in the solution that was 
generated whether, or not, it is correct can prompt an individual to seek alternative 
solutions. This can be seen in participants that write an answer, sit back and stare at it 
for a while, then either draw their workings to match the answer, or draw workings 
then erase the original answer and rewrite it to match the workings. The feeling of 
rightness is thought to follow fast and autonomous Type 1 processing (Thompson et 
al., 2011) and this prompts the reasoner to move to analytic Type 2 processing.  




  There are some limitations in the studies presented in this thesis. The studies in 
chapters 3 and 4 relied on participants demonstrating either a verbal or spatial strategy 
via the workings in their booklets. However, many of them failed to show any 
workings at all and some showed workings for odd problems but showed no 
discernible pattern. It would be useful for future research to test for verbal and spatial 
abilities first, for example using psychometric tests such as the GRE Analytic Test and 
the PFT test employed by Monaghan and Stenning (1998), which can first classify 
reasoners, before determining their behaviour in syllogisms, or their response to 
different intervention strategies. The GRE is a complex task and does reflect different 
strategic approaches to reasoning problems in participants. The PFT is about spatial 
ability and would be good to use. However, the focus for my work is the effect of 
training interventions on performance. Ideally, a broad suite of tests would be used, 
but practically, focusing on the training interventions meant a limit to the number of 
cognitive tests that could be included alongside the syllogism sessions. Therefore, in 
this instance, it was better not to use the GRE and PFT to “diagnose” aptitudes/styles 
of learning.   
 Another limitation, which holds for chapter 5 as well, is the number of 
syllogisms presented for each figure. There were not enough samples in each 
category. Testing participants on all 27 syllogisms with a valid conclusion can be used 
as a way of identifying reasoning strategies among participants with dyslexia and 
participants without dyslexia, as well as providing more robust data to determine if 
any individual differences exist, such as figural effects and belief bias. A better 
examination of figural effects can be accomplished with a larger sample of syllogisms 




The studies in this thesis were conducted in English using university students 
so is therefore limited by the English vocabulary and sentence structures. Results will 
likely differ with stimuli in a different language that has a very different form and 
grammatical structure to English, for example Japanese and Korean have topic 
markers and subject markers with no equivalent in English, as well as using characters 
rather than letters. What might be significant in English may not be significant in 
another language by virtue of its grammatical structure. Similarly, university students 
will have achieved a higher learning ability while progressing through the educational 
system. Some university students with dyslexia may have learned coping strategies 
(Miles, 1993) to help them overcome any difficulties they faced during their 
educational journey.  
The present research has shown supporting evidence for the notion that people 
tend to reason with a verbal or spatial strategy when solving syllogisms, and that 
people with dyslexia tend towards a spatial strategy. It has gone further to show that 
while there are no major differences in the way people with dyslexia and people 
without dyslexia reason, there are subtle differences in those that tend toward a spatial 
strategy and the differences most likely relate to manipulation of verbal information, 
driven by difficulties associated with a phonological deficit (Snowling, 2000) and 
working memory capacity (Smith-Spark et al., 2003). It has extended research in the 
area by introducing training in verbal and spatial strategies that may have been 
different to the strategy initially used by the participants, and has shown that training 
affected the performance of the tasks. 
The research has also shown that the pattern of eye movements while solving 
syllogisms can provide valuable information about the reasoning process. 




people with dyslexia to people without dyslexia, and the effects of training on the 
patterns. Would people look at problems differently with a better understanding of the 
nature of the task? Knowing that there is an expected method, whether it is the one 
they initially use or one they are taught to use is likely to change how they approach 
the task.  
Another consideration for future research is discourse study. This can take the 
form of embedding reasoning problems in passages of text to determine how dyslexia 
might affect problem solving in real world settings. For example, prior beliefs might 
have a greater impact when the problem is more ‘normal’ than a syllogistic one. 
The development of intervention strategies for people with dyslexia must 
consider the learning styles of individuals and their approach to problem solving, and 
indeed the difficulties they may face due to issues such as working memory capacity, 
phonological deficits and automatisation. Rather than assuming that all characteristics 
of dyslexia apply to all people with dyslexia there must be acknowledgement that 
there are many combinations of characteristics. Strategies must be flexible enough that 
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Appendix 1: Examples of participant information sheet,  
consent form and debrief sheets 
Participant Consent Form (Used for all studies) 
 
Title of Study:  Strategies in Reasoning 
 
Before signing this form you should have been given a sheet labelled “Participant 
Information Sheet”. If you have not already read this please do so before continuing 
with this form.  
 
Please sign and date this form if you are willing to take part in this experiment, and, if 
so, for the data that you provide to be used anonymously in reports arising from this 
study.  
 
You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason and 
with no adverse consequences. Involvement in this study must be of your own free will. 
If you are unsure about anything mentioned in this form please ask the researcher 
present for help.  
 
Please print the following information: 
 
Name of Participant  …………………………………………………  Age ……….. 
 




Address of Participant ……………………………………………………………….. 




Please tick this box if you are happy to be contacted for future studies  
        
Signature of Participant …………………………………………  Date …………… 
 
Signature of Experimenter……………………………………….  Date …………… 
 
 
Please feel free to get in contact with me if you have any questions about any aspects of 






Participant Information Sheet (Used for studies in Chapter 3) 
 
 
Title of study:  Strategies in Reasoning 
 
Researcher:  Kay Rawlins 
 
Contact details:  k.rawlins@lancaster.ac.uk 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary therefore you have the right to withdraw from 
the study at any time without having adverse consequences. No explanation need be 
given. 
 
Aim of the Study: The main aim of the research project is to examine how people 
reason and the different types of learning strategies that people use. We are 
particularly interested in whether there are different learning approaches for people 
with and without dyslexia. 
 
The study will take approximately 60 minutes. 
 
First you will be asked to look at patterns with a piece cut out of it and try to find the 
matching piece from a set.  
 
Second is a problem solving task to be completed on a computer. You will be asked to 
determine the conclusion from information presented in two sentences about logical 
relations.  
 
Participation in this study is confidential; all data will be analysed and stored 
anonymously, therefore no one will be individually identifiable. 
 
Should you have any complaints regarding this research you can contact the Head of 





Participant Information Sheet (Used for studies in Chapters 4 and 5) 
 
 
Title of study:  Strategies in Reasoning 2 
 
Researcher:  Kay Rawlins 
 
Contact details:  k.rawlins@lancaster.ac.uk 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary therefore you have the right to withdraw from 
the study at any time without having adverse consequences. No explanation need be 
given. 
 
Aim of the Study: The main aim of the research project is to examine how people 
reason and the different types of learning strategies that people use. We are 
particularly interested in whether there are different learning approaches for people 
with and without dyslexia. 
 
The study will be conducted over two sessions, each taking approximately one hour. 
 
In the first session you will be asked to look at a pattern with a piece cut out of it and 
try to find the matching piece from a set. Upon completion of this task, we will 
arrange a date and time for the second session.  
 
The second session will be done in 3 parts. First is a problem solving task done in a 
paper booklet. You will be asked to determine the conclusion from information 
presented in two sentences about logical relations.  
 
This will be followed by a short training session, in the form of a booklet that 
demonstrates a particular method for problem solving. 
 
Finally, there will be another problem solving task done in a paper booklet. The 
problems are similar to those you will have previously seen. Once again, you will be 
asked to determine the conclusion from the information presented. 
 
Participation in this study is confidential; all data will be analysed and stored 
anonymously, therefore no one will be individually identifiable. 
 
 
Should you have any complaints regarding this research you can contact the Head of 





Participant Information Sheet (Used for study in Chapter 6) 
 
 
Title of study:  Strategies in Reasoning 
 
Researcher:  Kay Rawlins 
 
Contact details:  k.rawlins@lancaster.ac.uk 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary therefore you have the right to withdraw from 
the study at any time without having adverse consequences. No explanation need be 
given. 
 
Aim of the Study: The main aim of the research project is to examine how people 
reason and the different types of learning strategies that people use. We are 
particularly interested in whether there are different learning approaches for people 
with and without dyslexia. 
 
The study will be conducted in one session taking approximately one hour (60 
minutes) on a non-invasive desktop eye-tracker. 
 
You will be presented with two sentences on a computer monitor and asked to 
determine the conclusion about their logical relations from information presented.  
 
Participation in this study is confidential; all data will be analysed and stored 
anonymously, therefore no one will be individually identifiable. 
 
Should you have any complaints regarding this research you can contact the Head of 





Participant debriefing sheet (Used for studies in Chapter 3) 
 
  
Researcher’s name: Kay Rawlins  
  
Title of study: Strategies in Reasoning 2  
  
Aim of the study:   
  
Ford (1995) suggests that people solve problems in very different ways. She identified 
two groups of reasoners – verbal and spatial. She found verbal reasoners tended to 
treat the syllogisms like mathematical problems, re-writing them as equations, 
substituting words with letters and using arrows to indicate relationships between the 
terms of the premises. Spatial reasoners, on the other hand, tended to use shapes in 
different spatial relationships to represent different classes and their relationships.  
  
Dyslexia has been widely accepted as a consequence of phonological deficit, the way 
the brain codes or ‘represents’ the spoken attributes of words (Snowling, 2000). 
People with dyslexia have difficulty with tasks that require short-term memory 
processing such as mental arithmetic, writing and learning new information. Research 
suggests that people with dyslexia tend to conceptualise information in a visuospatial 
rather than a verbal way (Von Karolyi, Winner, Gray and Sherman, 2003). Bacon, 
Handley and McDonald (2007) demonstrated that people with dyslexia tend to adopt a 
spatial strategy when solving syllogisms, while people without dyslexia tend to adopt 
a verbal strategy.  
  
The aim of this study is to contribute to the understanding of reasoning, strategy 
selection and problem solving. The focus is on the strategies people with dyslexia 
employ when solving syllogisms, compared to people without dyslexia, as well as the 
effect of learning a new strategy on the way they solve syllogisms. The main objective 
is to develop an intervention strategy for problem solving for people with dyslexia.  
  
Outline of the study design:   
  
The first part of the study was the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices test which 
was used only as a test of general intellectual ability. This was followed by a problem 
solving task in which participants were asked to determine a conclusion from 
information presented in two sentences about logical relations. Below is an example:  
  
Premises: Some lawyers are dancers; All dancers are poets.  
Correct conclusion: Some lawyers are poets.  
  
There are no risks associated with any part of this experiment; it does not involve any 
interventions or deception. Your personal data (name and age) will be immediately 
separated from the experimental data and it will not be possible to link this data back to 
you.   
  






Participant debriefing sheet (Used for studies in Chapters 4 and 5) 
 
Researcher’s name: Kay Rawlins 
 
Title of study: Strategies in Reasoning  
 
Aim of the study:  
 
Ford (1995) suggests that people solve problems in very different ways. She identified 
two groups of reasoners – verbal and spatial. She found verbal reasoners tended to 
treat the syllogisms like mathematical problems, re-writing them as equations, 
substituting words with letters and using arrows to indicate relationships between the 
terms of the premises. Spatial reasoners, on the other hand, tended to use shapes in 
different spatial relationships to represent different classes and their relationships. 
 
Dyslexia has been widely accepted as a consequence of phonological deficit, the way 
the brain codes or ‘represents’ the spoken attributes of words (Snowling, 2000). 
People with dyslexia have difficulty with tasks that require short-term memory 
processing such as mental arithmetic, writing and learning new information. Research 
suggests that people with dyslexia tend to conceptualise information in a visuospatial 
rather than a verbal way (Von Karolyi, Winner, Gray and Sherman, 2003). Bacon, 
Handley and McDonald (2007) demonstrated that people with dyslexia tend to adopt a 
spatial strategy when solving syllogisms, while people without dyslexia tend to adopt 
a verbal strategy. 
 
The aim of this study is to contribute to the understanding of reasoning, strategy 
selection and problem solving. The focus is on the strategies people with dyslexia 
employ when solving syllogisms, compared to people without dyslexia, as well as the 
effect of learning a new strategy on the way they solve syllogisms. The main objective 
is to develop an intervention strategy for problem solving for people with dyslexia. 
 
Outline of the study design:  
 
The study consisted of a problem solving task in which participants were asked to 
determine a conclusion from information presented in two sentences about logical 
relations. Below is an example: 
 
Premises: Some lawyers are dancers; All dancers are poets. 
Correct conclusion: Some lawyers are poets. 
 
This was followed by a brief training session introducing a method for solving similar 
problems, and then participants were asked to complete another problem solving task 
which was similar to the previous task. 
 
There are no risks associated with any part of this experiment; it does not involve any 
interventions or deception. Your personal data (name and age) will be immediately 
separated from the experimental data and it will not be possible to link this data back to 
you.  
 





Participant debriefing sheet (Used for the study in Chapter 6) 
 
Researcher’s name: Kay Rawlins 
 
Title of study: Strategies in Reasoning 
 
Aim of the study:  
 
Ford (1995) suggests that people solve problems in very different ways. She identified 
two groups of reasoners – verbal and spatial. She found verbal reasoners tended to 
treat the syllogisms like mathematical problems, re-writing them as equations, 
substituting words with letters and using arrows to indicate relationships between the 
terms of the premises. Spatial reasoners, on the other hand, tended to use shapes in 
different spatial relationships to represent different classes and their relationships. 
 
Dyslexia has been widely accepted as a consequence of phonological deficit, the way 
the brain codes or ‘represents’ the spoken attributes of words (Snowling, 2000). 
People with dyslexia have difficulty with tasks that require short-term memory 
processing such as mental arithmetic, writing and learning new information. Research 
suggests that people with dyslexia tend to conceptualise information in a visuospatial 
rather than a verbal way (Von Karolyi, Winner, Gray and Sherman, 2003). Bacon, 
Handley and McDonald (2007) demonstrated that people with dyslexia tend to adopt a 
spatial strategy when solving syllogisms, while people without dyslexia tend to adopt 
a verbal strategy. 
 
The aim of this study is to contribute to the understanding of reasoning, strategy 
selection and problem solving. The focus is on the strategies people with dyslexia 
employ when solving syllogisms, compared to people without dyslexia, as well as the 
effect of learning a new strategy on the way they solve syllogisms. The main objective 
is to develop an intervention strategy for problem solving for people with dyslexia. 
 
Outline of the study design:  
 
The study consisted of a problem solving task in which participants were asked to 
determine a conclusion from information presented in two sentences about logical 
relations. Below is an example: 
 
Premises: Some lawyers are dancers; All dancers are poets. 
Correct conclusion: Some lawyers are poets. 
 
A desktop mounted eye-tracker was used to determine where participants focused 
their attention while solving the problems, as well as how long the focus was on 
certain parts of the problems. 
 
There are no risks associated with any part of this experiment; it does not involve any 
interventions or deception. Your personal data (name and age) will be immediately 
separated from the experimental data and it will not be possible to link this data back to 
you.  
 





Appendix 2: List of syllogisms used in the belief bias study 
 
Abstract  Neutral  Belief bias  Correct answer  
All B are A  
Some B are C  
All of the politicians are potters  
Some of the politicians are chess 
players  
All of the mammals are goats  
Some of the mammals are 
cows  
Some A are C, or  
Some C are A  
Some B are not 
A  
All B are C  
Some of the doctors are not singers  
All of the doctors are intellectual  
Some snakes are not poisonous  
All of the snakes are cobras  
Some C are not A  
All B are A  
All B are C  
All of the engineers are sculptors  
All of the engineers are alcoholics  
All of the trees are oak  
All of the trees are pine  
Some C are A  
Some A are C  
All B are A  
All C are B  
All of the weavers are gardeners  
All of the vegetarians are weavers  
All of the mammals are tigers  
All of the animals are 
mammals  
All C are A  
No B are A  
All C are B  
None of the bankers are Buddhists  
All of the jugglers are bankers  
None of the reptiles are scaly  
All snakes are reptiles  
No C are A  
No A are C  
No A are B  
Some C are B  
None of the pianists are mechanics  
Some of the experts are mechanics  
None of the daffodils are 
yellow  
Some flowers are yellow  
Some C are not A  
Some A are B  
No C are B  
Some of the clubbers are pilots  
None of the rock climbers are pilots  
Some roses are red  
None of the flowers are red  
Some A are not C  
No A are B  
All C are B  
None of the chess players are 
bookbinders  
All of the dancers are bookbinders  
None of the ostriches are 
flying  
All of the birds are flying  
No A are C  








Appendix 3: List of syllogisms used in the pre-training workbooks  
and in the eye tracking study 
 
No Syllogism Easiest for 
1 All of the psychologists are gymnasts 
Some of the psychologists are not skaters 
 
Both 
2 All of the engineers are sculptors 
All of the engineers are alcoholics 
 
Both 
3 None of the bankers are tennis club members 
Some of the bankers are gymnasts 
 
Both 
4 Some of the soccer players are not professors 
All of the blood donors are professors 
 
Both 
5 All of the politicians are potters 
Some of the politicians are chess players 
 
Spatial 
6 Some of the playwrights are stamp collectors 
All of the playwrights are bookworms 
 
Spatial 
7 All of the teetotallers are reporters 
Some of the artists are not reporters 
 
Spatial 
8 None of the sculptors are columnists 
Some of the columnists are movie buffs 
 
Spatial 
9 None of the butchers are wine drinkers 
Some of the foreigners are butchers 
 
Verbal 
10 Some of the weavers are historians 
None of the historians are tennis club members 
 
Verbal 
11 All of the bookworms are doctors 
None of the doctors are beekeepers 
 
Verbal 
12 Some of the florist are not football fans 








Appendix 4: List of syllogisms used in the post-training workbooks 
 
No Syllogism Easiest for 
1 All of the zookeepers are surfers 
Some of the zookeepers are not homeowners 
 
Both 
2 All of the lawyers are athletes 
All of the lawyers are comedians 
 
Both 
3 None of the rock climbers are pilots 
Some of the rock climbers are clubbers 
 
Both 
4 Some of the poets are not prize winners 
All of the hikers are prize winners 
 
Both 
5 All of the secretaries are football fans 
Some of the secretaries are soccer players 
 
Spatial 
6 Some of the vegetarians are teachers 
All of the vegetarians are stamp collectors 
 
Spatial 
7 All of the wine drinkers are biologists 
Some of the potters are not biologists 
 
Spatial 
8 None of the chess players are bookbinders 
Some of the bookbinders are dancers 
 
Spatial 
9 None of the librarians are skaters 
Some of the sculptors are librarians 
 
Verbal 
10 Some of the bankers are Bhuddists 
None of the Bhuddists are jugglers 
 
Verbal 
11 All of the vegetarians are gardeners 
None of the gardeners are weavers 
 
Verbal 
12 Some of the doctors are not singers 













An easy way of solving syllogisms is by examining the relationship between the terms 
of the premises. For example, take the syllogism 
 
Some A are B 
All B are C 
 
Some A are B is represented as A & B, which means there’s at least something that’s 
an A and a B. There might still be some A that are not B, and some B that are not A, 
but we are only concerned with facts that we know about the premises. 
 
All B are C is represented as B → C. This means that if you’re a B, you’re also a C. 
But there might also be C that are not B, we just don’t know.  
 
So, now we’ve got: 
 
A & B 
B → C 
 
The next step is to see if we can apply a rule to join the two representations together.  
We can break down the A & B into an A, and a B: A, B 
 
Then, the next stage is to see if we can put either the A or the B with the B → C 
 (“if you’re a B you’re also a C”) representation. 
 
In this case, we can: 
 
From B and B → C, we can get C 
 




We can only use information we’re certain of, that we have an A that’s also a C, we 





All B are A 
Some B are not C 
 
All B are A is represented as B → A (“if you’re a B you’re also a C”). 
 
Some B are not C is represented as B & ¬ C. The ¬ C means that it’s not a C. We 
know that some B are not C, but it could also be that some B are C, and some C are 





The next step is to combine the two representations: 
 
B → A 
B & ¬ C 
 
Breaking down the B & ¬ C: 
¬ C, B 
putting together the B and the B → A 
B, B → A, gives A 
 
So, we have ¬ C, B, A 
 
We can get rid of the B, so we have ¬ C, A. We don’t know for sure that no A are C, 





No B are A 
All B are C 
 
No B are A is represented as B →¬ A (“if it’s a B then it’s not an A”)1 
 
All B are C is represented as B → C (“if it’s a B then it’s a C”). 
 
The next step is to combine the two representations. 
 
Let’s start with B → ¬ A.  
If we know someone’s a B, then we can work out they are also ¬ A. 
So, we can get ¬ A, B. 
Putting the B together with B → C, gives us C. 
So, we have ¬ A, B, C. 




1 Note that you can write No B are A as B →¬ A or as A →¬ B, whichever helps most. In this 




Appendix 6: Spatial strategy training booklet 
 
 




An easy way of solving syllogisms is by using Euler Circles. In logic, these are circles 
used to represent the terms of categorical statements. For example, take the syllogism 
 
Some A are B 








In this diagram, the B is inside the C, indicating that all Bs are also Cs.  
The diagram also shows that some of the Cs may not be Bs.  
We put a * where we are sure that something exists.  
 








A B * 
The diagram shows that some As are Bs, but also some As might not be Bs,  
and some Bs might not be As. We put a * where we know there is at least  
something (in the overlap between the A and the B). Remember, we are only  
concerned with facts that we already know about the premises. 
 
 










The next step is to combine the two diagrams. Draw the pictures so the B circles  
overlap, and then make the A and C circles overlap wherever possible from the  
original diagrams. Then decide whether any of the asterisks “survive” –  









The * from Some A are B is in an unchanged region, so we keep it.  
The * from All B are C is in a changed region, so we don’t keep it.  
Since we can only use information we are certain of, the only logical  
conclusion we can draw from diagram is that some of the As are also Cs.  








All B are A 
Some B are not C 
 
 
In this diagram, the B is inside the A, indicating that all Bs are As.  





The diagram shows that some Bs are not Cs, but also some Bs might be Cs,  













The next step is to combine the two diagrams so that the common term B overlaps,  
then see where the * ends up. 
 
 
The * from All B are A is in a changed region so we don’t keep it.  
The * from Some Bs are not Cs is in an unchanged region so we keep it.  












No B are A 
All B are C 
 
 
In this diagram, the circles are drawn separately to show that none of the As are Bs. 















The * in the A circle is in a changed region, so we don’t keep it.  







All B are C is represented as: 







Appendix 7: Pre-training workbook 
 
 
You are taking part in an investigation about how people use information in order to 
draw conclusions. You will be solving a series of syllogistic reasoning problems. A 
syllogistic problem consists of two premises (statements), for example: 
 
Some B are A 
All B are C 
 
Your task is to write down the conclusion (if any) which follows logically from these. 
A logical conclusion is a conclusion which must be true, if the premises are true. In 
this example, notice that the B appears twice, once in each premise, and the A and C 
are non-repeated terms. You are to draw a conclusion about these non-repeated terms. 
The conclusion must be in one of the following forms, where the question mark stands 
for a non-repeated term in the problem. 
 
All ? are ? 
No ? are ? 
Some ? are ? 
Some ? are not ? 
None ? are ? 
 
For example, Some teachers are tap dancers 
All teachers are bookworms 
 
Conclusion: Some of the bookworms are tap dancers, or  
 Some of the tap dancers are bookworms 
 
As we are trying to find out how people solve these problems, it is vital that you ‘think 
aloud’ while you are working out your answers. Please speak out loud while solving 
each problem to explain to the experimenter how you reached your conclusion. There 
should not be any silent periods on the tape. We also need a written record of your 
work. Therefore it is also vital that you use the pen and the space below the statements 
to show any working out that you use to help you solve the problems. Feel free to 
write or draw anything that helps you. When you have reached your conclusion, 
simply state that conclusion clearly in writing. You will be timed with a stopwatch. 
You will have 2 minutes for each problem. Do not refer to previous problems once 




1. Some of the florists are not football fans 
All of the florists are skydivers 
 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 





2. None of the sculptors are columnists 
Some of the columnists are movie buffs 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




3. All of the politicians are potters 
 Some of the politicians are chess players 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




4. Some of the weavers are historians 
 None of the historians are tennis club members 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




5. Some of the playwrights are stamp collectors 
 All of the playwrights are bookworms 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




6. All of the engineers are sculptors 
 All of the engineers are alcoholics 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




7. None of the butchers are wine drinkers 
 Some of the foreigners are butchers 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




8. All of the bookworms are doctors 
 None of the doctors are beekeepers 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




9. Some of the soccer players are not professors 
 All of the blood donors are professors 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




10. All of the psychologists are gymnasts 
 Some of the psychologists are not skaters 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




11. All of the teetotallers are reporters 
 Some of the artists are not reporters 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




12. None of the bankers are tennis club members 
 Some of the bankers are gymnasts 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 






Appendix 8: Post-training workbook (Verbal) 
 
You are taking part in an investigation about how people use information in order to 
draw conclusions. You will be solving a series of syllogistic reasoning problems. A 
syllogistic problem consists of two premises (statements), for example: 
 
Some B are A 
All B are C 
 
Your task is to write down the conclusion (if any) which follows logically from these. 
A logical conclusion is a conclusion which must be true, if the premises are true. In 
this example, notice that the B appears twice, once in each premise, and the A and C 
are non-repeated terms. You are to draw a conclusion about these non-repeated terms. 
The conclusion must be in one of the following forms, where the question mark stands 
for a non-repeated term in the problem. 
 
All ? are ? 
No ? are ? 
Some ? are ? 
Some ? are not ? 
None ? are ? 
 
For example, Some teachers are tap dancers 
All teachers are bookworms 
 
Conclusion: Some of the bookworms are tap dancers, or  
 Some of the tap dancers are bookworms 
 
As we are trying to find out how people solve these problems, we need a written 
record of your work. Therefore it is vital that you use the pen and the space below the 
statements to show any working out that you use to help you solve the problems. Feel 
free to write or draw anything that helps you. When you have reached your 
conclusion, simply state that conclusion clearly in writing. Do not refer to previous 





1. Some of the doctors are not singers 
All of the doctors are intellectual 
 
























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




2. None of the chess players are bookbinders 
Some of the bookbinders are dancers 
 
























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




3. All of the secretaries are football fans 
Some of the secretaries are soccer players 
 


























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




4. Some of the bankers are Buddhists 
None of the Buddhists are jugglers 
 

























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




5. Some of the vegetarians are teachers 
All of the vegetarians are stamp collectors 
 


























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




6. All of the lawyers are athletes 
All of the lawyers are comedians 
 


























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




7. None of the librarians are skaters 
Some of the sculptors are librarians 
 


























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




8. All of the vegetarians are gardeners 
None of the gardeners are weavers 
 
























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




9. Some of the poets are not prizewinners 
All of the hikers are prizewinners 
 

























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




10. All of the zookeepers are surfers 
Some of the zookeepers are not homeowners 
 


























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




11. All of the wine drinkers are biologists 
Some of the potters are not biologists 
 


























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




12. None of the rock climbers are pilots 
Some of the rock climbers are clubbers 
 

























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 






Appendix 9: Post-training workbook (Spatial) 
 
You are taking part in an investigation about how people use information in order to 
draw conclusions. You will be solving a series of syllogistic reasoning problems. A 
syllogistic problem consists of two premises (statements), for example: 
 
Some B are A 
All B are C 
 
Your task is to write down the conclusion (if any) which follows logically from these. 
A logical conclusion is a conclusion which must be true, if the premises are true. In 
this example, notice that the B appears twice, once in each premise, and the A and C 
are non-repeated terms. You are to draw a conclusion about these non-repeated terms. 
The conclusion must be in one of the following forms, where the question mark stands 
for a non-repeated term in the problem. 
 
All ? are ? 
No ? are ? 
Some ? are ? 
Some ? are not ? 
None ? are ? 
 
For example, Some teachers are tap dancers 
All teachers are bookworms 
 
Conclusion: Some of the bookworms are tap dancers, or  
 Some of the tap dancers are bookworms 
 
As we are trying to find out how people solve these problems, it is vital that you ‘think 
aloud’ while you are working out your answers. Please speak out loud while solving 
each problem to explain to the experimenter how you reached your conclusion. There 
should not be any silent periods on the tape. We also need a written record of your 
work. Therefore it is also vital that you use the pen and the space below the statements 
to show any working out that you use to help you solve the problems. Feel free to 
write or draw anything that helps you. When you have reached your conclusion, 
simply state that conclusion clearly in writing. You will be timed with a stopwatch. 
You will have 2 minutes for each problem. Do not refer to previous problems once 




1. Some of the doctors are not singers 
All of the doctors are intellectual 
 




























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




2. None of the chess players are bookbinders 
Some of the bookbinders are dancers 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




3. All of the secretaries are football fans 
Some of the secretaries are soccer players 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




4. Some of the bankers are Buddhists 
None of the Buddhists are jugglers 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




5. Some of the vegetarians are teachers 
All of the vegetarians are stamp collectors 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




6. All of the lawyers are athletes 
All of the lawyers are comedians 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




7. None of the librarians are skaters 
Some of the sculptors are librarians 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




8. All of the vegetarians are gardeners 
None of the gardeners are weavers 
 




























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




9. Some of the poets are not prizewinners 
All of the hikers are prizewinners 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




10. All of the zookeepers are surfers 
Some of the zookeepers are not homeowners 
 




























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




11. All of the wine drinkers are biologists 
Some of the potters are not biologists 
 




























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 




12. None of the rock climbers are pilots 
Some of the rock climbers are clubbers 
 





























Please write your answer here using one of the following formats: 
 
All:     Are:                                                         
 
No:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are: 
 
Some:     Are not: 
 
No:     Are:  
 
 
 
 
